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Cybersecurity is one of the key issues facing the world today. With an ever-increasing number of 
devices connected across the internet, the need to secure all these different devices against potential 
attackers is an endless effort. This thesis is focussed on the most promising new developments in the 
hardware aspect of this battle for security. The first section of the thesis looks at what is the current 
state of the art when it comes to hardware security primitives, with a focus on random number 
generators and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF). The strengths and weakness of the current 
implementations of these systems are analysed so that the areas which are most in need of 
improvement can be highlighted.  
The second major section of this thesis is looking to improve how random numbers are generated, 
which is essential for many current security systems. True random number generators have been 
presented as a potential solution to this problem but improvements in output bit rate, power 
consumption, and design complexity must be made. In this work we present a novel and 
experimentally verified true random number generator that exclusively uses conventional CMOS 
technology as well as offering key improvements over previous designs in complexity, output bit rate, 
and power consumption. It uses the inherent randomness of telegraph noise in the channel current 
of a single CMOS transistor as an entropy source. For the first time, multi-level and abnormal telegraph 
noise can be utilised, which greatly reduces device selectivity and offers much greater bit rates. The 
design is verified using a breadboard and FPGA proof of concept circuit and passes all 15 of the NIST 
randomness tests without any need for post-processing of the generated bitstream. The design also 
shows resilience against machine learning attacks performed by an LSTM neural network.        
The third major section describes the development of a novel PUF concept, which offers a new 
approach to authentication, allowing low power devices to be included in existing networks without 
compromising overall security. The new PUF concept introduces time dependence to vastly increase 




the efficiency of entropy source usage, when compared with a traditional PUF. This new PUF also 
introduces a probability-based model which greatly reduces the required server memory for Challenge 
Response Pair (CRP) storage when large numbers of CRPs are used. The concept is verified 
experimentally on nano-scale CMOS technology as well as through simulation and a proof-of-concept 
circuit. These combined benefits bring the PUF concept much closer to being a viable solution for 
widespread cybersecurity applications. 
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Chapter 1 -   Motivation of the project 
Cybersecurity is a huge and growing industry with cyberattacks being listed as a tier 1 threat to the UK 
in the government’s 2011-2016 and 2016-2021 “Cyber Security Strategy Reports” [1], [2]. The Internet 
of Things (IoT) is a new and rapidly growing market. It is expected to reach a value of $28.9 Billion by 
2020 [3] and cybersecurity is one of the key parts that must be improved in order to unlock the 
potential of the IoT [4], [5]. At the heart of many modern cybersecurity systems is the random number 
generator [6]. The random number generator is the root for the current cryptographic systems such 
as encryption, authentication, Secure session links, car keys, and much more, but it is an area which is 
facing a huge problem [7].  
Currently, the vast majority of security systems use pseudo-random number generators (PRNG). 
PRNGs use mathematical algorithms to create pseudo-random number streams and are incapable of 
creating truly random sequences [8]. As modern computers are becoming faster and more powerful, 
we are starting to see instances where PRNGs have been cracked or exploited for malicious activity. 
As this trend continues and becomes worse, we are facing the potential collapse of many of our cyber-
security systems [5], [9]–[12]. To try and solve this problem new methodologies for creating random 
numbers have been explored. A leading new methodology is the use of “true random number 
generators” (TRNGs). TRNGs use an inherently random real-world phenomenon as the seed for the 
random number generation. Because the real-world source is not derived from mathematics, it cannot 
be predicted mathematically, no matter how much previous information an attacker has on it. They 
are naturally resistive to the cyber-attacks we are starting to see [13]. Despite the clear advantages of 
using TRNGs for cybersecurity purposes, TRNGs have not yet gained a major role within the industry. 
The primary reasons for this are deficiencies with one or more of the following in current designs: 
reliability, output bit rate, efficiency, power consumption, vulnerability to attack, or design footprint 




[13]–[17]. The first aim of this project is to create a TRNG that can eliminate or improve upon these 
factors and meet the need of cyber-security systems, with a strong emphasis on application into IoT 
devices. 
Another key task for current cybersecurity systems is authentication. Authentication is the process of 
verifying the identity of each entity in communication. Classical examples are the use of a password, 
pin number, or security questions. It has been known for many years that these classic authentication 
methods are not fully secure [18]–[23] and can be exploited by attackers [24]. Efforts have been made, 
but no solution has presented itself as the clear answer to all the problems. Biometrics offer some 
improvements for the security but still have limitations, such as recoverability if someone’s biometric 
data is stolen, usability for people with disabilities that prevent them from using certain biometrics, 
limited entropy of biometric data making it cloneable, or inapplicability in cases such as IoT sensor 
nodes.  
Physically/Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a possible solution to the 
weaknesses of current authentication systems. PUFs make use of the unique physical properties of a 
system embedded within them to create a unique set of responses to a given challenge input from 
the authenticating server. This unique set of challenge-response pairs are stored on the authentication 
server. When authentication with an external party is requested, the challenge is issued. If the party 
requesting authentication can reply with the correct response, authentication is successful. PUFs are 
particularly attractive for use within the IoT as they can potentially be much more efficient in terms of 
power and design footprint, when compared with traditional authentication methods [25], [26]. 
Despite the advantages of PUFs they are not yet widely used in real-world applications, because of 
key deficiencies in areas such as, reliability, clonability, key distribution, power consumption, design 
complexity, or design footprint [26]–[31]. The second aim of this project is to overcome or improve 




upon as many of these deficiencies as possible by developing a new PUF design and protocol tailored 
for use within the IoT.  
 




Chapter 2 -  Literature Review 
In this chapter, the literature of the previously proposed designs for both TRNGs and PUFs is reviewed 
to outline the key concepts behind their operation as well as what level of performance they can 
achieve. Section 2.1 covers how the performance of TRNGs is accessed in terms of the randomness of 
the output.  Section 2.2 focussed on the existing designs and what they can achieve. In section 2.3, 
attention will be paid to the various types of attacks being used against TRNGs and the protection 
methods against these attacks. Section 2.4 consists of an overview and analysis of the existing PUF 
designs, focussing on the most prolific type of PUF design, their working principles, as well as their 
drawbacks. The final section 2.5 covers the basic information of random telegraph noise (RTN) which 
will be used as the entropy source for both the TRNG and PUF developed in this project. 
 True Random Number Generators  
2.1.1 Verification of Randomness 
The first important concept to understand when analysing TRNGs is that of entropy. For TRNGs the 
type of entropy one is interested in is the Shannon entropy which gives the average rate at which 
information is created by a stochastic data source. TRNGs typically generate one bit at a time giving 
us two possible outputs, either ‘0’ or ‘1’. Utilising equation 1, where ‘n’ is the number of possible 
outcomes, it can be calculated that the maximum entropy possible (k) to get from each output bit of 
a TRNG is equal to 1.  
𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑛) = 𝑘      (1) 




If several bits are generated, one can calculate the information entropy of the TRNG using equation 2, 
where ‘H(X)’ is the information entropy of the system, ‘p’ is the probability of one of the two possible 
results and ‘q’ is the probability of the other.   
𝐻(𝑋) =  −(𝑝 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑝)) − (𝑞 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑞))    (2) 
Further exploring equation 2, one can see that if the probability of each outcome is equal the entropy 
is equal to the maximum possible value of ’1’ meaning there is no bias towards one result in the 
output. Conversely, if the probability of one of the outputs is certain (probability = 1) then the entropy 
calculated will be ‘0’ meaning the system is completely biased to one result and no randomness is 
produced.   
For TRNGs to work and be used in the real world, it is essential to prove that the random numbers 
that it creates are truly random. Truly random processes, by definition, do not have memory, making 
it impossible for past outcomes to affect future outcomes. In this way, the true random number is 
impossible to predict, giving a system the highest security level. However, it is difficult to test if a 
number sequence is truly random. Several tools have been suggested for the test. The most widely 
used tests are discussed in this section.   
Although the information entropy can give us a good quick impression of the randomness of a TRNG, 
it is not enough by itself to show that the output is truly random as it simply shows the probability of 
each result. For example, the information entropy of a TRNG that produces a bitstream of ‘1’ then ‘0’ 
repeatedly will have an entropy of ‘1’, but it is obviously not random as anyone can predict the next 
result with certainty. As a result of this several different test suits have been developed that can 
mathematically analyse a given bitstream to identify not just the entropy but also if there are any 
predictable patterns or other non-random events.  




The first set of tests discussed in this section is the DIEHARD battery (of tests) [32], which was 
developed in 1995 by George Marsaglia. It consists of 12 different tests for randomness that must be 
passed for the output to be verified as random. These tests are birthday spacings, overlapping 
permutations, rank of matrices, monkey tests, count the 1s, parking lot test, min distance test, random 
spheres test, the squeeze test, overlapping sums test, runs test, and the craps test. The DIEHARD 
battery was used to verify many of the early TRNG designs but has now been replaced by the NIST test 
suite, which is to be discussed in the following section.  
The second suite of randomness tests is the NIST test suite [33]. It was developed by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology in 2010 and has now become the de-facto standard test suite 
to test random number generators and has been verified independently in works such as Sadique’s 
2012 review [34]. The NIST test suite is based on null hypothesis theory, where the null hypothesis is 
that the sequence is random. The tests are designed to predict the probability that this hypothesis is 
correct or not. Generally, the tests should be selected to approve the hypothesis if the tested 
sequences have less than 0.01% of disagreeing with it. The NIST suite consists of 15 tests: monobit 
frequency test, block frequency test, runs test, longest run of 1s in a block test, matrix rank test, 
discrete Fourier transform test, non-overlapping template test, overlapping template test, Maurer’s 
universal statistical test, linear complexity test, serial test, approximate entropy test, cumulative sums 
test, random excursions test, and the random excursions variant test. The test suite is made to run on 
Linux systems and will be used to verify any random number generators developed in this project.  
More recently, machine learning has also become a key part of both attacking and testing TRNGs [16], 
[33], [35]–[40]. Machine learning offers a new way of trying to identify patterns and non-random 
elements within a bitstream that would previously have been missed by conventional testing. The idea 
of using machine learning is to provide the machine learning algorithm with a series of previously 




generated bits and allow it to try and predict future generated bits. A common machine learning 
algorithm to use is a long short-term  memory (LSTM) algorithm such as the one used in [38]. When 
looking at the results from machine learning testing, the ideal result is a 50% prediction rate as this is 
what one would expect when the result is a pure guess between two equally probably outcomes. Any 
deviation from 50% shows the machine learning was able to find some part of the bitstream that was 
not random and able to predict it.             
2.1.2 Existing TRNG Designs  
This section reviews the existing TRNG designs. A solid understanding of the existing designs is 
essential for this project both as a guide for further development of the design and as a benchmark 
for the performance that any new design must achieve in order to be commercially competitive. The 
most important designs for each type of TRNG are covered in detail and then other less notable 
designs are summarised in Table 1.  
One of the earliest and most influential TRNG designs was by Intel in 1999 [7]. The block diagram is 
shown in Figure 1. This Intel design makes use of Johnson thermal noise across a resistor as the source 
of randomness. It is then amplified and used to control the frequency of a voltage-controlled oscillator. 
The rising edge of the voltage-controlled oscillator is used to trigger sampling of another much faster 
frequency oscillator. The current state of the high frequency oscillator determines whether the TRNG 
output is ‘0’ or ‘1’. To increase the entropy of the output bits and avoid chains of 0s or 1s, a Von 
Neumann post-processing circuit is used. Von Neumann post-processing is a technique which 
improves the entropy of the output bitstream in many earlier TRNG designs. Its basic principle is 
shown in Figure 2. Essentially, the Von Neumann technique eliminates long chains of ‘0’ or ‘1’ from 
the output bitstream as it only gives an output when there is a transition from one to the other. 
Although this allows the TRNG to have higher output entropy, it does come at the cost of efficiency. 




Von Neumann processing has a high overhead in terms of design complexity, design footprint, and bit 
efficiency in terms of generated bits to final output bits. The inefficiencies of Von Neumann processing 
make most modern designs avoid it. The output bits were tested with the DIEHARD tests and shown 
to be random. No information on the bit rate, design area, or power consumption were given.    
 
Figure 1, Block Diagram of Intel 1999 RNG[7]. 
 
Figure 2, Vonn Neumann Corrector Operation[7]. 
Metastability is a phenomenon that is frequently used for TRNG designs. One of the first influential 
designs is the 2008 Holleman et al. design [41]. As shown in Figure 3, the metastability is harvested 
from a pair of cross coupled latches. This design works by having two evenly matched latches triggered 
by the same clock signal. Depending on the current state of the noise source, either the left latch or 
the right latch will settle at ‘high’ and the other at ‘low’. This circuit can be reset and triggered again 
at a fast rate in order to get a random bitstream. The main difficulty with this type of design is the 




balancing of the left and right latches so that the chance of a ‘0’ or ‘1’ output is 50%.   The Holleman 
design uses a combination of circuits to remove correlated events from the noise source itself, 
including DC nulling on the latches to compensate for device mismatch and a post-processor based on 
non-linear feedback registers to remove any bias form the final bitstream. The Holleman design can 
achieve a bit rate of 50Kbit/s with a power consumption of 180uW and a design area of 1.49mm2. The 
output randomness is verified by the NIST tests.  
 
Figure 3, Cross coupled latch circuit used for metastability based TRNGs such as the 2008 Holleman design [41]. 
One of the most powerful existing TRNG designs is the 2012 Sanu et al. design developed at Intel [42]. 
This design is also based upon the metastability of cross coupled inverters. Figure 4 shows the random 
source circuit for this design. To harvest the randomness in this circuit, the Sanu design waits for the 
metastability to be resolved and then checks to see if the outputs ‘a’ and ‘b’ are ‘0’ and ‘1’ or ‘1’ and 
‘0’ respectively. The key innovation is the tuning circuits that are used. As shown in Fig. 5, the Sanu 
design has 3 different tuning circuits, one for ‘coarse’ tuning, one for ‘fine’ tuning, and a self-calibrating 
feedback loop to select the tuning values. The coarse tuning is achieved through an array of selectable 
resistors on each side of the inverter that can be used to change the balance and account for device 
mismatch. The fine tuning is achieved through delay units before the input for each side of the inverter 
that can be adjusted to account for any small changes in environmental conditions. Both tuning 




systems are controlled by the feedback loop which extracts the probability of a ‘0’ or a ‘1’ output in a 
sample of bits and adjusting the tuning circuits to achieve a 50% probability of each. The output bits 
are tested and verified by the NIST statistical tests. All of this combines to create a TRNG with an 
output bit rate of 2.4Gb/s which is by far the fastest generation rate achieved by any design. However, 
at this generation rate the power consumption is 7mW and the design area is 4004um2, making it 
power hungry, large, and not suitable for low power compact applications such as IoT edge devices.   
 
Figure 4, Random source circuit for 2012 Sanu TRNG [42]. 
The next key type of TRNG design is based on time-dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB), first 
proposed by Liu et al. in 2011 [43]. Its block diagram and basic principles are shown in Figure 5. In this 
design the TDDB in an array of MOS capacitors is used. TDDB is a process where, after some stress 
time being applied to an MOS device, the oxide will break down and allow a current to flow through 
it. A counter is left running until a breakdown is detected. When a breakdown is detected the counter 




is stopped and will contain a number which is represented by the ‘Q’ output of each ‘count’ element 
in Figure 5. ‘N’ number of the most significant bits are then removed, because they are the least likely 
to change over multiple measurements. The remaining bits stored in the counter become the output 
of the TRNG. The number of most significant bits which are removed for each measurement (N) is a 
variable which can be adjusted. The effect of ‘N’ on the output bitstream’s ability to pass the NIST 
tests is shown in Figure 6. Each capacitor is estimated to be able to be tested ~5 billion times until the 
breakdown becomes permanent. This means that with the current array size, the TRNG will run out of 
devices after ~3-10 years. A major benefit of this design is that it requires no post-processing circuits 
to pass all the NIST tests. This design can generate random bits at 11kbits/s with a power consumption 
of 2mW and a design area of 0.0012mm2. This makes the design smaller than most comparable designs 
but also slower and more power hungry.   
 
Figure 5, System diagram of 2011 Liu TDDB TRNG design [43]. 





Figure 6, Effect of number of removed bits (N) on the pass rate of generated bitstreams when tested with the NIST test suite 
[43]. 
 
Oscillator jitter is another phenomenon that is frequently used in TRNGs to generate random bits. The 
2014 design by Yang et al. is one of the most prominent designs based on oscillator jitter. As shown in 
Figure 7, it uses a ring oscillator that is modified with 3 input edges. These 3 edges propagate around 
the ring oscillator and each edge captures timing jitter, shifting the phase difference between the 
edges until two edges converge and the edge collapses. It is this time until collapse that is harvested 
to extract a random bit stream from the timing jitter. A second ring oscillator is used under normal 
operation to act as a reference so that a phase detector can capture the edge collapse event. Once a 
collapse is detected the number stored in the counter is extracted to give the random bits. The random 
bits generated by this design were verified by the NIST test suite. This design can achieve a bit rate of 
23Mbits/s with a design area of 375um2 and a power consumption of 0.54mW. This makes it faster 
and smaller than most comparable designs, although they only state “TRNG Core Area” which could 
be misleading. It also consumes lower power than other comparable designs, apart from the Random 
Telegraph Noise based TRNGs.   





Figure 7, Block diagram of the 2014 Yang Oscillator Jitter based TRNG [44]. 
An emerging type of TRNG uses new memristor technology. The designs by Rai et al. [17] and Hao et 
al. [45] are two examples of this. Both designs make use of the static and dynamic stochastic behaviour 
of the time it takes to set and reset memristors to generate a random bitstream. The basic schematic 
of a memristor-based TRNG is shown in Figure 8. The working principle of the memristor-based design 
is that a write voltage is sent to a memristor and the time taken for the memristor to set is where the 
entropy is extracted from, as outlined in Figure 9. For Rai’s work the time taken for the memristor to 
set itself is measured by an oscillator-controlled counter which is shown in Figure 8. When the 
memristor is set, the voltage across it exceeds the reference voltage and a comparator is used to signal 
the oscillator-controlled counter to stop counting. The value recorded within the counter is then used 
as the random numbers. There are still some issues with the current memristor designs. The first is 
the control, the reference voltage that is used to determine when the memristor is at the set voltage. 
The voltage used as reference must be set very accurately which increases design complexity as well 
as the fact that exact voltage required varies by devices so it must be adjustable. The second major 
issue is reliability of memristor devices. Currently memristor technology is not mature and the number 
of read and writes that each device can perform without breakdown is not enough for widespread use 
[46], [47]. The immaturity of memristor technology is also an issue in terms of availability and cost, as 
novel technology is much less attractive for low cost, high volume applications when compared with 




conventional CMOS technology. The final issue for the memristor designs is that neither of these two 
examples can pass the NIST statistical tests for randomness with the recommended level of 
significance (α) of 0.01 [33]. Due to the failure to pass the NIST tests with the recommended settings, 
these TRNGs are not suitable for real world implementation until further work is done.  
 
Figure 8, Basic circuit schematic of a memristor based TRNG [45]. 
 
Figure 9, Operating principle of memristor based TRNGs [45]. 




An early TRNG design, and also a very important one for this work as it is based on the same Random 
Telegraph Noise (RTN) phenomenon that our design is based upon, is the 2006 Brederlow et al. design 
[48]. The Brederlow et al. design is the first to propose the use of RTN as a source for randomness, 
Figure 10 shows the block diagram for the design. The 2006 Brederlow et al. design amplifies the RTN 
signal (solid black signal in Figure 11) from a single transistor and then samples this RTN signal based 
on the timing of rising edges of a sampling clock (dashed black line in Figure 11) in order to obtain the 
random number (random numbers in Figure 11). This design also uses a Von Neumann correction 
post- processing circuit. This design is verified using the NIST randomness tests. One drawback of this 
design is that an RTN signal of the required speed and amplitude is very rare. Because of this, a very 
large transistor array (up to several million devices) is used so that a device with the required 
properties can be found. Another drawback is that it cannot extract entropy from multi-level RTN 
signals which have greater than 2 current levels. This design can produce random numbers in the order 
of ~200kbits/s with a power consumption of 50uW and a design area of 9000um2. It is not fast 
compared with other designs of a comparable size, but it has low power thanks to the single transistor 
nature of the RTN signal.  
 
Figure 10, Block diagram of 2006 Brederlow TRNG design[48]. 





Figure 11, Amplified RTN, sampling clock signal, and example number outputs for Brederlow TRNG [48]. 
In 2017 another RTN based TRNG was proposed by Abinash Mohanty et al. [37]. It harvests the RTN 
as a random source in much the same way as that proposed by Brederlow [48]. However, it offers two 
key improvements over Brederlow’s original design. The first one is in the post-processing technique 
that avoids the need for a complex Von Neumann post-processor. The new post-processing technique 
is outlined in Figure 12. The figure shows that the output signal is simply toggled every time a rising 
edge is detected in the amplified and digitised RTN signal. This makes use of the fact that the average 
time between two rising edges is constant so the ideal 50% of a final ‘1’ or ‘0’ is achieved without any 
complex post-processing circuits [17]. 
 
Figure 12, New post-processing method proposed by Mohanty [37]. 




The new post-processing method simplifies the TRNG system, making it viable for low power 
applications. It, however, does introduce some new issues. With traditional Von Neumann post- 
processing, long chains of ‘0’ or ‘1’ caused by oversampling of the RTN source were eliminated from 
the output bitstream. Without it, the sampling clock must be closely matched with the RTN signal to 
avoid oversampling. This oversampling issue adds design complexity as a frequency tuning system 
must be implemented. It also makes the design susceptible to failure if an unstable or abnormal RTN 
is present, which makes the time at the high and low states of the amplified RTN signal diverge from 
the typical distribution. 
The second key innovation that Mohanty’s paper introduces is a thresholding technique that allows 
the TRNG to extract entropy from sources that exhibit multi-level RTN. The basic principles of this 
thresholding technique are shown in Figure 13. The idea is to select a threshold just above the 
minimum value that the RTN signal will reach and state that anything below this value will be counted 
as ‘0’ and anything above it will be counted as ‘1’. This allows multi-level RTN to be used. It means, 
however, that the entropy of all traps apart from the slowest one is ignored. As only the entropy from 
the slowest traps is extracted, this design suffers from slow operational speeds of only around 3 bits 
per second.      





Figure 13, Thresholding technique for multi-level RTN entropy sources as proposed by Mohanty [37]. 
Finally, for clarity, the key TRNGs designed in the last few years are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1, Key points of TRNG designs 
Authors  Type of 
random source 
Generation rate  Design area Power 
consumption 
Verification 




2.5 Mbit/s N/A N/A N/A 
Tokunaga et 
al. 2008 [50] 
Metastability 
of inverters 
200 kbit/s 0.036mm2 1mW Passes NIST 
at 20%-bit 
efficiency 




N/A N/A N/A Passes NIST 




162.5 Mbit/s 1088um2 1.5mW Passes NIST 
Figliolia et al. 








al. 2016 [54] 
Metastability 
of inverters 
1/0.16 Mbit/s 271 slices/199 
cells 
90mW Passes NIST 
Gimenez et 
al. 2017 [55] 
Ring Oscillator 
Jitter 
N/A N/A N/A FIPS 140-1 
passed 




9.9 Mbit/s 920um2 0.418mW Passes NIST 
with < 4-bit 
Threshold for Digitisation  






Kim 2017 et 
al. [40] 
RTN in ReRAM N/A N/A N/A Passes NIST 
Matsumoto 




0.3 Mbit/s 1200um2 N/A Passes FIPS 
140-2 




40 Mbit/s 0.52mm2 30mW Passes NIST 





N/A N/A N/A Passes 
DIEHARD 
Brederlow et 




200 kbits/s 0.009mm2 50uW Passes NIST 
Holleman et 
al. 2008 [41] 
Metastability 
of inverters 
50kbits/s 1.49mm2 180uW Passes NIST 






110 kbits/s 0.0012mm2 2mW Passes NIST 
Soucarros et 
al. 2013 [59] 
Ring Oscillator 
Jitter 
N/A N/A N/A Passes NIST 




23 Mbits/s 0.000375mm2 0.54mW Passes NIST 





0.25-5 Mbits/s N/A N/A Passes NIST 




0.006mm2 N/A N/A Passes NIST 
with reduced 
α value  




100 Mbits/s N/A N/A Passes NIST 
Mohanty et 




3 bits/s N/A  N/A Passes NIST 




N/A N/A N/A Fails NIST 




86 Mbits/s 0.01mm2 523uW Passes NIST 




66 Mbits/s 0.00018mm2 N/A Passes NIST 






~100Mbits/s N/A N/A Passes NIST 
with reduced 
α 




2.1.3 Attacks on TRNGs 
Attacks on TRNGs can be split into two main categories, invasive and non-invasive. Non-invasive 
attacks use an external influence such as temperature, voltage supply, or strong magnetic fields to 
affect the randomness of the TRNG. Invasive attacks are where the circuit of the TRNG is directly 
tampered with, such as the destruction of transistors with lasers or tapping of new connections to the 
system [49]. The effect of attacks can also be put into two main categories, degraded performance, 
and compromised distribution of events.      
Gimenez et al.’s 2017 paper [55] covers several types of attack, some are exclusive to ring oscillator 
based TRNGs and some are for all TRNG designs. Figure 14 shows a block diagram of the most 
prevalent types of attack on TRNGs. The first type of attack covered is applicable to all TRNG designs 
and it is known as overclocking. In overclocking the time period of the clock is reduced in order to 
introduce timing violations into the system, which allows the attacker to manipulate the output bits. 
The best proposed solution to this type of attack is to use an internal clock signal for control of the 
circuit which makes it harder for attackers to gain any access to the clock system. The second type of 
attack covered is oversampling, where an attacker changes the ratio between the sampling circuit 
frequency and the system clock frequency. This results in a reduction of the entropy of the output 
bits. Again, the best way to solve this problem is to use internal signals for sampling and clocking. Fault 
injection attacks are also covered by Gimenez in his paper, which are specific to ring oscillator designs. 
The examples are forcing the oscillator into the incorrect mode of operation, such as burst-mode, 
phase covering mode, or bottleneck mode. When the oscillator is in an incorrect operation mode, the 
correct behaviour of the TRNG can no longer be guaranteed. Gimenez’s paper also outlined two 
methods on how these incorrect operation modes can be caused. The first of these is the 
token/bubble injection attack where the number of events propagating around the oscillator is 
modified which can force the oscillator into one of the previously mentioned incorrect modes and 




therefore remove the output randomness. The second method is called delay modification and is 
achieved through creating an artificial delay in some nodes of the oscillator which can cause the 
system to enter bottleneck mode. The paper recommends using a prime number of nodes in the 
oscillator as well as an event counter and continuous output monitoring in order to prevent these 
attacks. This recommendation is supported by the fact that both the FIPS and AIS31 standards require 
the output bits to be monitored and evaluated continuously anyway.  
 
Figure 14, Common Attack Types on TRNGs[55]. 
Kim et al.’s 2017 paper [56] has a strong focus on power-injection attacks on ring oscillator based 
TRNGs. Power-injection attacks consist of applying an AC signal on to the power supply to the TRNG. 
The aim is for the applied AC signal to mask the random noise that is being used as a source and 
replace it with a deterministic signal. If the source for the TRNG becomes deterministic then the output 
will also be deterministic and the TRNG has failed. Kim et al.’s design makes use of additional feedback 
resistors in order to remove any bias in the system which makes it more robust against power-
injection.  The results, however, show the attack can still cause the TRNG to fail when the AC signal is 
at the correct frequency.      




 Physically/Physical Unclonable Functions  
There are multiple types of PUF, and they are not limited to solely electronics-based designs. Even the 
name itself has inconsistency as the first design that could be described as a PUF was coined a Physical 
One-Way Function in the work by Pappu et al.[64]. Soon after that the term Physical random function 
was coined by Gassend et al.[65], which is then updated to Physical Unclonable Function to avoid 
having the same acronym as the Pseudo-Random Functions. Since then, others have used the term 
Physically Unclonable Function to describe designs that fit the same concept. To avoid confusion in 
this work, all designs that fit the same concept will be described under the common label of a PUF. 
The most basic principle of a PUF that all designs have in common is that they are a system that utilises 
some physical parameter of itself to generate a set of challenge and response pairs (CRPs). In this CRP 
system, a challenge can be issued to the PUF by an external entity, then the PUF will itself generate a 
unique response to that specific challenge that can be used to identify that individual PUF. Outside of 
this basic principle the variation between PUF designs can be significant. In the next section we will 
identify common characteristics and features of PUFs that have previously been developed and use 
this to focus on the specific sub-classes of PUF that we are interested in for this project.     
To help with evaluation of PUF designs Maes et al [64] proposed a list of key properties that are 
desirable for PUF designs to possess and make comparison between different PUF designs more 
structured and easily digestible. The strictness of these parameters is dependent upon the limitations 
of the intended application of a PUF. The parameters are as follows: 
Constructability – For useful PUF designs, they must be constructible. This means that it must be 
physically possible to manufacture it. It is desirable for a design to be more constructible which means 
easier to manufacture. It is important to note, however, that this means it should be easy to construct 




an example of the given PUF design with undefined CRPs and not that it should be easy to make a PUF 
with a defined set of CRPs.  
Evaluability – For useful PUF designs, it must be possible to evaluate the responses it gives so that the 
CRP can be verified. Generally, the easier the evaluation of responses, the better the PUF design is. In 
practice a PUF can be considered to have good evaluability if the response can be evaluated within 
the given restrictions of the application that a PUF is used for.      
Reproducibility - This refers to the ability of an individual PUF to reproduce a consistent response to 
the same challenge, regardless of external influencing factors. Reproducibility is hugely important for 
PUF designs as the response to a given challenge must match what is stored in the CRP or the 
verification of the PUF will fail. Reproducibility is generally quantified by the Intra hamming distance 
of the PUF, which will be covered in more detail later in this section.  
Uniqueness – This refers to the uniqueness of PUFs that are made of the same design. This uniqueness 
is a result of the physical stochastic property that is utilised to generate the CRP pairs of each PUF. 
Each PUF should have a set of CRPs that are different to every other PUF, making it unique. This is 
typically quantified by the Inter hamming distance between different PUFs of the same design, which 
is covered in greater detail later in this section.  
Identifiability – If a PUF has both reproducibility and uniqueness then it is considered to have good 
identifiability. Identifiability can be expressed as the distance between the Intra and Inter hamming 
distances of a PUF design. The greater the distance between these parameters the better the 
identifiability of the PUF. The practical implications of a PUF with good identifiability is a PUF design 
where each individual PUF can consistently generate responses to a given challenge that match the 
originally generated CRPs while different PUFs of the same design have completely different CRP pairs.  




Physical Unclonability – For a PUF it is desirable that it cannot be copied to create another identical 
PUF with the same set of CRPs, this is called Unclonability. Physical clonability refers to a potential 
attacker creating a physical copy of the PUF, as opposed to a mathematical model. Ideally, a PUF 
should be so physically unclonable that even the original manufacturer could not create an identical 
copy of a PUF. This means that not even the manufacturer needs to be a trusted party, further 
increasing the security of the PUF. Combining unclonability with constructability makes it easy to 
create a PUF with random CRPs, but hard to create a PUF with specific CRPs.    
Unpredictability – It is essential for a PUF to be unpredictable. Specifically, for PUFs, this means that 
there should be no correlation between different responses that would allow a potential attacker to 
guess future responses, having gathered a subset of previous responses. This is true for both multiple 
challenges and responses to a single PUF and across multiple different PUFs of the same design. Inter 
hamming distance can also be used to interpret the unpredictability of a PUF but rather than just 
looking at the distance between one CRP across multiple PUF instances, as was done for measuring 
uniqueness, the inter hamming distance here includes the distance between different CRPs on each 
individual PUF. Ideally, each CRP is completely independent of any other. However, this is generally 
not possible for every PUF. For PUFs where the independence of each CRP is not provable, the best 
practice is to prove that it cannot be predicted by the best-known type of attack. In this case the 
unpredictability of the PUF can be expressed in terms of how accurately the attacker could predict the 
future CRPs of the PUF. The specific types of attack used to predict PUF outputs will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this section.       
Mathematical Unclonability – Mathematical Unclonability differs from physical Unclonability. For 
mathematical Unclonability, one assumes that the attacker has total access the PUF system and can 
gather as many CRPs as they like or even gain some insight into the entropy source. With this extended 




access the attacker can build a mathematical model of the whole PUF or create a table of all possible 
CRPs. For a PUF to be mathematically unclonable, this must be unfeasibly difficult to do through either 
having an unmanageably large number of CRPs or having an entropy source too complicated to be 
modelled. Hence, mathematical Unclonability is an extension to unpredictability where the attacker 
has total access to the PUF. If a PUF is mathematically unclonable, it must be unpredictable.    
True Unclonability – Unclonability has been discussed so far from two different perspectives. Physical 
Unclonability refers to an attacker’s ability to create a physical copy of the PUF that has the same set 
of CRPs and mathematical Unclonability refers to an attacker’s ability to predict future CRPs by either 
modelling the source or building a table of all possible CRPs. For a PUF to be truly unclonable it must 
fit both definitions of Unclonability simultaneously.    
One-Wayness – One Wayness for PUFs is similar to the original definition given for physical one-way 
functions proposed by Pappu [64]. This definition states that there should be no efficient way to find 
a challenge that will give a specified response. This is very close to the classical definition of a 
cryptographic one-way function. For PUFs, however, an extra consideration must be made. Classically, 
the definition only refers to the difficulty of inverting a single specified response to find the 
corresponding challenge. For PUFs this can be extended to include the total number of possible CRPs. 
The larger this number is, the more responses a potential attacker would have to invert to have a 
statistically significant chance of knowing enough possible CRPs to have pre-calculated a CRP that will 
be used for identification.     
Tamper Evidence – As PUFs are used as a security device, there is always an increased chance that 
someone may attempt to tamper with them, to modify its operation in an unauthorised or harmful 
manner. Direct tampering is used to attempt to compromise security systems, this may be bypassing 
protection circuits or extracting important information about the internal workings of the system that 




could be used to compromise security. With this in mind, it is important that a security critical system, 
such as a PUF, should have some kind of mitigation of these risks. This usually involves the detection 
of such tampering and then performing an appropriate response to reduce security risks. In order to 
detect tampering, the system must have tamper evidence. Having temper evidence means that any 
tampering will have an unavoidable and detectable change on the system. For PUFs an example of 
tamper evidence would be a significant change in the challenge-response behaviour generated if any 
tampering has occurred. In the ideal case, a PUF would change its challenge-response behaviour so 
much from tampering that it would become undiscernible from being completely replaced with a 
different PUF instance. A PUF with this level of tamper evidence will have a natural protection from 
malicious tampering as the change in challenge and response behaviour would make the CRPs stored 
by the authenticating party no longer match those generated by the PUF, thereby locking it out of the 
system.     
Maiti et al. [66] introduces a further two key concepts that will be used in this work to evaluate the 
performance of a PUF. The first of these concepts is that of uniformity. Maiti et al. define uniformity 
as an estimate of the proportion of ‘0’ to ‘1’ responses from the response bits of a PUF. If a PUF shows 
ideal uniformity, then the proportion of ‘0’ responses to ‘1’ responses should be 50% as this shows 
there is no bias in the responses to one result or the other.  To calculate uniformity the Hamming 
Weight (HW) of an n-bit identifier response is calculated. The second metric proposed by Maiti et al. 
that will be used in this work is that of bit-aliasing. Bit-aliasing refers to the likelihood of different PUF 
units producing nearly identical responses. To estimate bit-aliasing Maiti et al. proposes using the 
Hamming Weight of the l-th bit of the response across a number(k) of PUF devices. The ideal value for 
the HW across response bits for bit-aliasing is again 50% as this indicates that there is no correlation 
between PUFs that could cause near identical responses to be generated.         




2.2.1 Intra Hamming Distance  
The hamming distance used for PUF evaluation refers to the proportion of bits that are different 
between two responses. In this work fractional hamming distance will be used when referring to 
hamming distance. For example, in two responses that are each 10 bits long, 8 bits are the same across 
the two responses and two are different then the fractional hamming distance would be 0.2. As 
reproducibility is a key characteristic for PUFs it is important to find a clear way to evaluate this 
parameter. The most common way of doing this is by evaluating the hamming distance between 
multiple responses given by a specific PUF instance to a given challenge. This is referred to as the intra 
hamming distance. For a PUF instance with perfect reproducibility we would expect the response to a 
given challenge to be the same every time which would result in an intra hamming distance of 0. If the 
response from the PUF instance to the given challenge changes at all this shows a reduction in 
reproducibility which will be represented as in increase in the intra hamming distance. For the intra 
hamming distance to give the most accurate representation of the reproducibility of the PUF each CRP 
selected for testing should be tested as many times as is feasible and under different operating 
conditions. To help in visualising the distribution of intra hamming distances for a PUF instance, a 
histogram is usually used, and one example is shown in Figure 15. Interpreting Figure 15, it can be 
seen that 65% of PUF responses have 0 bits in error, ~30% of responses have 2% of bits in error and 
~4% of responses have 4% of bits in error. Other useful information can be gained by calculating the 
mean intra hamming distance and its standard deviation, which can then be compared to other 
designs or application specific requirements.    





Figure 15, Example of histogram showing intra hamming distance of a PUF instance. 
2.2.2      Inter Hamming Distance  
Uniqueness is a key characteristic for a PUF to have and inter hamming distance can be used to 
evaluate it. The inter hamming distance is calculated by finding the difference between two responses, 
as is done when finding the intra hamming distance. However, to evaluate uniqueness we compare 
the responses from different PUF instances to the same challenge. This is known as the inter hamming 
distance. Inter hamming distance can also be evaluated using a histogram, and example of this is 
shown in Figure 16. To understand the histogram, we must consider what ideal uniqueness for a PUF 
would manifest in terms of hamming distance. If each PUF was completely unique then each bit of 
each response would have no correlation with the same bit of any other PUF instance’s response. 
There would be a 50% chance of any selected bit being the same as the corresponding bit from another 
PUF instance, therefore. If each bit in the sampled responses has a 50% chance of matching the same 
bit in the other responses, then the ideal inter hamming distance for a PUF is 0.5. Referring now to 



























which is the ideal value. There are, however, some variations from this ideal value, as some PUF 
responses are not 50% the same as the corresponding response from other PUF instances of the same 
design. This variation can be quantified by calculating the standard deviation of the hamming 
distances. In the case of Figure 16, the standard deviation is 0.027. The deviation of the mean away 
from the ideal value of 50% and the size of the standard deviation for a given PUF can be used to 
evaluate whether a specific PUF design is suitable for a specific application, in combination with other 
limiting factors such as size, power consumption, and speed.        
 
Figure 16, Example of histogram showing inter hamming distance of a PUF instance. 
2.2.3 Electric and Non-Electric PUFs  
One of the most obvious and important distinctions between PUF designs is whether the nature of 
their PUF behaviour is based upon inherently electric or non-electric principles. Non-electric PUFs are 
PUFs whose operation is based upon any physical phenomena that is not electrical in nature. This, 
however, only refers to the PUF behaviour and not how responses are processed or stored. Some 
examples of non-electric PUFs include the original PUF concept design by Pappu [67] which is based 
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pattern deposited onto it. Another example would be the paper-based PUF concept, where the 
surface of a sheet a paper is used as the source of entropy [68]. The surface of the paper is measured 
optically or texturally to create a unique “fingerprint” for each piece.  
Electric PUFs on the other hand have their basic operating principles built around the observation of 
some electronic principle, such as resistance, capacitance, or some other electrical phenomenon. An 
example of this would be the metal coating-based PUF proposed by Tuyls et al. [69], where metal is 
specially coated to make the capacitance of the metal sheet have a large variance across it. The 
capacitance is then measured in multiple different locations across the sheet, which is used to create 
the unique “fingerprint” of each PUF. Within the electric PUF category there is also a large subcategory 
of silicon based PUFs that includes many of the more prolific and recent designs. Silicon based PUF are 
based upon electrical principles but also must be capable of being an integrated circuit so that they 
can be embedded onto silicon chips. The first example of this was proposed by Gassend et al. [65] and 
was based upon the difference in delay time between supposedly identical self-oscillating circuits. As 
the focus of this work is on security primitives that can be used for IoT applications, it is vital that they 
can be compact and used in integrated circuits. Because of this, the focus will be on silicon based PUFs.  
2.2.4 Intrinsic and Non-Intrinsic PUFs 
 Another key distinction between different types of PUF design is if they are intrinsic or non-intrinsic 
PUFs. The idea of an intrinsic PUF was first proposed by Guajardo et al. [70] and then further refined 
by Maes et al. [64]. There are two key conditions for a design to be defined as an intrinsic PUF. The 
first key property is that it must perform all its evaluations internally. Internal evaluation means that 
the PUF must perform all measurements and data processing required to generate a response within 
the PUF structure itself. This gives a couple of advantages over external evaluation. The first is the 
practicality. If a PUF has internal evaluation, then it can work without having to consider any external 




limitations or restrictions while also offering greater potential reliability as there is less opportunity 
for external influences. The second advantage of internal evaluation is that it increases security 
potential. If the evaluation is performed purely internally and no response is openly broadcast to the 
outside world, the response can be considered as an internal secret. This internal secrecy makes any 
snooping harder to perform for a potential attacker. The embedded system is also harder to tamper 
with than external evaluation systems.  
The most obvious disadvantage of internal evaluations is that it is harder to verify the operation of 
internal measurements as compared to external measurement. The worst possibility is internal 
measurements not working as intended and adding some unwanted correlations to the responses that 
could compromise security. However, it is more likely that if internal measurement is not working as 
expected the PUF will simply not function and will need to be replaced as a complete unit.  
The second key characteristic that a PUF must have to be considered intrinsic is that the random 
variations extracted must be from an implicit source rather than an explicit one. An implicit random 
variations source comes as an artefact of uncontrollable variations in the manufacturing procedure 
that arise naturally. Alternatively, explicit random variations are added intentionally to be evaluated 
and used specifically as a PUF source. Implicit PUFs have some advantages over explicit PUFs. The first 
of these is that implicit variations occur naturally without any further effort during the manufacturing 
process. The removal of having to add a manufacturing step to create random variations can result in 
better efficiency in terms of both time and cost when bulk manufacturing is used. The second key 
advantage of implicit random variations is a potential increase of security potential. As these random 
variations are usually an undesirable side effect that reduces the yield, manufacturers spend a lot of 
time and effort trying to remove or control them. Despite these great efforts the random variations 




are still present, proving the difficulty any potential attacker would have to go through to try and 
impact the randomness of the PUF source.     
Due to the potential benefits, particularly the self-contained and improved efficiency of manufacture, 
intrinsic PUFs are more attractive when considering the context of low-power IoT applications. The 
self-contained nature makes it far more feasible for use in applications such as IoT nodes or even 
potentially smaller applications such as RFID chips. These types of devices also tend to be low cost and 
high-volume devices, so that a reduction in manufacturing time and costs will be a huge advantage. 
Due to these considerations implicit PUFs will be the focus of this project and all the PUF designs 
examined in more detail will be in this category.    
2.2.5 Weak and Strong PUFs  
The final major classification is weak and strong PUFs. These classifications were first coined by 
Guajardo et al. [70] and further worked on by Ruhrmair et al. [71]. The strength of the PUF refers to 
the security characteristics of the challenge and response behaviour. For a PUF to be considered to be 
“strong”, it must be able to continue to have a high probability of the next CRP being selected to be 
unknown to a potential attacker, even if they have a prolonged period to gather past CRPs. For this to 
be true Maes et al. [64] suggest that, at least, the following two conditions must be true. Firstly, the 
CRP set of the PUF must be extremely large (ideally infinite) to stop a potential attacker from simply 
querying all possible CRPs so there is none unknown left. Secondly, it should be infeasible for a 
potential attacker to build an accurate model of the PUF by observing previous CRPs, which was 
previously defined as the unpredictability. Any PUF that does not meet these specific requirements is 
considered to be a “weak” PUF. It is clear that the security potential of strong PUFs is greater than that 
of weak PUFs, thereby increasing their potential applications and impact. However, the practicality of 
building a strong PUF has proved to be very difficult as it is difficult to find a balance of design size, 




complexity, and number of CRPs. It is also difficult to prove the infeasibility of an attacker being able 
to simply learn all of the possible CRPs. Due to these difficulties, it can still be considered an open 
question as to whether a truly strong PUF is possible. It may be better to consider the strength of a 
PUF as a sliding scale that should be compared against a given application’s specific requirements. 
2.2.6 Existing Intrinsic PUF Designs 
In this section the existing intrinsic PUF designs are reviewed. Currently all of these designs are electric 
and silicon-based designs. The random variation source in all of these designs comes from process 
variations introduced during the manufacturing of devices within the PUF. The basic working principles 
of these existing PUFs fit into 3 major categories. The first category is the PUFs whose working 
principles are based upon delays within digital circuitry where the time of specific delays derives from 
random process variation. These PUFs are labelled as delay based PUFs. The second major PUF 
category is the PUFs whose working principles are based on memory elements. These memory based 
PUFs use a random variation known as device mismatch which appears in bi-stable memory and 
affects the write time and balance between components. The final major group of intrinsic PUF designs 
is the PUFs whose random variation is extracted from mixed signal analysis. In these mixed signal PUFs 
some embedded analogue measurement is performed and then quantised through analogue-to-
digital conversion to produce a response.             
Arbiter PUFs  
Arbiter PUFs are a delay-based silicon PUF whose basic principles are to introduce a race condition 
between signals travelling along two different paths through an IC circuit and was first proposed by 
Lee at al. [72]. At the end of the race an arbiter circuit is used to determine which path propagated 
the input signal faster. In these arbiter designs the race paths should be designed so that the delay 
times should be almost identical so that the fastest path is determined by random process variation 




and cannot be predicted simply by observing or modelling the design layout. However, due to the 
short time difference between the delay of the two paths there is a realistic chance that both signals 
arrive at the arbiter at a close enough time to cause the arbiter itself to enter a metastable state. If 
the arbiter enters a metastable state, then the eventual output will be dictated by the internal 
components of the arbiter and from the race condition. The metastability resolution is one of the 
major causes of error and unreliability in arbiter-based designs.  
In the Lee et al. arbiter PUF [72], the race condition is created using a series of connected switch units 
that either allow the input signals to propagate along the one path or switch which path the two 
signals are propagating along. The challenge bits are used to determine which switch blocks will switch 
the signal path and which will not and consist of two cross coupled 2-to-1 multiplexers. At the end of 
the switch paths an SR latch is used as the arbiter circuit to determine which signal propagated faster, 
thereby giving a single response bit. This system is illustrated in Figure 17. In this design each switch 
block must be controlled by an individual challenge bit.       
 
Figure 17, Working Principles of the Lee arbiter PUF[72] as illustrated by Maes et al.[64]. 




The arbiter-based design of PUF suffers from several key difficulties that have limited their usefulness 
and it is still yet to be seen if it is possible for them to be solved. The first fundamental problem is that 
each response is not independent of the others. This is due to the nature of the switch blocks where 
each one has a fixed underlying delay parameter which can be found and modelled by an attacker if 
they observe even a relatively small subset of past challenge and response pairs. This type of modelling 
attack is very powerful, especially against delay based PUFs, and will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this section. Another difficulty for arbiter PUFs is that of tuning and selecting the components 
of both the switches and the arbiter circuit itself. For the switches, the design should be that each path 
should nominally be perfectly symmetrical so that the variance in propagation time comes purely from 
device to device variation. If this is not the case, then the output of the PUF will have some bias which 
will cause different PUF instances to be more similar to each other resulting in poor uniqueness and 
identifiability. For the arbiter circuit, it should be balanced so that there is no bias towards one input 
or the other. If this is not the case the system will suffer the same deficiencies as with unbalanced 
switching components. These limitations are the reason why early arbiter-based designs such as the 
ones tested by Gassend et al. [73] have poor Inter hamming results of 1.05% indicating different PUF 
instances are not unique. Using more balanced components, Gassend’s team were able to achieve a 
PUF with an intra hamming distance of 0.7% and inter hamming distance of 23% under ideal 
conditions. Although this PUF now shows high reliability and somewhat improved uniqueness Lim et 
al.[74] showed that it was possible to perform an accurate modelling attack after observing only 5,000 
CRPs.  
In an attempt to prevent these modelling attacks Lee at al.[72] proposed the feed forward PUF which 
introduces extra arbiters that are inserted along the race paths and are used to feed forward their 
responses to following switches in order to replace some ‘known’ challenge bits with unknown 
internal responses. This feed forward technique attempted to introduce non-linearity to the responses 




to make modelling more difficult. However, it also introduces more noise due to the metastability of 
some of the arbiters which increase the intra hamming distance to 9.84%, making the PUF fairly 
unreliable. Further, Rührmair et al.[75]  showed that using more advanced modelling techniques could 
still build accurate models of feed forward arbiter PUFs, although the complexity of this task was 
correlated with the delay path length and number of feed forward arbiters. The need to have large, 
complicated designs for arbiter PUFs to be resistive to modelling attacks, as well as the far from ideal 
hamming distances achieved in these designs, have made them unsuitable for widespread adoption.   
More recently arbiter based PUFs utilising emerging technologies, such as the design proposed by 
Govindaraj et al.[76], which uses the write time of resistive RAM in place of the traditional switch 
blocks, can offer some benefits in terms of design efficiency but there are still big questions to be 
answered in terms of their resistance to modelling attacks. Designs that use emerging technology also 
have a more difficult time trying to enter mainstream usage due to unreliability of the devices as well 
as cost of manufacturing when compared to conventional CMOS technologies. This is a particularly 
large obstacle when the focus of this project is on low cost, IoT applications.   
Ring Oscillator PUFs 
Ring oscillator PUFs are another major group of PUFs that have been prevalent in research. The first 
ring oscillator PUF was proposed by Gassend et al.[73] and utilised the same switch block based system 
as his arbiter PUF. However, negative feedback was introduced to induce oscillation in the system.  
After constructing several oscillators of identical design, the difference between the oscillation 
frequencies can be used as a PUF random variation source. One problem Gassend greatly improved 
upon is the external influence on PUF results. Gassend proposed using a differential function when 
comparing different oscillators to reduce external interference. If all the PUF’s oscillators are on the 
same chip in close proximity to each other, then the external influences such as temperature will be 




close to consistent across all of them. If the output oscillation frequencies are compared as a ratio 
between two compared oscillators, the effects of external factors are suppressed and the majority of 
observed variations will be from implicit device variation, thereby increasing PUF reliability. Although 
Gassend’s design offers some good ideas for improving reliability, this ring oscillator design is 
vulnerable to the same modelling-based attacks as his arbiter design due to the switch block system. 
For a more robust ring oscillator PUF, the design proposed by Suh and Devadas[77] will be reviewed. 
Figure 18 shows a block diagram depicting the working principle of the ring oscillator PUF design 
proposed by Suh and Devadas. A large number of identically designed oscillators are connected to a 
pair of counters which in turn are connected to a comparison circuit. In this system the challenge is 
used to select which pairs of oscillators should be compared to find which is operating at a higher 
frequency. Each tested pair of oscillators will give a single response bit. As each oscillator is identically 
designed the primary source of variation between frequencies should be device-to-device variation 
introduced implicitly during manufacturing.                     
 
Figure 18, Diagram of Ring Oscillator PUF as proposed by Suh and Devadas [77]. 
 




To avoid dependence between the output responses in this design some pre-selection of comparable 
oscillators has to be performed. In Suh and Devadas’ original proposal they group the oscillators into 
groups of ‘k’ size and find the pair of oscillators with the greatest frequency difference, then pre-select 
these as the pair to be compared. This gives two clear benefits. Firstly, it removes any dependence 
between responses, and secondly makes the PUF more reliable as external influencing factors will 
have to be large to ‘flip’ the PUF response, as the largest possible difference was pre-selected. Using 
this technique Suh and Devadas were able to achieve an intra hamming distance of 0.48% and an inter 
hamming distance of 46.15%, which shows a clear improvement over the arbiter PUF results. The 
major drawback to this method is that it is inefficient in terms of design complexity and footprint as 
the number of oscillators (n) has to be very large to give a reasonable number of CRPs, as the maximum 
number of CRPs is given by n/k. The need for pre-calculating the pairs of oscillators also adds a great 
deal of effort when manufacturing these PUFs, as each device must be independently measured and 
then a sorting system used to match the best possible pairs.      
Several improvements on the ring oscillator PUF design have been proposed. Two of the most 
important ones are suggested firstly by Yin and Qu [78] and then by Maiti and Schaumont [79]. The 
first key improvement suggested by Yin and Qu is to the oscillator pairing scheme, where they ignore 
far fewer oscillators but maintain a similar reliability. To achieve this, they make use of a new pairing 
algorithm which can more efficiently group oscillator pairs. The second key improvement Yin and Qu 
proposed is a new architecture for arranging the oscillators and frequency counters so that multiple 
oscillators can share a single counter. The proposed architecture can better find an optimal value for 
response speed and resource demand of the PUF. Maiti and Schaumont also proposed two key 
improvements to the ring oscillator PUF’s design. The first of these is a set of guidelines that should 
be followed when implementing ring oscillator PUFs in order to minimise any systematic bias. They 
looked in detail at the effect of each guideline on the reliability and uniqueness of the implemented 




PUF design. The second key improvement that they proposed is an alteration on the oscillator paring 
scheme used. In the improved pairing scheme Maiti and Schaumont replaced the idea of finding the 
most reliable pairs and ignoring the others and instead utilised the configurability of the oscillators 
and found the most reliable configuration for each pair of oscillators. By doing this they can achieve 
equal or improved reliability while also not wasting oscillators. These improvements greatly increase 
the efficiency of ring oscillator PUFs. However, they still require significant resources to implement 
the large number of oscillators required for a useful number of CRPs. The process of pairing oscillators 
pre-installation is also still a large hurdle to overcome when considering this type of PUF for use in low 
cost IoT applications.       
Glitch PUF 
Another prominent type of PUF that has been proposed is the Glitch PUF. These PUFs extract their 
random variation from the glitch effect that can occur in combinational logic circuits. Combinational 
circuits have no internal states, they only have a steady-state output which is determined by the input 
signals applied. However, due to internal delays within the circuit, caused by random process 
variation, the output of the circuit can be unstable for some time before settling at the steady-state 
value. The value observed on the circuit output during this time of instability is the glitches. Because 
the instability is caused by delays resulting from process variation, they are consistent for each circuit 
and are unique in each component. This reliable and unique glitch behaviour is what is utilised to 
create a PUF system. The first glitch PUF design was proposed by Anderson et al. [80], in this design 
Anderson proposes a circuit that either creates a single or no glitch at its output, dependent on the 
random variation-based delay within itself. A flip-flop is then used to sample the output to see if a 
glitch has occurred or not. The output of this flip-flop is used as the response bit. When many of these 
circuits are copied across a chip a PUF can be created where the challenge is which circuits to test and 
the response is the presence or lack of a glitch within each challenged circuit.  Using this technique 




Anderson et al. achieved a PUF with an inter hamming distance of 48.3% and an intra hamming 
distance of 3.6%.  
The glitch PUF principle was expanded upon by Shimizu et al. [81], [82]. The main improvement of 
Shimizu’s design is the replacement of the specific combinational circuit in Anderson’s design with the 
output from any combinational circuit. Shimizu’s more recently proposed design uses a toggle flip-flop 
on the output of any combinational circuit to sample how many glitches occur on that output before 
a steady state is achieved. The response behaviour is then extracted from finding if the number of 
glitches that occurred was odd or even. This concept is illustrated in Figure 19.   
 
Figure 19, Glitch PUF as proposed by Shimizu et a[81]l., illustrated by Maes et al[64]. 
To improve the reliability of the proposed glitch PUF, Shimizu proposes a ‘bit-masking’ technique. In 
this technique, every PUF instance is measured before being used. The purpose of this measurement 
is to find which glitch responses are stable and which are not. The responses that are found to be 
stable are selected as actual responses for the PUF. The responses that are unstable are ‘masked’ 
which in this case simply means that they are ignored for normal PUF operation. The bits which are 
and are not used is information that must be distributed with the PUF and stored with the CRPs. This 
process of bit masking does result in some extra overhead in production and CRP storage but also 
greatly increases the reliability of the PUF. With bit masking Shimizu’s PUF design can achieve an inter 
hamming distance of 38%, intra hamming of 1.3% with 38% of total bits being masked, while operating 




under ideal conditions. This design, however, is very sensitive to temperature and supply voltage 
variation with the intra hamming distance increasing to 15% at 85˚C and 5% supply voltage increase.     
Glitch PUFs offer some complexity improvements over previous PUF designs in terms of circuit 
footprint. However, they require a lot of pre-installation tuning and adjustment to make them at least 
semi-reliable under nominal working conditions. Even with the potential reduced footprint, when 
compared to ring oscillator PUFs, a glitch PUF with a large number of CRPs requires a large number of 
combinational circuits to be implemented which may not be feasible for small scale applications. There 
has also not been any major work performed testing the resilience of glitch based PUFs to modelling 
or other types of attack.         
SRAM Based PUFs 
Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) is a digital volatile memory technology built from bi-stable 
circuits. The typical CMOS implementation is built using cross coupled inverters, which is the same 
circuit used in the metastability based TRNGs, such as the design proposed by Sanu et al. [42], that 
were discussed earlier. SRAM PUFs make use of the same metastability resolution as the TRNGs using 
this technology. The key difference between the two applications is that the TRNG design wants the 
metastability resolution state to have a 50% probability of going either way, whereas the PUF design 
wants the metastability resolution state to be consistent so it can be used as a basis for PUF operation. 
The basic working principle of the design is that a set of ‘challenged’ SRAM units selected from a large 
array will be powered up into a state of metastability, the resolution of the metastable state for each 
selected SRAM circuit is used as the response for the PUF. As with the TRNGs using the same principle 
the SRAM units are designed to be identical and symmetrically balanced so that any bias in the 
resolution of the metastable state is a result of random device-to-device variation that occurs during 
fabrication. The first SRAM PUF designs were proposed by Guajardo et al.[70] and Holcomb et al.[83]  




almost simultaneously. Guajardo’s design was able to achieve an inter hamming distance of 49.97% 
and an intra hamming distance of 3.57% under ideal conditions and implanted on an FPGA. Holcomb’s 
design was able to achieve similar results with a inter hamming distance of 43.16% and an intra 
hamming distance of 3.8% on 8 commercial SRAM chips and an inter hamming distance of 49.34% 
with an intra hamming distance of 6.5% on embedded memory in 3 microcontroller chips.  
The main challenges for SRAM PUFs are tuning the SRAM circuits and reliability when using different 
technologies and when operating under different environmental conditions.  
As the random variation source can be the same for both SRAM PUFs and metastability based TRNGs, 
Satpathy et al. [36] have proposed a combined design. In the combined design Satpathy uses the cross 
coupled inverts which have a strong bias to one stable state as a ‘chip ID’. This chip ID is a PUF with 
only a single CRP, which is sometimes also known a physically obfuscated key. The cross coupled 
inverters that have the closest to a 50% probability of entering each possible stable state after 
resolving the metastability are used to create a TRNG following a design very similar to Sanu et al. [52] 
design, which was reviewed in detail earlier. This combined design offers key improvements in 
efficiency and security. Satpathy states that the combined design reduces the total area by 63% and 
the energy consumption by 20% as against implementing the same circuits individually. In this work 
the PUF part of the design is limited to a chip ID rather than a fully functional PUF which is one of the 
key areas where this idea could be built upon. The tuning required for this design is also extensive as 
the system has to find which cross coupled inverters should be used for each part of the design, as 
well as tuning the circuits, when selected to be biased appropriately to give a circuit with an acceptable 
reliability.              
 





After reviewing RTN-based TRNG design, the RTN-based PUF design is reviewed now. Chen et al. [84] 
proposed using the presence or lack of RTN in each device of an array of nFETs as the random variance 
source for a PUF design. To detect whether there is RTN in each device, a large voltage is applied to 
the gate to charge any traps within the device. After the charging, the gate voltage is dropped to a low 
value and the drain current is observed. With the low gate voltage any traps that were charged have 
a high chance to discharge causing a sudden rise in the drain current. If these current rises are 
detected, then the device is said to have RTN and the response will be ‘1’. If no rises are detected, 
then the device is said to have no RTN and the response will be ‘0’. A typical drain current response 
from a device showing RTN is shown in Figure 20. The challenge in this PUF design is selecting which 
devices within the array to test. Using this methodology Chen was able to achieve an inter hamming 
distance of ~42% and an intra hamming distance of ~5% under ideal conditions. One big advantage of 
this design is that only a single device is needed to obtain the random variation for each CRP rather 
than the complex circuits used in other designs, although the supply voltage and measurement circuits 
are still relatively complex. The main drawback of this design is the temperature dependence of RTN, 
which means some devices without RTN at one temperature in the given sampling time might show 
some RTN at another temperature, reducing reliability. Another disadvantage is that the drain current 
must be observed for a relatively long time (0.1s) before a response can be extracted for each device. 
To speed up the PUF behaviour multiple devices could be measured at once, however this would 
require more measurement circuits, increasing design area and power consumption.              





Figure 20, Typical drain current signal response for a device with RTN [84]. 
Other Notable PUF Designs  
This subsection covers the basic principles and performances of some other notable PUF designs that 
are not as prolific as the previous ones covered in detail or are not as relevant to the research 
performed in this project.  
Latch PUFs 
Latch PUFs were first proposed by Su et al. [85] and work on a very similar principle to SRAM PUFs. 
Latch PUFs are based on the metastability resolution state of cross couples NOR-latches. The key 
difference between this PUF and SRAM PUFs is that Latch PUFs induce the metastability through 
resetting the NOR-latches while powered on rather than having to de-power and power up the SRAM 
circuits used in SRAM PUFs. This ‘reset while powered’ functionality gives the latch PUF some 
advantages over SRAM PUFs. Firstly, the response behaviour can be quickly re-invoked while the 
devices are still powered up. This means that the generated responses do not need to be stored in 
other memory blocks over the active time of the PUF and can be recreated at will. This fast re-creation 




time of responses allows the PUF to use more complex post-processing techniques, such as majority 
voting, to improve reliability. Using their proposed Latch PUF, Su was able to achieve a PUF with an 
inter hamming distance of 50.55% and an intra hamming distance of 3.04%.  Latch PUFs still have 
many of the difficulties faced by SRAM PUFs, such as the difficulty of tuning the balance of the cross 
coupled devices which create the random variation source. Also, if more complex post-processing is 
needed to increase reliability to an acceptable level, the increase in design complexity, power 
consumption, and design footprint may not be suitable for many low power IoT applications.     
Butterfly PUFs 
The Butterfly PUF is an extension of the SRAM PUF principle and was proposed by Kumar et al. [86]. 
The Butterfly PUF was developed as a way to implement an SRAM PUF type onto general purpose 
FPGAs. This is required as the traditional SRAM PUF cannot be implemented onto most FPGAs as they 
have in-built systems that clear the values stored in the SRAM units after being powered up. As the 
SRAM units are automatically and unavoidably cleared after start-up, the metastability resolution 
state required for SRAM PUF operation is lost. The Butterfly PUF avoids this problem by using creating 
cross coupled transparent data latches rather than SRAM units. These transparent data latches create 
a bistable circuit that can be forced into a state of metastability through the use of preset / clear 
functionality. Using this methodology Kumar was able to achieve a PUF with an inter hamming 
distance of ~50% and an intra hamming distance of ~5% under high temperate conditions. As this 
design is made specifically for implementation onto FPGAs it may not be applicable for application 
onto many IoT devices such as remote sensors. The Butterfly PUF principle also has the difficulty of 
creating well matched random variation sources, as the discrete routing of most FPGAs can make it 
difficult to create balanced designs.        
 





Buskeeper PUFs are another PUF design that makes use of a bistable memory element and was first 
proposed by Simons et al.[87]. The Buskeeper PUF is based upon Buskeeper memory cells, which are 
components connected to bus lines within embedded systems. Buskeeper memory cells is a cross 
coupled inverter-based latch system with a weak drive-strength. The basic operating principles past 
this point are the same as with SRAM PUFs. Using this design Simons was able to achieve a PUF with 
an inter hamming distance of 49.9% and an intra hamming distance of 7% under ideal conditions. The 
main advantage of Buskeeper PUFs over SRAM PUFs is that the Buskeeper memory units are slightly 
more efficient in terms of design footprint when compared to SRAM units; other than this all of the 
challenges present for SRAM PUFs are still present for Buskeeper-based designs.     
Table 2, Key points of PUF Designs gives a quick reference to compare the key statistics of the some 
of the major electronic PUF designs that have been proposed previously.  
Table 2, Key points of PUF Designs 
Authors Entropy Source Mean Intra Hamming 
(%) 
Mean Inter Hamming 
(%) 
Lee et al. [72] Arbiter 0.7 23 
Suh et al. [77] Ring Oscillator 0.48 46.15 
Maiti et al. [79] Ring Oscillator Not provided 47.31 
Anderson et al. [80] Glitch  3.6 48.3 
Shimizu et al. [81], [82] Glitch 1.3 38 
Sanu et al. [42][88]  Metastability SRAM 2.8 50 




Guajardo et al.[70] Metastability SRAM 3.57 49.97 
Holcomb et al.[83] Metastability SRAM 3.8 43.16 
Chen et al. [84] RTN ~5 ~42 
Su et al. [85] SRAM Latch 3.04 50.55 
Kumar et al. [86] SRAM Butterfly ~5 ~50 
Simons et al.[87] Buskeeper 7 49.9 
 
2.2.7 Variations on the PUF Principle  
This section looks at ideas that are variations of the core operation of the PUF principle. These 
concepts take the basic CRP-based approach of PUFs but add extra elements to it to try and make the 
PUF principle more secure, more practical, or both.  
Controlled PUFs (CPUFs) 
Controlled PUFs are a variation of the PUF principle, where a normal PUF system is taken but it is only 
accessible through another cryptographic primitive. In an ideal case this link should be made so that 
if the systems do become separated it should destroy the functionality of the PUF. This idea was first 
proposed by Gassend et al. [89] and he outlined four examples of how this idea could be useful. The 
first proposed idea was to use a hash function to generate the challenges sent to the PUF in order to 
stop chosen challenge attacks. It has since been shown, however, that model building attacks work 
equally well for random challenges or chosen challenges. The second proposed way of creating a CPUF 
was to add error correction algorithms to the output of the PUF to increase reliability. This is a 




technique that many subsequent PUFs have adopted, although most have not defined themselves as 
CPUFs. The third suggested implementation of a CPUF is to add a hash function to the error corrected 
outputs of the previous CPUF suggestion. Adding a hash function breaks any connection between the 
observed responses and the underlying PUF behaviour, making model building attacks much more 
difficult. However, it is very important that the error corrected PUF output has zero error, as the hash 
function will create a completely different response even if a single bit is in error, causing a CRP 
mismatch. The final suggestion for CPUFs is to use a hash function with additional inputs so that a 
single PUF can have multiple ‘personalities’ so that each user connected to the PUF can have their 
own unique set of CRPs. This may be desirable where multiple parties can be connected to the PUF 
and not all parties trust each other.  
Reconfigurable PUFs (RPUFs)  
Reconfigurable PUFs (RPUFs) are an extension of the typical PUF concept that was first proposed by 
Kursawe et al. [90]. In Kursawe’s proposal, RPUFs are defined as a PUF whose CRP behaviour can be 
reconfigured. This reconfiguring can be a partial or complete change of the CRP behaviour, which is 
random and preferably irreversible, resulting in a new PUF behaviour. Kursawe proposed two ways in 
which this type of behaviour for a PUF could be achieved. The first is an optical PUF where the optical 
medium used to give the PUF behaviour can be melted by a laser, thereby changing the scatter pattern 
and the PUF identity. The second possible implementation is to use phase change memory. With this 
phase change memory, the phase of each cell can be changed from crystalline to amorphous or some 
intermediary states. The resistance of the phase memory cell is then measured to give the PUF 
behaviour. Re-writing the phase array cells will change the resistance in a random way thereby 
reconfiguring the PUF identity. Kursawe did not test these implementations in detail so that its 
performance is not known.  




Katzenbeisser et al. [91] proposes a specific type of RPUF which they coin as a logically reconfigurable 
PUF or LRPUF. Katzenbeisser defines the LRPUF as a typical PUF that has a state-update mechanism 
which can transform the input and output to change the CRP behaviour. The state-update mechanism 
consists of a non-volatile memory system that stores a state and state dependent input and output 
transformation. LRPUFs do have some drawbacks compared to the original RPUF as proposed by 
Kursawe. Firstly, the transformations that LRPUFs perform are not irreversible as each transformation 
possible is available within the state-update circuit, which potentially reduces security. The second 
drawback of LRPUFs over RPUFs is that the state-update circuit requires complex anti-tampering 
circuitry to ensure security of the system. With this being said, LRPUFs use well matured technology 
so that they can practically be implemented currently, whereas the technology used in the proposed 
RPUFs is not commonplace, making their implementation difficult.  
Public PUFs (PPUFs)  
PPUFs were first proposed by Rührmair et al. [92] where he outlines a new type of PUF scheme based 
on a public key structure. This public key system is based on the idea that Rührmair terms as SIMPL, 
which stands for “SIMulation Possible, but Laborious”. In this system, a PUF is possible to model to 
find a CRP but this modelling takes much longer than it takes the actual PUF instance to generate the 
same CRP. Using this SIMPL behaviour, the challenging party can pre-compute a CRP using the public 
model of the PUF then issue the challenge. When the PUF instance receives the challenge, it generates 
the appropriate response and replies. When the challenging party receives the response, it checks to 
see how long the response took to generate. As only the specific PUF instance can generate the 
response quickly, the challenging party can determine whether the response was generated by the 
PUF instance or not. Rührmair’s design was based on an optical PUF principle, however. The first 
silicon based PPUF was proposed by Beckmann et al. [93]. This design is based upon a PUF system 
built from XOR gates that have different delay times for signal propagation through each gate caused 




by manufacturing variation. This PUF can then be used in a PPUF scheme where the delays of each 
device are distributed as the public model and a challenge can be built from this model. However, 
these early PPUF designs had quite a few drawbacks. The first is the very precise time measurements 
that have to be performed. It is possible to measure time very accurately, but precise measurement 
requires complicated and expensive equipment that might not be available or appropriate for most 
applications. While keeping the time measurement accuracy requirements to a minimum, the PUF 
must also have speed, an advantage over attackers trying to clone the system. This advantage must 
be at least several seconds [29], making these PPUF systems significantly slower than traditional public 
key cryptographic protocols. These types of PPUF are also potentially vulnerable to mathematical 
cloning or machine learning attacks if the number of available CRPs is not sufficiently large.  
Matched PUFs are a more recent innovation within the PPUF concept. First proposed by 
Meguerdichian et al. [94], this PUF concept is based upon the idea of creating two identical PUFs but 
making the creation of any more impossible. Meguerdichian suggests creating these two identical 
PUFs through simultaneous device aging through stress to the two PUF instances; after this stressing, 
any parts which cannot be matched across the two PUFs are removed through either gating or 
software mechanisms. When two identical PUFs have been created they can be distributed so that 
the authenticating party has one and the external party the other. The key advantage of this 
mechanism over the previous PPUF designs is that it removes the need for the authenticating party to 
simulate the PUF instance from a public model, which requires significant effort by design. Despite 
offering this potential improvement, matched PUFs have several unanswered questions. The first is 
how difficult it really is to create a 3rd copy of the PUF instance either through physical or mathematical 
cloning. Secondly, an authenticating server may have to be connected to a large number of external 
PUF instances.  It may not be practical to have another full PUF instance within the server structure to 
match every external PUF. This is further exacerbated if more parties than the two need to be able to 




communicate using this PUF then creating more matched PUF becomes increasingly difficult. Finally, 
reliability of each PUF could be a problem for this design as any change in either PUF instance will 
result in them no longer being matched.  
Quantised PUFs are the final type of PPUF to be reviewed here. First proposed by Meguerdichian et 
al. [95], quantised PUFs are an extension of the matched PUF, which solves the issue of matched PUF 
only being able to secure communication between two parties. Quantised PUFs are created by aging 
PUF instances separately and then matching elements later and de-activating all elements which do 
not match across the PUF that will need to communicate. To get a reasonable number of PUF 
components to match across multiple instances the responses from each element are quantised to a 
level of accuracy that makes finding matched elements acceptable likely. This PUF idea however does 
still have issues with reliability as well as potential weakness to model building attacks, either 
physically or mathematically.         
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Chapter 3 -  Measurement and Characterisation Methodology  
 Introduction  
This chapter presents the equipment, samples, measurement techniques, and characterisation 
methods used in this project. Firstly, the equipment required to perform the experiments is described. 
Next, the samples used for testing are listed and described. Thirdly, the details of each measurement 
technique are explained.  
 Equipment Used  
This section details the equipment required to perform the experiments. Table 3 shows a summary of 
the equipment. The main piece of equipment used is the Keysight B1500 semiconductor analyser. It is 
equipped with 4 source measure units (SMU) and 2 waveform generator/fast measurement units 
(WGFMU), although only 2 SMU and 2 WGFMU units are used in this project. The B1500 was 
controlled by an external PC through a general-purpose interface bus (GPIB), with control programs 
written in Visual Basic. Devices were probed on a Cascade MPS150 probe station which was also fitted 
with a controllable temperature hot plate.  
For the proof of concept and design testing circuits a Keysight 81150A pulse generator was used to 
provide gate voltage to the sample wafer which was probed on a Cascade Summit Probe station. A 
Keysight E3632A DC power supply was used to supply drain voltage. A Femto DHPCA-100 amplifier 
was used to amplify the drain current. An Agilent Infiniium MSO8104A oscilloscope was used to record 
the required signals. A Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGA was used as the basis for the proof of concept circuit 
development.  
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Table 3, Measurement Equipment Usage. 
Test Equipment Tests that require this 
equipment 
Specific Requirements 
Keysight B1500 Stepped IV SMU 
 DC RTN SMU and WGFMU 
 ACRTN SMU and WGFMU 
 HC Stress and Recover SMU and WGFMU 
 TDDS SMU and WGFMU 
Cascade MPS150 Stepped IV  
 DC RTN  
 ACRTN  
 HC Stress and Recover High temperature  
 TDDS  
Cascade Summit Proof of concept circuit  
Keysight 81150A Proof of concept circuit  
Keysight E3632A Proof of concept circuit  
Femto DHPCA-100 amplifier Proof of concept circuit  
Agilent Infiniium MSO8104A Proof of concept circuit  
Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGA Proof of concept circuit  
 
 Samples Used in this Work 
Several different types of devices were used in this work to verify the functionality of the designs 
across different processes. Table 4 summarises the key details of the samples used in this work. Each 
process was available in both nMOSFETs and pMOSFETs. The samples were sourced from either the 
Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre (IMEC) or CSR plc (formerly Cambridge Silicon Radio acquired 
by Qualcomm in 2015). The samples from IMEC were developed for the Industrial consortium of Logic 
devices based at IMEC. The CSR wafer is a commercial grade product and was manufactured by the 
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) using their 28 nm technology node. The 
majority of the work was performed on the 22 nm FinFET process with only trap timing information 
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being extracted from the other IMEC samples. The CSR wafer was exclusively used for testing with the 
proof of concept circuit for the TRNG design.     
Table 4, Test Sample Information. 
Sample Name HK45 HK28 FF CSR 
Gate Material Metal Metal Metal Metal 
Dielectric HK Stack HK Stack HK Stack HK Stack 
EoT (nm) 1.45 1.3 1 1.2 
Technology Node (nm) 45 28 22 28 
Structure Planar Planar Planar Planar 
Supplier IMEC IMEC IMEC CSR 
 
 Measurement Methodologies  
This section explains and discusses the different types of measurements performed in this work. The 
aim is to create an understanding of how each measurement was taken so that the results shown in 
later sections can more easily be interpreted, as well as providing key information for anyone trying 
to replicate any results from this work.   
3.4.1 Stepped IV Measurement – Drain and Gate Current Measurement Against Gate Voltage 
Drain current against gate voltage (IV) measurement is one of the simplest and also most important 
measurements performed in this work. IV measurement has several different uses. It is used to have 
a quick check whether the probing and basic operation of a selected device are working as expected. 
It is also used to quickly see if there are any clear RTN traps present, as the characteristic RTN switching 
behaviour will be evident in the IV plot. Using IV measurement for quickly checking for RTN is more 
powerful than checking at individual gate voltage as most RTN traps will only be present over a specific 
range of gate voltages and the IV measurement sweeps a wide range of gate voltages. The final use of 
the IV measurement is to find threshold voltage shift (ΔVth). ΔVth is a key parameter when discussing 
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device aging and RTN characterisation, both of them are widely discussed in this work. For device 
aging, an increase in the magnitude of threshold voltage (Vth) is a key measurement of the device 
lifetime [96] and for RTN characterisation the ΔVth caused by trapping and de-trapping is a key 
measurement.  
In this work, a stepped IV measurement is made by using the SMU units of the Keysight B1500 
semiconductor analyser. Figure 21 shows the test waveforms for the stepped IV measurement.   
 
Figure 21, Test waveforms for a stepped IV measurement[97]. 
For the stepped IV measurement, one SMU is used to increase the gate voltage in steps, while another 
SMU supplies a constant drain voltage. At the level part of each voltage step the drain current is 
observed, also using the SMU. The time spent at each step as well as the size of each step are 
adjustable parameters. The typical time to measure the drain current at each step is from a few to a 
few hundred milliseconds and the step size is typically from a few hundred microvolts to a few 
millivolts. The typical time to complete an IV measurement is from 1 second to 20 seconds. The very 
high resolution of the SMU units allows for this IV measurement to be very accurate (sub-pA range) 
which is ideal for the experiments that are frequently operating around or below the threshold 
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voltage. This technique also allows measuring the gate leakage current, which is significantly smaller 
than drain current under normal operation, using the same SMUs. Observing gate leakage can be 
important when looking at devices under a heavy stress to ensure that the device is not broken down. 
It also allows observing any RTN events visible in the gate current.  Figure 22 shows a typical result 
from a stepped IV measurement on a fresh 22nm FinFET device which is functioning normally with a 
drain bias of Vd=0.1 V.       
 
 
As mentioned, one of the main purposes for performing an IV measurement is to find the Vth of a 
device. The method for finding the Vth used in this work is the max-gm method which is illustrated in 
Figure 23. The first step is to find the transconductance (gm). Transconductance is the slope of the IV 
measurement so it can be calculated by finding the first derivative of the IV measurement curve (blue 
curve in Figure 23). The next step is to find the corresponding Vg value to the maximum gm (max-gm) 
Figure 22, Typical stepped IV measurement result. 
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value. Finally, a tangent line is drawn from the max-gm Vg value and its intersect with the Vg-axis is 
the Vth (blue square in Figure 23).   
 
Figure 23, Illustration of max-gm method for finding Vth [97]. 
 
3.4.2 DC RTN Measurement 
The basic principle of DC RTN measurement is to observe the drain current of a device under constant 
gate and drain voltage. For this work the first purpose is to detect visible RTN within the drain current. 
Measuring the drain current in this way allows extracting several key characteristics of RTN. Firstly, it 
gives the timing of the trapping and de-trapping, usually in terms of capture time (τc) and emission 
time (τe), which are the average time taken to observe a capture or emission event, respectively. 
Secondly, DC RTN measurement allows finding the magnitude or impact of a trap, either in terms of 
change in drain current (ΔId) or change in threshold voltage (ΔVth) if an IV measurement is also 
available.  
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The applied voltage waveforms for performing a DC RTN measurement are shown in Figure 24. A Vg 
voltage is supplied by an SMU unit and its value is guided by the regions of an IV measurement that 
shows clear signs of RTN. The Vd voltage is fixed at a constant level and supplied by an SMU unit. The 
Vd is fully adjustable but 0.1V is the typical value used initially. It is then expanded to more values 
when looking at a device in detail. The Id current is observed using a WGFMU unit, this is used as it 
can perform measurements more quickly than an SMU unit, which is preferable as it can capture fast 
RTN traps that can have capture and emission events within the microsecond range. The time window 
of a DC RTN measurement is also fully adjustable. Typically, the duration of the test should be long 
enough to observe at least several RTN events if the goal is simply scoping or long enough to observe 
at least 100 RTN events if the goal is to extract the characteristics of an RTN trap. The sampling rate 
selected is again, fully adjustable. The sampling rate should be selected so that it is at least 10 times 
faster than the speed of the fastest RTN event switching if the characterisation results are to be of an 
acceptable accuracy.    
 
Figure 24, Applied voltage waveform for DC RTN measurement. 
Figure 25 shows a typical result of a DC RTN measurement when performed on a device exhibiting 
clear single trap RTN behaviour. Figure 25 clearly shows the RTN switching events and the number of 
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30, which is good for showing the type of RTN present in this device. If full characterisation of the trap 
was to be performed, however, a longer time should be used so that at least 100 RTN events are 
captured (run for around 100ms to capture a statistically significant number of events).  
 
Figure 25, Typical type of result for a DC RTN measurement of a device with clear, single dominating trap RTN. 
After a DC RTN measurement has been used to capture enough RTN events, the key parameters of 
that RTN trap can be extracted. To improve the accuracy of the parameters and to make extraction of 
them easier the raw Id data containing the RTN signal is fitted using a hidden Markov model (HMM) 
[98]. Figure 26a shows both the raw Id data and the fitting result. To extract the amplitude of the trap, 
ΔId, it is a simple case of subtracting the Id value of the captured state from that of the emitted state 
of the trap. The amplitude can also be expressed in other ways. To find the amplitude as a percentage 
of total current flow or ΔId/Id0, ΔId is divided by the value of the current in the emitted state, Id0. The 
amplitude in terms of ΔVth can be obtained by ΔVth=ΔId/gm, where gm can be obtained from the IV 
measurement as shown in Figure 23.       
After fitting a DC RTN measurement result with the HMM technique, the values of τc and τe can be 
extracted. To find τc, all of the times that the RTN signal spends in the emitted state before 
transitioning to the captured state are extracted. This gives all of the tc values. The τc is the mean of 
the tc values. Finding the τe value uses the same method by extracting all of the times the RTN signal 
takes to transition from a captured state to an emitted state, giving the te values. Figure 26d shows 
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the distribution of tc and te. If the extraction is accurate then the tc and te should follow an 
exponential distribution as they do in Figure 26d. 
 
Figure 26, (a) Raw Id data with many RTN events (b) Zoomed in snapshot showing RTN events in Id data (c) Raw Id data in 
blue with HMM Fitting in red (d) distribution of tc and te as a Weibull plot. [97]. 
It is important to note that these characterisation methods are for single RTN traps. This methodology 
for RTN characterising is most effective when employed upon devices which show one clear 
dominating RTN trap. Extraction of multiple traps is possible using the HMM fitting technique, 
although adding more traps makes the extraction significantly more difficult and time consuming.    
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3.4.3 AC RTN Measurement  
This work also utilises an AC RTN measurement scheme, to accelerate the events of an RTN trap. Using 
an AC gate voltage when performing an RTN measurement was first proposed by Zou et al. [99] as a 
way of better understanding RTN behaviour under digital circuit operations.  
The basic principle of AC RTN measurement is to replace the constant Vg and Vd used in DC RTN 
measurement with two level voltages which alternate inversely at a pre-determined rate, as shown in 
Figure 27. The voltages are applied by a pair of SMUs. All voltage levels in this test are fully adjustable. 
As a general guide, VgH should be set to the highest voltage possible without overstressing the device, 
VgL should be the lowest voltage possible while still being able to accurately measure the Id current, 
VdH should be the highest value possible without overstressing the device, and VdL should be 0V. The 
frequency of switching between voltage levels (Fac) is also fully adjustable but as a general guide it 
should be as fast as possible with the equipment used.  
 
Figure 27, Applied voltage waveforms for AC RTN measurement.  
In this test the Id current is measured only at VgL and not observed at VgH. This is done mainly for 
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sampling rate should be selected to be at least 10 time faster than both Fac and the switching 
frequency of the fastest observed RTN trap.   
 
Figure 28, Typical result type from an AC RTN measurement of a device with clear, single dominating trap RTN. 
Figure 28 shows a typical result of an AC RTN measurement when a single dominating trap is present 
within the measured device. After a result similar to Figure 28 has been obtained then the RTN trap 
can be characterised. The methodology used for characterisation of RTN traps observed by AC RTN is 
identical to that used in the DC RTN section. The only important difference is that the τc extracted is 
not the true τc value for that trap. As Id is measured only at VgL for the AC RTN, the vast majority of 
capture events will occur under VgH levels and will therefore not be observed until after switching to 
VgL. This results in some correlation between Fac and observed τc.  
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To further explore the effect of Fac on the observed τ values a number of simulations were run. The 
RTN model used in these simulations is built on a first-order Markov chain process. The full details of 
the model used were published by Toledano et al. [100]. To find Fac’s effect, an RTN trap where 
τc(VgH) and τe(VgL) are equal to 2µs is simulated. These parameters are based on the timing analysis 
shown in Figure 29 with applied VgL = 0.78V and  VgH = 0.82V. Figure 30 shows the results from two 
of these simulations where the Fac values were 1MHz (Figure 30a) and 40KHz (Figure 30b).          
 
Figure 30. Two simulated AC RTNs under two different fac, 1MHz (a) and 40kHz (b), respectively. The time to 
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τc = 2.463e-05, τe = 1.9532e-6  
(a) 
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In Figure 30 it can be seen that under the lower frequency, there are far fewer RTN events, indicating 
that the pre-set τc and τe are different from its apparent values, τc’ and τe’, which is extracted from 
the simulated RTN trace, showing the “shadowing” behaviour caused by AC RTN measurements. To 
find an appropriate minimum value for Fac (Fac_min), this simulation was run for a very large range 
of Fac and the resulting observed values for τc and τe are shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31, Impact of Fac on the time to capture/emission, represented by the ratio between the simulation parameters (τc & 
τe) and the apparent values extracted from the simulated AC RTN traces (τc’ & τe’). 
In Figure 31, it can clearly be seen that Fac has a huge effect on the τc’/τc ratio but hardly any on the 
τe’/τe. In Figure 31, Fac_min is defined as the minimum frequency required to achieve a unity ratio 
between τc’ and τc. This can be explained by the following, when the gate voltage is switched from 
VgH to VgL, the trapped charge can be emitted in a very short time, which, on average, is equal to the 
τe of this trap. Under the low Fac, the time under VgL is much longer than τe. Therefore, τc is controlled 
τc = τe = 2µs 
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by time at VgL, which is much larger than the τc under VgH. This suggests that the Fac frequency must 
be higher than Fac_min to obtain accurate τc when performing an AC RTN measurement. 
The final piece of exploration performed on this subject is looking at the relationship between 
Fac_min, τc and τe. To do this a wide range of τ values was randomly generated and the corresponding 
Fac_min was found by following the procedure laid out in Figure 31. The results of this process are 
shown in Figure 32.  
 
Figure 32, The correlation between the critical frequency, fac_min, and the time to capture and emission pre-set in the 
simulation (τc_th and τe_th), respectively. 
Figure 32 shows that τc has a much stronger correlation with Fac_min than τe. The relationship 
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a goof value for Fac when performing an AC RTN measurement to ensure that the “shadowing” effect 
does not impact upon the potential speed of observed RTN events.  
3.4.4  Hot Carrier or Bias Temperature Instability Device Stressing and Recovery  
In this work defects are generated in devices that originally do not show any clear RTN in order to 
increase the yield of our TRNG designs. To do this, devices were stressed thermally and electrically. 
Chen, Puglisi and Brown et al. [101]–[103] showed the effectiveness of using heavy hot carrier (HC) or 
bias temperature instability (BTI) stresses when trying to generate defects. After applying heavy 
stresses, some recovery should be allowed to remove any temporary or unstable defects. B1500a 
control program can be used to apply both of these stresses and the recovery voltages. Figure 33 
shows the voltage waveforms for stressing and recovery of devices.   
 
Figure 33, Device stressing and recovery voltage waveforms. 
The voltages for stressing and recovery are supplied by 2 SMUs. Both stressing and recovery are best 
performed at a high temperature of 120˚C controlled by the hot plate on the cascade MPS150 probe 
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1.7V to 2V for the samples used in this work. For BTI stress the Vd voltage supplied should be 0V and 
the Vg stress should be between 1.7V-2V for the samples used in this work. For both HC and BTI the 
stress time is fully adjustable, typically ranged from 10s to 100s in this work. For the recovery, Vd is 
equal to 0V and Vg was typically -0.6V. The recovery time is also fully adjustable but typically ranged 
from 10s to 100s depending upon the specific test performed. Figure 34 shows a typical IV 
measurement result from a device when it is fresh, after HC stressing, and after recovery. The specific 
conditions for the example in Figure 34 were 1.9V HC stress voltages for 100s and -0.6V recovery 
voltage for 100s applied to one of the 22nm FinFET samples. In Figure 34 it can be seen that after 
stressing, the IV has significantly degraded and clear RTN switching appears. After recovery, the IV are 
partially recovered, but the RTN switching is still present.  
 




















Chapter 3 - Measurement and Characterisation Methodology




3.4.5   Time Dependent Defect Spectroscopy (TDDS) Measurement  
TDDS measurement is the basis of the PUF section of this work. The TDDS measurement technique 
was first proposed by Grasser et al.[104] as a technique for characterising BTI within a device. The 
basic principle of TDDS measurement is to charge all of the defects within a given device with a high 
gate voltage and then observe all of the de-trapping events when this gate voltage is dropped to a low 
voltage.  
Figure 35 shows the voltage waveforms of a TDDS measurement. It begins with a stabilisation period 
where both the applied Vg and Vd voltages are 0V, the duration of this time is adjustable. The typical 
stabilisation time used in this work is 0.1s. After stabilisation, the Vg voltage is increased to the VgH 
level which is used to charge as many traps as possible within the device. The typical value for VgH 
used in this work is 1.2V, which is high enough to give rapid trap charging but not high enough to 
overstress the device. The Vd voltage is left at 0V during this trap charging stage in order to minimise 
device stress. The time spent charging traps is adjustable but typically done for 0.1s in this work. After 
trap charging, the Vg voltage is dropped to the Vgmeasure level. In the original proposal for TDDS, 
Vgmeasure was selected as Vth [104] but in this work we use a Vg slightly lower than Vth such as 0.36V 
for the HK45 devices, whose Vth is ~0.4V. During this measurement stage the Vd voltage is stepped 
up so that the Id current can be measured, because we are using a very low Vg during this stage, the 
Vd is slightly increased compared to other tests in this work to a value of 0.3V which gives a 
measurable Id current. In this test the only measured parameter is the Id current during the 
Vgmeasure phase of the test. The Id current is measured using a WGFMU allowing for fast 
measurement with a sampling rate of 100ksa/s. The measurement phase typically lasts for 0.1s in this 
work. For our PUF application this TDDS measurement is usually repeated many times on each device 
between 100 and 1,000 times.      
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Figure 35, Applied voltages for TDDS measurement. 
 
Figure 36, Typical Id measurement results from 6 TDDS measurements on a HK45 device. 
Figure 36 shows a typical result from observing the Id current in a HK45 device, after applying the 
TDDS measurement technique 6 times. In Figure 36 the de-trapping events can clearly be observed 
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Chapter 4 -  A novel Random Telegraph Noise (RTN) Based TRNG 
  Introduction 
As discussed in section 2.1.2, RTN is a phenomenon that has been observed in transistors for decades 
but is now becoming a key issue with many research papers focussed on it ([97], [102], [113], [105]–
[112] are examples of recent papers). RTN is caused by defects within a device which have a chance 
to capture or emit charge carriers flowing through the device channel [114]. The effect of these 
captures and emissions is a characteristic square wave effect in the drain and/or gate current of the 
device [101]. RTN is a growing issue in the nano-electronics community because it creates device 
reliability problems as the current fluctuations can result in reduced device lifetime and unwanted 
noise. RTN is gaining more attention from researchers because it has been observed that the 
amplitude of the RTN signal is inversely proportional to device size, meaning that as devices are getting 
smaller  every year, the impact of RTN on the device performance is larger[113], [115], [116].  
As described in section 2.1.2, RTN has been proposed as an entropy source for TRNGs in several papers 
and shows key benefits over other types of noise when it comes to resistance to noise manipulation 
attacks[37], [48], [53], [60], [117].  
 Figure 37 shows the conventional design for an RTN-based TRNG, where the Id current in the device 
is harvested and sampled to gain a random sequence. Some post-processing is then applied to gain 
the random bitstream. However, all of the previously suggested designs have had issues with either 
low speed or poor device selectivity. Some recent research into RTN has given some potential 
improvements to these problems that are investigated in this work.  
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 Figure 37, Conventional RTN based TRNG design.  
To begin, improvements to the utilisation of the individual device as the entropy source in isolation 
are examined. The first major improvement is how the chance of finding clear RTN can be increased. 
In Chen et al.’s 2011 paper [101] and Puglisi et al.’s 2016 paper [102] it is shown that the RTN 
phenomenon can be generated in devices that do not initially show any, through heavy electrical and 
thermal stress. In this work how stressing can be used to reliably create RTN are investigated, to 
improve the selectivity.  
The second Improvement over the traditional RTN-based TRNG scheme is the rate at which any given 
RTN trap can generate random numbers. The use of an AC signal on the gate allows the average 
capture and emission times to be controlled independently, whereas with a DC signal they have an 
inverse relationship with Vg, so one will increase as the other decreases, which limits the maximum 
generation speed. In this work the effect of using an AC signal is further investigated to see how much 
the RTN signal can be accelerated, in the hope of solving the problem of slow number generation rate 
with traditional RTN-based TRNGs.     
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After looking at how to improve the efficiency of the entropy source in isolation, improvement in 
circuit design and components of the TRNG are studied. This includes how the RTN signal is extracted, 
manipulated, and the methodology used for converting the entropy into random numbers. In the 
circuit design section, research is carried out on how multi-level and abnormal RTN can be extracted 
as well as how the security and efficiency of the circuit can be improved.  
Finally, the overall performance of the proposed TRNG design is compared with other state-of-the-art 
TRNG designs. To do this the two main randomness tests suites, the NIST and the DIEHARD tests are 
used. The emerging technique of neural networks is used to test the resistance of the proposed TRNG 
against cracking. The key stats and considerations of the proposed design for the specific applications 
are discussed against other TRNG options.        
 - Generating RTN traps  
In order to improve upon device selectivity, which has been a problem for previous RTN-based TRNGs, 
this work explores the use of electrical and thermal stress to generate traps into any device.  By 
stressing the transistors with a voltage higher than operating condition, new traps can be generated 
through either breaking the hydrogen bond [102] or converting some kind of precursors [109]. These 
generated traps can also induce RTN, like pre-existing traps [102]. This provides a pathway to insert 
RTN into nano-scaled devices. This work explores how to optimise this stressing technique for 
generating traps so that they can be used as an entropy source for a TRNG. These generated traps are 
analysed, and their key parameters are characterized, including the types of traps generated, the 
number of traps generated per device, their amplitude, location, and timing characteristics.  
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4.2.1 Optimising Trap Generation Procedure 
The first step in this process was to find the optimum parameters for generating traps in a given device. 
First, we look at what type of stress gives the best chance of generating traps as well as at what 
temperature. After finding what stress type is most effective, we look at what are the most efficient 
stress voltages and times to generate traps reliably and efficiently, which will be performed a single 
time during manufacture. We also look at the stability of these generated traps to make sure they are 
stable and will not disappear after some time. To accelerate the stability testing and to eliminate 
temporary defects we explore the use of a recovery voltage. The specific voltage used for recovery as 
well as recovery time and temperature are explored. This parameter optimisation work was mainly 
performed on the 22nm FinFET samples as they are the most numerous, allowing us to achieve good 
statistical confidence in the results. After the optimal values were found, several HK45 and HK28 
devices were also tested to show the procedure can work with devices from different fabrication 
processes.    
To make sure we are only looking at generated traps for this section we first scoped all tested devices 
to see if there was any pre-existing RTN. The procedure for this probing is illustrated in Figure 38. The 
probing starts with an IV measurement to see if there is any clear RTN on the IV. The IV measurement 
should range from Vg=0.1V to 1.1V in steps of 2mV with a Vd of 0.1V. If there are clear RTN steps on 
the IV, then we can confidently say there is clear pre-existing RTN without looking in further detail. If 
the IV measurement does not show any clear RTN then we look more closely at the DC RTN 
measurements. For the DC RTN tests, we repeat the measurement 36 times sweeping Vg values from 
0.4V to 1.1V, in steps of 0.02V with a constant Vd of 0.1V with a measurement duration of 0.1s. The 
DC RTN measurement is first done with a sampling frequency of 100kSa/s. If no extractable RTN can 
be observed in any of these measurements we repeat the DC RTN measurement with a sampling 
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frequency of 1MSa/s, and if this has no extractable RTN we repeat again with a sampling frequency of 
1kSa/s. Only if all of these measurements do not show any extractable RTN do we consider the device 
to have no pre-existing traps.  Figure 39 shows the results from this scoping for the 90nm x 28nm 
devices of the 22nm FinFET wafer, where we can see that 38% of tested devices show no signs of any 
RTN traps being present. It is important to note that even though 58% of devices showed some signs 
of RTN it does not mean that this RTN would be useful as an entropy source for a TRNG as the current 
processing circuits require clear edges and plateaus in order to extract the timing information. We 
only aim to look at generated traps in this section so devices that showed any signs of RTN are avoided 
in later testing.   
 
Figure 38, Scoping procedure for finding pre-existing RTN. 
IV Measurement DC RTN 
Measurement
Repeat 36 times sweeping from 0.1Vg 
to 1.1Vg at sampling frequencies of 
100KSa/s, 1Msa/s, and 1kSa/s 
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Figure 39, Rates of pre-existing traps in 175 9nm x 28nm n-type 22nm FinFET devices. 
The next step was to find the stress conditions which gave the highest chance of generating stable 
RTN in our devices. This stress will be performed a single time during manufacturing. Several stress 
modes can introduce trap generation, such as Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) and Bias Temperature 
instability (BTI). BTI is a uniform stress and therefore independent of device geometry [101]. HCI stress 
is non-uniform and can be enhanced with shorter channel length [108]. It has been reported that, for 
some advanced CMOS technologies, HCI can be more effective than BTI in generating new defects 
[107]. To verify the idea that HC can be more effective than BTI and to find the optimal stress 
conditions, scoping tests using both BTI and HC stress with a range of voltages, temperatures, and 
stress times were performed. Figure 40 shows the procedure used to scope each device. 5 devices for 




No pre-existing Normal pre-existing
Abnormal Pre-existing
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Figure 40, Procedure for optimal stress condition scoping on devices showing no pre-existing RTN. stress can be BTI or HC. 
The scoping tests ranged from stress voltages of 1.5V (Vg=1.5V, Vd=0V for BTI and Vg=Vd=1.5V for HC) 
to stress voltages of 2.1V (Vg=2.1V, Vd=0V for BTI and Vg=Vd=2.1V for HC). These voltages were 
applied for 10 seconds at 30˚C and 125˚C for each stress type. Table 5 shows the results from these 
scoping tests. From the scoping tests a HC at 125˚C and 1.9V stress voltages was found to be optimal. 
The higher stress of 2.1V initially shows a very good generation rate, but devices have a high chance 
of breaking down soon after this stress is applied, which is taken into account in the results of Table 
5. With the stress voltages and temperature now selected the stress time was further explored. Stress 
times of 1s, 5s, 10s, 30s, and 50s were applied. The results from this testing are shown in Figure 41. 
We found that increasing the stress time increases the chance of generating RTN, however this 
increased chance follows a power law that gives diminishing returns in terms of generation chance. 
From these tests we selected 50s as the final stress time as it provided a good generation chance of 
85% and increasing the generation chance any higher than this would require significant stress times 
that would be impractical for real world use.  
  
Recover IV IV+DC 
RTN 
Repeat 36 times sweeping 
from 0.1Vg to 1.1Vg 
Stress IV 
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Table 5, RTN trap generation rates under different stress conditions. Optimal results are highlighted. 
Stress Type Stress Temperature (˚C) Stress Voltage (V) Generation Rate (%) 
BTI 30 1.5 0 
  1.7 0 
  1.9 0 
  2.1 0 
 125 1.5 0 
  1.7 0 
  1.9 0 
  2.1 20 
HC 30 1.5 0 
  1.7 0 
  1.9 0 
  2.1 0 
 125 1.5 0 
  1.7 20 
  1.9 80 
  2.1 20 
 
 
Figure 41, Percentage of devices showing clear RTN after given stress times. 
Our findings fit with the widely accepted idea that the HCI of nano-scaled devices is driven by carrier 
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occurs under Vg = Vd with the other two terminals grounded. This supports our choice to use 
Vg=Vd=1.9V at 125o C to accelerate the trap generation during preliminary stressing. Others have also 
suggested that high temperature can further accelerate the generation of traps [102].  
Figure 42 shows a typical result for the IV curves measured when a fresh device is stressed and 
recovered following the optimal procedure explored in this section. The fresh IV shows no signs of 
RTN switching whereas both the stressed and recovered IV curves show clear RTN switching. The 
stressed IV curve shows clear degradation compared to the fresh IV. After recovery, the IV curve is 
shifted closer to the fresh IV. Figure 43 shows typical DC RTN measurements of a device that has been 
stressed and recovered following the procedure outlined in this section. Normally a DC RTN 
measurement is not performed between the stress and recovery steps, however one has been 
included here to show the effects of the process in full. The fresh DC RTN measurement has no signs 
of RTN switching. After both stress and recovery, clear RTN is present showing that the stressing 
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Figure 43, RTN measurements on (a) fresh (b) stresses (c) recovered device following the procedure outlined in section 4.2.1. 
As discussed, when introducing the recovery process, electrical stress can not only generate new 
defects but will also trigger unstable traps. Although both types of trap introduce RTN when 
immediately measured after the stress, it has been reported that the latter will recover and disappear 
after floating for some time. To make sure that our recovery procedure was sufficient for eliminating 
temporary traps we measured the time constants of the generated traps both immediately after 
generation and one month later. Figure 44 shows the results from the time constant measurement of 
the RTN immediately after stress and after 1 month on 20 devices. It can be seen that the time 
constant is very stable after 1 month for all of the tested devices. As the time constant is stable on all 
of the tested devices, we can say with some confidence that the recovery procedure is effective at 
removing unstable traps and that our generation procedure is effective at creating long term RTN 
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Figure 44, Time constant of generated RTN signal in 20 devices immediately after generation and after 1 month. 
The final test for the generation procedure was the effect of the stressing on the gate current (Ig). If 
the stress level is too harsh the gate current of the device increases, because the damage in the gate 
oxide results in larger leakage current. This greater leakage current would lead to decreased efficiency 
of the final design and also could indicate the lifetime of the stressed devices has been reduced too 
significantly. To check the leakage current through the gate, Ig versus Vg measurements were 
performed. These measurements follow the same procedure as the IV sweeps, but the Ig is recorded 
rather than the Id. The Vd for these measurements was fixed at 0.1V. Figure 45 shows the results of a 
typical Ig, Vg measurement. The results from the Ig, Vg measurements show that the increase in the 
Ig current is not significant after stressing (still in the pA range) which shows that our stress level is 
not causing too much damage to the oxide of the devices.    
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Figure 45, typical Ig, Vg measurement of a device before and after optimal stressing procedure. 
With all of the key parameters for the generation of RTN traps found the final procedure could be set. 
In the final design it is not necessary to separate pre-existing and generated traps so the initial scoping 
and measurement to eliminate pre-existing traps does not need to be performed. It is still important 
to do an IV measurement after recovery to test the device is still working correctly and also to do a DC 
RTN measurement to find which devices have clear RTN so they can be used in the TRNG circuit. The 
final procedure is shown in Figure 46, with the stress and recovery times being 50s and the IV and DC 
RTN measurements matching the parameters used in the scoping tests from this section.  
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Figure 46, Generation procedure to be used in final design. 
4.2.2 Characterisation of Generated RTN Traps 
In order to better understand the properties of the generated RTN traps, so that they can be utilised 
to their maximum extent as an entropy source of a TRNG, a number of different characterisation 
techniques were used. The first aspect of the generated RTN to be characterised was the Vg 
dependence of the capture and emission times. This was done to find what Vg values would give the 
optimal τ values for TRNG operation. Following the Vg dependence, we look at the Vd dependence of 
the RTN traps to see how this affects the τ values extracted from the traps. After fully exploring the 
voltage dependencies of the τ times we look into the location of the RTN traps within the stressed 
devices. We first look at the location of the traps in the vertical plane (distance from substrate and 
gate). The location of the traps caused by generation can give us some insight into how they differ 
from pre-existing traps and if using generated traps can have some advantages over pre-existing traps. 
Finally, for the characterisation techniques we look at the amplitude of generated traps over a range 
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of Vg values to find what effect Vg has on single trap impact and if this can be used to improve 
performance of the final TRNG design.  
To explore the Vg dependence of the capture and emission times a large number of RTN traces were 
required. Following the procedure finalised in section 4.2.1 we generated RTN traps in 33 devices and 
performed multiple DC RTN measurements on each device sweeping all of the Vg values where RTN 
could be observed. After the DC RTN measurements were collected the capture and emission events 
were extracted from the RTN traps present in the Id. The RTN events were extracted using the HMM 
fitting technique discussed in section 3.4.2. Figure 47 shows the extracted tc and te values from a 
typical DC RTN measurement. It shows that the tc and te for generated traps follow an exponential 
distribution in the same way as pre-existing traps do. The average of the tc and te values is then taken 
to give τc and τe.  
 
Figure 47, tc and te extraction using HMM method from DC RTN measurement with constant Vg with exponential fitting. 
By performing the same test procedure across the multiple DC RTN measurements, sweeping Vg 
values for each trap, the typical voltage dependence for τc, τe and τc/τe can be extracted. Figure 48 
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referred to as type 1 dependence) and exhibits a similar trend to that of the RTN signals from pre-
existing traps discussed in previous works [99], [100], [118]. This type of RTN accounts for 81% of 
extract dependencies. In this type 1 dependency, the log(τe) is proportional to Vg and log(τc) is 
inversely proportional to Vg.    
 
Figure 48, Example of most common type (type 1) of Vg dependence of tc, te, and tc/te for a generated RTN trap. 
We also found a second type of Vg dependence (type 2) that accounts for 19% of the extracted 
dependencies. Figure 49 shows that log(τc) is inversely proportional to Vg, whereas log(τe) has little 
dependence on Vg. For both types of traps τc is typically more sensitive to Vg than τe, which can be 
seen from the downward trend of τc/τe when Vg is increased. In traditional RTN based TRNG designs 
the optimal Vg to use for operation would be as high as possible to take advantage of the reduced 
τc/τe at higher Vg values. The lower the τc/τe the more RTN events will be observed in any given time 
resulting in a faster entropy source and therefore faster number generation.  
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Figure 49, Example of type 2 trap's Vg dependence for tc, te, and tc/te for a generated RTN trap. 
The next thing that we look at is how the capture and emission times of generated traps respond to 
different applied Vd voltages. To do this we applied the same methodology as that for finding Vg 
dependence and we repeated the measurements over a range of Vd values from 0.1V to 0.3V. After 
extracting all of the τ values for an RTN trap we plotted the Vg dependence of τc and τe against Vg for 
each Vd voltage that was applied. Figure 50 shows a typical response of a generated trap to different 
applied Vd values. It can be seen that changing the Vd applied to a generated trap has the ability to 
shift the τ values to the left or right for any given Vg value. This effect can be quite significant. If we 
look at a Vg value of 0.35 in Figure 50, the τe value is over 1 order of magnitude shorter under 0.3Vd 
than it is at 0.1Vd. Across the devices we tested to see if the slope of τc and τe with regards to applied 
Vg remains constant under different applied Vd values. To find the average effect of changing Vd on 
generated RTN defects, this measurement was repeated across 12 devices, varying the applied Vd 
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shift in the Vg required to give τ0 was extracted. Figure 51 illustrates how the Vg at τo are shifted 
when Vd is increased.  
 
Figure 50, Typical Response of τ values to a change in Vd for a generated RTN trap. 
 
Figure 51, Average shift of Vg required to give τ0 when increasing applied Vd from 0.1V(baseline) to 0.5V across 12 
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Next, we look at the location of the generated defects within the devices. First, the spatial location in 
terms of distance from the gate and substrate of 20 generated traps was extracted using equation 3 











,     (3) 
where:  
Tox = oxide thickness 
Xt = trap position in vertical direction 
k = Boltzmann constant 
T = temperature 
q= magnitude of the electrical charge on the electron 
 
Looking at the results in Figure 52 we can see that the location of the majority of the traps is away 
from the substrate interface and also away from the gate interface distributed in a close to normal 
distribution, slightly biased towards the substrate. As the traps are away from the interface it is more 
difficult for charge carriers to be captured from or emitted to the channel, because of this these traps 
are likely to be slower than the traps at the substrate interface. This impact is, however, not significant 
as we observe many traps which are of useful switching speeds.  
 
Figure 52, Spatial location of generated traps in the vertical plane. 
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The final characterisation was to look at the magnitude of the generated traps. To do this the RTN 
signals were observed, and the top and bottom current levels of the signal were extracted to find the 
ΔId. Id0 was estimated by extracting the uncaptured level of the RTN signal. The ΔId/Id0 for each trap 
was found at a range of different voltage levels. Figure 53 shows the results from 4 typical generated 
RTN defects, where the RTN fluctuation can be as much as 30% of the total current flow, or as little as 
6%. The clear trend of all the RTN signals in Figure 53 is that the single trap impact increases as the Vg 
is reduced, this is not surprising when looking at the impact in terms of ΔId/Id0 as the total current 
flow through the device is reduced with lower Vg values, but the traps themselves can have the same 
size impact on the ΔId. There are some practical implications of this Vg dependence of the single trap 
impact. Firstly, if the RTN signal is extracted at a lower Vg the signal to noise ratio (SNR) will be larger 
making it easier to extract the signal against other environmental noises that could affect the entropy 
of the signal while also making it harder for a potential attacker to insert a malicious noise signal to 
the system. Secondly, it makes the amount of amplification required to extract the signal smaller. This, 
however, is less important as it will not remove the need for amplification, so that the efficiency saving 
is not significant.    
 
Figure 53, Magnitude of 4 generated RTN traps across a range of Vg values. 
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4.2.3 Design Implications of Using Generated RTN 
This subsection looks at the practical implications of using generated RTN over purely pre-existing RTN 
as an entropy source for a TRNG. Firstly, we look at how this affects the requirements for the array 
size used to ensure a useful entropy source is present. After that, we discuss the extra requirements 
for using generated RTN, when compared with using pre-existing RTN. Some other potential ideas are 
also explored.  
The primary purpose of using generated RTN was to decrease the total area required for the TRNG 
circuit, achieved by reducing the array size required to guarantee the presence of a good entropy 
source. Figure 54 shows an analysis of the probability of having a good entropy source, as array size is 
increased with smaller probabilities of clear RTN being present. In Figure 54 we can see that with our 
generated RTN rate of 68%, there is a standard normal cumulative distribution (SNCD) (maps 
percentages to a distribution that has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1) of 6 (equal to a 
probability of ~99.999998%) when the array size is only 10 devices. If the probability RTN is reduced 
to 3%, which is closer to the amount of RTN in high quality commercial wafers, then the number of 
devices required for a similar SNCD is many hundreds of devices.      
 
Figure 54, Analysis of required array size the give a high chance of a good entropy source being present with different 
probabilities of RTN existing within source devices. 
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These results show that the amount of space required for devices within the transistor array can be 
reduced by ~97.5% which is significant when the target market for this design is super low power 
devices which can be 0.05 x 0.05 millimetres or smaller[120]. From this we can say that we have 
improved upon the issue of device selectivity that faced previous RTN based TRNG designs. In addition, 
there are more improvements that could be made to further increase this efficiency. For example, 
entropy source efficiency could be further increased by making multi-level and abnormal RTN usable 
as entropy sources which we will look at in more detail in section 4.4.2. The main downside to using 
generated RTN is that it adds an extra step where devices in the array are stressed using the procedure 
outlined in section 4.2.1. The stressing step will make the manufacture more costly and time 
consuming and the benefits in the area saving have to be weighed and compared to these extra costs 
when considering potential applications. 
Using heavy stresses may not be the only way to introduce or enhance RTN in devices reliably. It may 
also be possible to introduce RTN with specific modification to the device design itself, either in the 
layout of each device or the materials used. For example Lin et al.[121] reduce RTN amplitude by 
changing the fin height direction in FinFET transistors, we could follow the same process but with the 
opposite goal of increasing RTN impact by varying the fin height direction. Unfortunately, we do not 
currently have the required resources to fully explore these ideas and whether they are practical. 
In conclusion for this section, the results show that we can greatly increase the chance of there being 
clear RTN in a device through the use of our generation procedure. We also characterise the behaviour 
and properties of generated RTN so that it can be fully utilised as a TRNG entropy source. As we can 
now have a much greater chance of RTN being present we have greatly improved the previous 
limitation of poor device selectivity that was a problem for previously proposed TRNG designs. 
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However, this innovation does not solve the issue of poor random number generation speed, so 
another key innovation had to be made.  
  Using AC RTN for TRNGs 
As mentioned, the rate of random number generation has been a key limiting factor for previous RTN 
based TRNGs. In this section we discuss our novel solution to this problem. The basis of this new 
technique is to use AC RTN technique, inspired by the work of Zou et al. [99], [118], where an AC signal 
is used on the gate of a device to accelerate the observed τc and τe of an RTN trap. By accelerating 
the observed τ values we can extract entropy from the RTN at a faster rate, allowing for random 
numbers to be generated more quickly. The details of the AC RTN measurement procedure were 
introduced in section 3.4.3, so this section will focus on how using AC RTN measurement can improve 
the efficiency and performance of an RTN based TRNG.   
Traditionally RTN based TRNGs have used a DC measurement technique where constant Vg is used 
[37], [48], [53], [60]. However, using this measurement technique, the maximum output bit rate is 
limited and is one of the key weaknesses of this type of design. The reason for this was illustrated in 
Figure 48, it can be seen that as the value for Vg is adjusted to reduce either τc or τe then the other 
will increase meaning that one of them will always be the bottleneck for the speed. To solve this 
bottleneck, this work proposes using AC RTN which allows us to control τc and τe independently. For 
AC RTN, a square wave signal is applied as Vg rather than the traditional constant voltage signal. This 
allows us to control the τe with the low part of the AC signal (VgL) and the τc with the high part of the 
AC signal (VgH).  
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Figure 55 shows a comparison in how our AC technique and the traditional DC technique interact 
differently with the τc and τe of an RTN trap. With DC RTN measurement, only a single Vg value is 
used, which means that the observed τc and τe are linked, introducing the problem of them having 
inverse relationships with Vg. The AC RTN measurement allows us to use VgL and VgH to separate the 
observed τc and τe so long as the Fac frequency is sufficiently high (see section 3.4.3). The results in 
Figure 55 show that the difference in these observed values can be many orders of magnitude when 
switching from DC to AC techniques. The degree to which an RTN trap can be accelerated using this 
method is proportional to the slopes of τc and τe against Vg. Ideally, the gradient of τe should be as 
high as possible and the gradient of τc should be as negative as possible for the most acceleration.  
 
Figure 55, Diagram of (a) DC RTN measurement technique (b) AC RTN measurement technique and (c) a comparison of DC 
and AC measurement techniques’ effect on observed τ values. 
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To further illustrate the increased rate at which RTN events can be observed using the AC RTN, by 
increasing VgH, one trap’s observed τ values were extracted under different gate voltage conditions, 
the results of this process are shown in Figure 56. The results clearly show that when using the AC RTN 
technique, the greater the difference between VgL and VgH the smaller τ will be.     
 
Figure 56, Illustration of the reduction in observed τ values when using AC measurement method compared to DC. 
To explore this concept in more detail, some of the raw RTN signals were plotted with a range of Vg 
values for the DC RTN results and a range of VgH values, with fixed VgL, for the AC RTN results. Figure 
57 clearly shows that for the DC results with 0.53Vg τc is longer than τe. As the Vg is increased τc 
becomes shorter but τe becomes longer. Looking at the AC results, 0.53VgH has a longer τc than τe 
but when VgH is increased τc becomes smaller but τe remains constant, which shows how the τ values 
have been de-coupled. It is clear that the AC result with a 0.68VgH has many more RTN events than 
any of the DC results, clearly demonstrating the rate of acceleration of using an AC RTN signal. 
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Figure 57, DC and AC comparison with different VgH and AC frequencies and a fixed VgL of 0.28V. 
One major issue with using AC RTN measurement is that half of the time the Id signal is not measured. 
This is because measurement is only performed at VgL and not VgH. While this does offer some 
benefits, such as lower power consumption and taking advantage of the larger single trap impact at 
lower Vg values, losing half the signal needs to be considered. One possible solution is to use two 
devices as entropy sources and apply the AC RTN technique to each, but 180˚ out of phase with each 
other so that when VgH is applied to one, VgL is applied to the other. Using these 2 inverse entropy 
sources allows for continuous Id signal to be used for random number generation. 
One further improvement that can be added to the AC RTN measurement is to utilise the Vd 
dependence of RTN traps that was discussed in section 4.2.2. In that section it was shown that 
increasing Vd can shift the τ cross so that the observed τe value will be lower at any given Vg value 
than for the same Vg with a lower Vd. This concept is illustrated in Figure 58. If this Vd effect is 
combined with the Vg effect so that Vd is increased at VgL and decreased at VgH, it is possible to 
further reduce the observed τ values significantly. Using the trap shown in Figure 58 as an example, 
both τc and τe can be accelerated by an order of magnitude by utilising an AC Vd and Vg signal. The 
specific voltage levels for VdH and VdL can be selected so that VdH is the highest voltage possible 
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without over stressing the device (0.3V usually for this work) and VdL is 0V so that power consumption 
is minimised, and acceleration maximised.    
 
Figure 58, Illustration of how adjusting Vd can be used to decrease observed τ values. 
In conclusion for this section, the results have shown that our second key innovation of using a new 
AC RTN technique has allowed us to greatly increase the speed at which RTN events can be observed, 
thereby increasing the speed at which entropy can be extracted to generate random numbers. It has 
also been shown how using AC signals for both Vg and Vd can further accelerate the speed. 
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  - TRNG Circuit Design 
In this section we look at the circuits that are used to convert the entropy from RTN into a random 
number sequence. We first look at a basic circuit built up from conventional RTN TRNG designs and 
analyse the randomness of the output bits, the performance, and limitations of the circuit. We then 
research into a novel circuit design for extracting entropy from RTN and converting it to random 
numbers, to improve TRNG performance and efficiency at which entropy is extracted from a transistor 
with RTN. As with the first circuit we also evaluate the performance and limitations of the new TRNG 
circuit and analyse the randomness of the output bitstream. To analyse the randomness of these 
circuits we utilise both the NIST test suite and the DIEHARD battery of tests as well as the emerging 
technique of using neural networks to try and crack TRNGs. 
4.4.1 Basic TRNG Circuit 
Here we look at the first circuit design that was created for the TRNG developed in this project. It uses 
a lot of elements from existing TRNGs together with our generated and AC accelerated RTN as the 
entropy source. Figure 59 shows that this circuit follows the traditional principles of amplification, 
digitisation, de-biasing, and sampling, to convert the raw RTN entropy to a random bitstream. In this 
circuit design we use two entropy sources in parallel with two AC voltage supplies 180˚ out of phase 
in order to avoid the problem of AC RTN entropy sources only measuring half of the AC cycle. The 
entropy will be extracted from the transistor currently supplied with VgH and VdL.  
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Figure 59, Basic RTN based TRNG circuit design. 
The performance of this design was verified by simulation. Using simulation allowed for results to be 
gained quickly with limited facilities and time available for this project. The first stage of our 
simulations was to import RTN data from our measurements. A simulated RTN signal was also created 
with parameters extracted from RTN measurement, rather than directly taken from measurement. 
This was done because it was necessary to have RTN data over exceptionally long time periods (>100s) 
to generate enough random numbers to verify the randomness. The memory and processing time 
required to use raw measurement data over time periods this long makes it unfeasible when using a 
simulation-based processing circuit. This limitation is present because we need to maintain a high 
sampling rate of the Id current to be able to extract the RTN signal and this high sampling rate can 
only be maintained for a few seconds before filling the memory of the B1500A. As the processing 
circuit is simulated, all of the RTN data needs to be saved and then imported to the circuit simulation. 
For the randomness analysis that only requires a small number of bits, the raw data is used, for the 
tests that require very large numbers of bits, the simulated RTN signal is used.  
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The RTN simulation followed the technique proposed by Puglisi et al. [105]. The key parameters of τc, 
τe, and amplitude were extracted from the results of AC RTN measurements. The extracted 
parameters were then used as inputs for the simulations to give an RTN signal which has the same 
timing and amplitude characteristics as the measured signal but over a much longer period. Figure 60 
shows a comparison of our simulated RTN signal, as well as the amplified and digitised version of an 
RTN measurement using a simulation of the circuit shown in Figure 59. Figure 60 shows that we can 
accurately simulate the timing characteristics of a measured RTN signal.  
  
Figure 60, Comparison of simulated (top) and measured (bottom) RTN signals with the same time constants. 
With the simulated RTN signal now accurately representing the amplified RTN signal, the next stage is 
the de-biasing section of the circuit. De-biasing is an essential step to ensure that the average time 
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spent at ‘high’ and ‘low’ is the same. It is important that the average time spent at ‘high’ and ‘low’ is 
the same so that when the signal is sampled at regular intervals, the chances of the output being a ‘1’ 
or a ‘0’ are 50%, which is a key feature for any random sequence. Traditionally de-biasing is done using 
a post-processing circuit, such as a Von-Neumann corrector, as explored in section 2.1.2, however 
Chen et al. [60] proposed a new de-biasing technique which can be much more efficient. The principles 
of Chen’s proposed technique are shown in Figure 61. Chen’s method was implemented into our 
simulations to achieve the desired output signal for the de-biasing section of the circuit. 
 
Figure 61, Chen's proposed de-biasing method [60]. 
The basic principle of Chen’s de-biasing technique is to use the digitised RTN signal as the input and 
to toggle the output between high and low every time a rising edge is detected on the input. This 
principle works because an imbalance between time at ‘high’ and time at ‘low’ is caused by a 
difference between τc and τe. By only toggling the output on a rising edge from the input, the time 
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average between switching events becomes the sum of τc and τe which will then balance the time at 
‘high’ and ‘low’. The obvious downside to this de-biasing scheme is that the time between switching 
events becomes longer, therefore reducing the rate at which the signal can be sampled without having 
long chains of a single bit. Another downside to this de-biasing scheme is that the sampling rate has 
to be closely matched to the output de-biased signal to avoid oversampling while maintaining the 
highest bit rate possible, which requires some tuning circuits. The advantages it offers over traditional 
post-processing circuits, however, are significant. Firstly, it is a much simpler circuit, only requiring a 
single flip-flop, massively saving on design footprint and efficiency. This de-biasing also has much 
better bit-efficiency than Von Neumann post-processing as every sampled bit can be used in the 
output bitstream, whereas Von Neumann has to discard many generated bits to maintain high 
entropy.  
With the de-biased RTN waveform gained the last step is to sample the waveform to obtain the ‘1’ 
and ‘0’ output bits. A sampling clock in the form of the ‘clock’ signal in Figure 61 is used to sample the 
de-biased RTN signal on every rising edge of the clock signal. The sampling rate has to be carefully 
selected as a sampling rate that is too fast will cause long chains of ‘1s’ or ‘0s’ which reduces the 
output entropy and causes the bitstream to fail the randomness tests. Figure 62 shows a sample of 
some random bits that were generated with a sampling rate of 2Msa/s. 
 
Figure 62, Sample of random bitstream, sampled at a rate of 2MSa/s. 
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In order to verify that the generated bits have a high degree of randomness they were tested using 
the NIST test suite, which was discussed in section 2.1.1. For the NIST tests at least 5 million bits should 
be generated for the results of the tests to be reliable. Using the settings defined in the user guide 
[33] for the parameters of each NIST test is important to gain reliable results. The settings for the NIST 
test suite used in this work are as follows:  
NIST Test Parameters  
Significance value (α) = 0.01 
Frequency monobit test – sequence length (n) = 100, number of sequences = 100  
Frequency within a block test – sequence length (n) = 100, block size (M) = 20, number of sequences 
= 100   
Runs test - sequence length (n) = 100, number of sequences = 100 
Test for the Longest Run of Ones in a Block – sequence length (n) = 128, length of each block (M) = 8, 
number of sequences = 100   
Binary matrix rank test – sequence length (n) = 38,912, number of sequences = 100   
Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test – sequence length (n) = 1,000, number of sequences = 50  
Non-overlapping Template Matching Test - bits of each template (m) = 9, length of the entire bit string 
under test (n) = 1,000 
Overlapping Template Matching Test - sequence length (n) = 1,000,000, number of sequences = 10 
Maurer’s “Universal Statistical” Test -   sequence length (n) = 387,840, number of sequences = 10 
Linear Complexity Test - sequence length (n) = 1,000,000, block size (M) = 500 
Serial Test - sequence length (n) = 1,000, length in bits of each block (m) = 7, number of sequences = 
100   
Approximate Entropy Test - sequence length (n) = 1,000, length in bits of each block (m) = 4, number 
of sequences = 100   
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Cumulative Sums (Cumsum) Test - sequence length (n) = 1,000, number of sequences = 100   
Random Excursions Test - sequence length (n) = 1,000,000 
Random Excursions Variant Test - sequence length (n) = 1,000,000 
Figure 63(a) shows a bitmap of some of the TRNG results from the measured RTN data. Bitmaps make 
it easier to visualise the randomness of the results, as no clear patterns or large blocks of a single 
colour can be seen. Figure 63(b) shows the results from the NIST tests which must be passed if the 
bitstream is to be declared as random. Tests T1 to T9 could be performed with measured RTN data, 
the other tests required simulated RTN to generate enough bits to complete the test. As the figure 
shows, the proposed TRNG design passes all of the NIST tests under the applied sampling rate of 
2MSa/s. The tests which require many repeated tests show the proportion of bitstreams that pass as 
well as the overall pass/fail status. The tests that perform a single test on one bitstream only show the 
pass/fail result of that one test.  
 
Figure 63, (a)Bitmap of random bitstream created by proposed TRNG and (b)NIST test results of bitstream generated by 
proposed TRNG with a significance value of 0.01. Results from one TRNG instance operating with a sampling rate of 
2MSa/s. Tests T1-T9 use measured RTN data, the others use simulated RTN data. 
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The sampling frequency(fsp) plays a huge role in the output entropy of the TRNG. Oversampling under 
high fsp lowers the randomness significantly as it will result in long chains of ‘0’ or ‘1’ if the RTN is 
sampled multiple times before changing state, as is discussed by Mohanty et al [37]. To explore the 
effects of fsp on the proposed TRNG design, we simulate an AC RTN entropy source with τc=τe=2μs at 
the fac larger than fac_min. Different fsp values are used to generate random numbers, which are 
evaluated through the NIST test suite. Figure 64 shows the results of this process. When fsp is higher 
than a specific value, which we term fsp_max, the TRNG fails some or all of the NIST tests. To explore 
the impact of fsp_max on different entropy sources, which have different trap properties, we 
randomly generate τc and τe values and then determine the fsp_max for each trap by performing the 
NIST tests on each result. Figure 65 shows the results from this experiment. In Figure 65 fsp_max is 
plotted against τc + τe, a clear power law correlation can be observed between these two parameters. 
For example, a maximum random bit generation speed of 1MHz can be achieved if the RTN entropy 
source has τc + τe = 2μs. For each entropy source, by selecting the smallest possible τc and τe with 
VgH, VgL and operating under the suitable fac and fsp, the maximum possible speed of the TRNG 
based on this entropy source can be achieved. Figure 65 shows that fsp_max can be estimated by 
using: fsp_max = 1/(τc+τe). 
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Figure 64, NIST test results on the generated bitstream of a single TRNG instance under different sampling frequencies (fsp).  
 
Figure 65, Fsp_max for TRNGs with RTN entropy sources of different τc+τe values. 
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To find the optimal sampling rate to be applied across multiple TRNGs, a yield analysis was performed. 
20 TRNGs were simulated and a range of sampling frequencies was applied. The number of TRNGs 
that passed the NIST tests at each sampling value were then counted. Figure 66 shows the analysis of 
these 20 simulated TRNGs, based on different measured traps. The results show that currently just 
under 20% of devices will pass the NIST tests at a sampling rate of 5Mbps and 40% at 3Mbps, under 
the current limitations. 90% of devices can function under a sampling rate of 1Mbps which is more 
than what is needed by some low power applications such as, internet secure session links, car keys, 
or ID cards [45]. 
 
Figure 66, Percentage of devices (20 total) that pass the NIST tests at a given sampling frequency. 
Next, we will discuss the limitations of this TRNG design and potential improvement. The first 
limitation is this design’s ability to extract entropy from devices which have more than 1 active RTN 
trap, resulting in multi-level RTN. In this design a simple thresholding technique can be used to allow 
for multi-level RTN to be used as an entropy source. The thresholding technique was proposed by 
Mohanty et al. [37] and is illustrated in Figure 67. A threshold is selected and any value above it is 
considered as ‘high’ and any value below it is considered as ‘low’. This allows for multi-level RTN to be 
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used as an entropy source; but it limits the operation of the TRNG to the speed of the slowest RTN 
trap. Only being able to extract entropy from the slowest trap is clearly not ideal as a significant 
amount of entropy is lost which could be used to increase the operational speed of the TRNG. 
 
Figure 67, Threshold technique for extracting entropy from multi-level RTN, as proposed and illustrated by Mohanty et al 
[37]. 
Another key limitation of this TRNG design is its ability to deal with abnormal RTN where there can be 
‘quiet’ phases, which is when it appears that the RTN has disappeared for some time and will then re-
appear after a random delay. The obvious problem is that, even when the RTN temporarily disappears, 
the TRNG continues to sample the signal at the same rate, causing oversampling and a long chain of 
either ‘0’ or ‘1’. No previous RTN based TRNGs have considered this problem even though it could be 
significant as abnormal RTN is fairly common and could be mistaken for normal RTN if the time window 
for observing it is too small. As most RTN measurements are currently performed with short time 
windows it is highly possible that abnormal RTN is a bigger issue than currently known. Finally, this 
type of RTN based TRNG can be susceptible to oversampling attacks where an extra signal is injected 
into the sampling clock in order to effectively increase the sampling rate. If the sampling rate is 
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increased through this attack it can cause long chains of a single output which reduce the output 
entropy and make the system easier to predict. 
In conclusion for this section, a novel RTN based TRNG circuit has been proposed that improves upon 
the selectivity and generation rate. These improvements are achieved through a novel RTN generation 
scheme and a new use of AC RTN measurement. The proposed design’s key parameters are outlined, 
and the randomness is verified using the industry standard NIST test suite.  This section also discussed 
how the proposed TRNG still has limitations when trying to extract entropy from RTN sources which 
are not ideal two-level RTN, as well as issues with resistance to oversampling attacks.  
4.4.2 Improved RTN Based TRNG Circuit 
In this section we look at the details of the improved RTN based TRNG circuit. First, the problems that 
this new circuit hopes to solve are looked at in more detail. Next, we develop a circuit that converts 
all RTN edges to pulses which can be used as a sampling signal for generating random numbers. This 
is followed by looking at the FPGA-based circuit for converting the RTN edge pulses to random 
numbers. Finally, the performance of the improved TRNG circuit is compared with the most prominent 
existing TRNG designs.  
In the previous RTN TRNG explored in this work, only two-level RTN could be extracted effectively. 
This type of RTN is shown in Figure 68a where a constant gate (Vg) and drain (Vd) voltage are applied 
and two clear levels can be observed in the measured drain current (Id). However, it is often the case 
that more than one trap is present in a given device, resulting in an RTN signal with more than 2 visible 
levels. This is referred to as multi-level RTN [122] and one example is given in Figure 68.b, where we 
can observe 4 clear levels in the Id. When 4 clear levels can be observed, there are 2 active traps 
influencing the channel current. It is possible to have more traps active, although in nano-scale devices 
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it is rare to have more than a few clearly discernible traps. The number of traps present is proportional 
to device area and the single trap impact is inversely proportional to it [113], [116]. It is also  observed 
that an RTN trap may only be active when a dominating trap is in a certain state [123]. This can result 
in Id measurements similar to Figure 68.c where there is clearly a slower trap and a faster trap, but 
the faster trap is only active when the slow trap is in the empty state. This third type of trap is what 
we refer to as abnormal RTN and shows the ‘quiet’ phases of the RTN signal which would cause issues 
for previously proposed RTN TRNGs.  
 
Figure 68,  Major different types of RTN observed in measurement of individual transistors of the same design and size. (a) 
An example of two-level RTN, the most well studied type of RTN utilised by traditional RTN based TRNGs (b) An example of 
multi-level RTN, a more complex RTN signal which cannot be used by traditional RTN based TRNGs but can be used by our 
newly presented TRNG design. (c) An example of abnormal RTN, the most complex type of RTN discussed here. Abnormal 
RTN could not be used in traditional designs and could cause major issues such as oversampling.  
It was found that only 81% of traps displayed single level RTN, with the rest showing multi-level RTN. 
19% of traps having clear multi-level behaviour is a significant amount that would not be efficiently 
extracted using traditional techniques for RTN-based TRNGs. It is also possible that this is an 
underestimation of the number of traps that show multi-level behaviour. As a very high sampling rate 
has to be used by the WGFMUs to capture the RTN trapping, a very short time window (<1s) has to be 
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used which means that it is possible that a slower trap could be missed which would destroy the 
performance of a traditional RTN TRNG. This is also the reason we do not show the percentage of traps 
that are abnormal as it is impossible to accurately predict this with the time windows available using 
the measurement techniques discussed in this work. To avoid this problem the improved circuit design 
can utilise any of the types of RTN. 
TRNG design utilising multi-level RTN. The TRNG presented in this work has 3 major parts. The first 
part is the entropy source which is a single nano-scale transistor with a constant Vg and Vd applied to 
it, whose Id current is amplified so that it can be used as an input to the edge-to-pulse circuit. The 
second major section of the TRNG circuit is the edge-to-pulse circuit which is used to perform the 
analogue to digital conversion where the amplified RTN signal is converted to digital pulses that can 
be used as an input to the processing circuit. The final part of the circuit is the processing circuit, which 
converts the digital pulses to random numbers through the sampling of a high frequency oscillator. 
The processing circuit also acts as a bridge between the asynchronous random number generation 
and any synchronous circuit it is attached to.  
Edge-to-Pulse circuit. The edge-to-pulse circuit takes an amplified RTN signal and converts the 
trapping and de-trapping events into short pulses. These short pulses can then be used by the 
processing circuit to generate random numbers based upon the timing interval of these events. The 
edge-to-pulse circuit consists of 3 sub-circuits.  
The first of these sub-circuits is a differentiator that converts the RTN trapping and de-trapping events 
into positive and negative voltage spikes respectively as seen in Figure 69a-b. It is important that the 
differentiator circuit is biased so that no edges give a constant output voltage of 0. This 0V no edge 
output is set so that differentiated de-trapping events will give a negative voltage spike which is 
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required for the next absolute value sub-circuit. In our proof of concept circuit, this 0V bias was 
achieved with a variable resistor connected to the non-inverting terminal supplied with -5V. In a 
commercial product this would be replaced with a fixed resistor as the expected Id current from the 
entropy source for the given Vg and Vd would be known. 
The second sub-circuit is the absolute value circuit seen in Figure 69c-d. It converts the negative spikes 
from the differentiated de-trapping events into positive spikes so that they can be digitised by the 
same comparator. The gain of the absolute value circuit can be greater than 1 if required, but in our 
experimental case it is left at unity as no further amplification was required for the spikes to be of 
sufficient magnitude as input for the comparator. 
The final sub-circuit shown in Figure 69e-f is a comparator which is used to convert the analogue spikes 
from the absolute value circuit to digital pulses which can be used as an input to the processing section 
of the TRNG. Figure 70 shows the output with a multi-level RTN input. The comparator is set to give a 
0V or 3V output for low and high levels which is required by the I/O of the FPGA used for the processing 
section. The reference voltage for the comparator input is set to be slightly higher than the background 
noise of the absolute value circuit so that all RTN event spikes will be digitised. The complete 
breadboard implementation of the edge-to-pulse circuit is shown in Figure 71.  
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Figure 69, Edge-to-pulse circuit diagram and example outputs. (a) Circuit diagram of differentiator used to convert RTN 
edges to voltage spikes. (b) Example output signal from differentiator for the given input RTN signal, edges converted to 
positive and negative spikes. (c) Circuit diagram of absolute value circuit used to convert positive and negative differentiator 
spikes to all positive spikes. (d) Example output signal from absolute value circuit for the given RTN input. All voltage spikes 
are now positive. (e) Circuit diagram of comparator used to convert voltage spikes from absolute value circuit to digital 
pulses that can be used as input to the FPGA. (f) Example output from comparator circuit for given RTN input, spike has 
been converted to square pulse. 
 
Figure 70, Output of comparator for given RTN input signal to edge-to-pulse module. Output of comparator has a 
magnitude of 3V making it a suitable input for the FPGA. The comparator output is triggered on both the edges of the large 
slower trap and the smaller faster trap, showing our design can make use of multi-level RTN. Some of the edges of the small 
trap can be missed, however, as the magnitude of the trap is close to the background noise. 
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Figure 71, Photograph of Edge-to-pulse circuit, implemented on breadboard, including differentiator, absolute value, and 
comparator circuits. Amplified RTN signal is used as input to this circuit and the comparator output is sent to processing 
FPGA.  
 
For the proof of concept circuit, supply voltages were applied with Keysight E3632A DC power 
supplies, Id current with RTN events was amplified using a Femto DHPCA-100 amplifier, and a Xilinx 
Spartan 3 FPGA development board was used. The entropy source device was probed on a sample 
silicon wafer using a Cascade Summit probe station. FPGA programming was performed in the ISE 
design suite using a combination of custom and conventional VHDL blocks assembled in the visual 
programming environment. Videos of the TRNG proof of concept circuit in operation are available. 
Processing Circuit implemented on an FPGA. The second major part of our TRNG design is the 
processing circuit where the digitised pulses from the edge-to-pulse circuit are used to generate 
random numbers, the complete block diagram of this part of the TRNG is shown in Figure 72. The 
processing circuit itself can be split into 3 sub-circuits. The first two sub-circuits for sampling and data 
buffering are essential for random number generation. The third sub-circuit is used for transmission 
of the generated numbers to an external analysis PC which is used for result verification. To perform 
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the data transmission, the RS232 UART communication on the FPGA development board was used. 
The requirements of the RS232 communication governed the selection of the 8-bit words of random 
numbers that were created in the first 2 sub-circuits, as well as the maximum data transfer rate of 
19200 bps, which is limited by the maximum clock speed of the FPGA. Without the limitations of the 
RS232 communication these variables could be changed to fit the requirements of the given 
application. 
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Figure 72, Block diagram of FPGA section of the proof of concept TRNG. This block diagram was used for the visual 
programming part of the FPGA implementation. Each block is created using VHDL programming, with the De-bias and 
Trigger modules being custom code and the other modules created using conventional designs. This block diagram shows 
all 3 key parts of the FPGA design, which are the sampling, buffering, and transmission circuits.  
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The sampling sub-circuit contains two key components, the first of these is a D-Flip-flop which is used 
to asynchronously sample an oscillator (in this case the clock of the FPGA) whenever a rising pulse 
edge is received from the edge-to-pulse circuit. To achieve the sampling, the oscillator is connected 
to the D-input of the flip-flop and the output of the edge-to-pulse circuit is connected to the clock 
input of the flip-flop. The output ‘Q’ will update to whatever value the oscillator was at when the rising 
edge of the pulse was received. The second key component in this section is a trigger module that is 
used to ensure each pulse from the edge-to-pulse circuit only results in one value being written into 
the data buffering section. This is achieved by the trigger module having both the FPGA clock and the 
edge-to-pulse output connected as inputs. Every time a pulse rising edge is received from the edge-to 
pulse circuit the trigger unit will output a pulse that has a duration of a single clock cycle of the FPGA 
clock. This single clock cycle pulse can then be used as an enable signal in other parts of the circuit 
that requires to be synchronous.  
The data buffering sub-circuit is used to buffer the random numbers that are generated at an 
asynchronous non-constant rate so that they can be read at a constant synchronous rate. In our proof 
of concept circuit, it also converts the single generated random bits into 8-bit random words so they 
can be transmitted following the RS232 communication scheme. The first important module of the 
data buffering sub-circuit is the serial-to-parallel converter. For the proof of concept circuit this 
module converts 8 serial input random numbers to a single parallel 8-bit random word which can then 
be sent to the first-in-first-out (FIFO) buffer. The second key module is a counter which outputs a single 
pulse for every 8 input pulses from the trigger module of the sampling sub-circuit. This counter is used 
to control the transmission of data from the serial to parallel converter to the FIFO buffer. The data 
buffering sub-circuit also contains a trigger module that is the same as in the sampling sub-circuit. This 
second trigger module is used to ensure that the output from the counter is a pulse that only lasts for 
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a single clock pulse of the FPGA. This is important to ensure that when data is transferred from the 
serial to parallel converter and then to the FIFO buffer, it is only transferred once per 8-bit word.  
The final key module in the data buffering sub-circuit is the FIFO buffer, the main purpose of this 
module is to allow the random words to be read from the TRNG at a different rate from that which 
they are generated at. This concept is key as the random bits are generated at the rate of the RTN 
events whereas any application using these numbers can use them at a rate dictated by the 
application’s requirements. The depth of the FIFO buffer can also be adjusted depending on the 
application’s requirements. The FIFO buffer will write in the random number sent from the serial to 
parallel converter every time an enable pulse is received from the data buffering trigger module. 
When the FIFO is full, data will not be written in and instead will be discarded. The FIFO buffer will 
output a random 8-bit word every time an enable signal is received from the transmission sub-circuit 
unless the FIFO buffer is empty in which case nothing will be transmitted.  
The transmission sub circuit is used to transmit the random 8-bit words from the data buffering sub-
circuit to an external analysis PC. In practice this sub-circuit is not required for TRNG operation, but it 
is used here in our proof of concept circuit so analysis such as the NIST tests could be performed. The 
first key module in the data transmission circuit is the baud generator, which divides the FPGA clock 
signal down by 16 times to give a baud rate for the RS232 UART communication. The second key 
module is the UART transmitter, this is a module that follows the RS232 communication scheme and 
has a maximum data transfer rate of 19200 bps for the used FPGA. This maximum data transfer rate 
is the bottleneck for our proof of concept circuit. The TRNG itself can generate random bits at a much 
faster rate, the maximum of which is limited by the slew rate of the op-amps in the edge-to-pulse 
circuit.  
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Sampling Oscillator Parameters. The parameters for the oscillator are key for the proposed TRNG to 
work properly and output unbiased random numbers. The key parameters are the frequency of 
oscillation, and duty factor.  
For the frequency of oscillation, the key point is that the frequency should be high enough that the 
signal is not sampled multiple times by the RTN before switching state. If the oscillator is too slow and 
sampled multiple times before switching, the output will contain long chains of the same bit which 
lowers entropy and causes the bitstream to be non-random. Figure 73 shows a simulation of a TRNG 
with multiple RTN traps with fixed capture times (τc) and emission times (τe) operating across a range 
of oscillator frequencies. The bit rate remains almost constant as this is controlled by the RTN event 
timing. When the oscillator frequency is reduced below Foscmin, however, the generated bits start to 
fail the Runs Test for randomness. Foscmin is defined by equation 5 where n is the number of traps 
present in the entropy source. To act as a rule of thumb when choosing an oscillator frequency, it 
should be selected to be as high as possible without violating the other key parameters as any 





𝑖=1   (5) 
For the duty factor of the oscillator the key point is that it should be kept as close to 50% as possible, 
this is because a duty factor significantly different to this will result in a bias of the output bitstream 
to either ‘0’ or ‘1’. Figure 74 shows the relationship between duty factor of oscillator and the Shannon 
entropy of the output bitstream. Shannon entropy is used to check if there is any bias towards one 
value. For a system with two possible outputs, the ideal result for Shannon entropy is ‘1’. Any 
reduction from this represents a reduction in the randomness of the results. To find the maximum 
allowable error in the duty factor away from 50% the NIST test suite was used to test bitstreams 
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generated from a simulated TRNG over a range of duty factors. It was found that the maximum 
variation away from 50% that would still pass all 15 NIST tests was 6%. If the oscillator has a duty factor 
that is not ideal but has a consistent frequency greater than double Foscmin the duty factor can be 
improved by use of an extra de-bias module. This module takes the unbalanced oscillator as the input 
and toggles the output every time a rising edge is detected in the input. This follows the de-biasing 
scheme outlined in section 4.4.1 as proposed by Mohanty et al. [37]. 
 
Figure 73, Output bit rate and Runs Test result against the frequency of the oscillator being sampled by the RTN edge 
pulses. The Runs Test is used to find runs of ‘1’ or ‘0’ and determines whether a run of the same result that number of times 
is acceptable in a bitstream of the given length, based on a null hypothesis theory with a significance value of 0.01. The 
Runs Test gives a result of ‘1’ if it passes and a ‘0’ if it fails, a failure indicates oversampling of the oscillator by the RTN 
signal causing long chains of the same result. The RTN signal simulated for this test uses 5 traps with τc and τe values 
extracted from characterisation of real traps. Both the rising and trailing edges of the RTN signal were used for sampling 
giving and Foscmin of 1.21E+5Hz. The minimum frequency that could pass the Runs Test was 8.6E+4Hz and the output bit 
rate was fixed at 122800bps. 
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Figure 74, Shannon entropy of output bitstream when RTN signal is used to sample oscillators of different duty factors. 
Shannon entropy is used to measure the ratio of ‘0’ bits to ‘1’ bits. A Shannon entropy of ‘1’ indicates a 50% of any selected 
bit being ‘0’ or ‘1’. A Shannon entropy less than 1 is caused by a bias in the bitstream to either ‘0’ or ‘1’, indicating that the 
bitstream is not random. A 100kb bitstream was generated at each data point to be tested. 9 NIST tests were done on these 
bitstreams to find the largest error from 50% duty factor that could pass. When the largest error that could pass 9 NIST 
tests was found, a 3Mb bitstream was generated with that error to verify the results with all 15 NIST tests. 
Bitstream analysis and NIST test results. To verify the randomness of the generated bitstreams, they 
were transmitted to an external analysis PC. On the analysis PC, bitstreams were divided up into blocks 
whose sizes are defined by the guidelines provided in the instruction manual for the NIST test suite[33] 
(see section 4.4.1 for full details) and all 15 NIST tests were run. The significance value for our NIST 
tests was set to 0.01 which is the recommended value from NIST. For the tests excluding the non-
overlapping template matching, random excursions, and random excursions variant, multiple blocks 
of random numbers are tested, and a proportion defined by NIST must pass the test for the bitstream 
to be considered random. For the three tests that do not require multiple blocks tested, the individual 
P-value is used to determine success or failure. The bitstreams from our TRNG have passed all 15 NIST 
tests without post-processing as shown in Table 6.  
Our generated bitstream was also tested by using the DIEHARD test suite [124]. As the original version 
of the DIEHARD test suite is not readily available any more, we used the Dieharder test suite 
constructed by Robert G. Brown [124] for Duke University, which contains accurate reconstructions 
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of each of the original DIEHARD tests. To perform the DIEHARD tests the binary bitstreams used for 
the NIST test were converted to a stream of 32-bit unsigned integers, as required by the “202” 
generator setting in the Dieharder test suite. 8Mb of data was used for testing in the Dieharder suite. 
The lengths of the bitstreams used for each test were determined by the guidelines provided with the 
Dieharder test suite [124]. The random excursions and random excursions variant tests were not 
included in the Dieharder test suite, however the tests are identical to the tests with the same name 
in the NIST test suite, so the NIST test results are shown. The Monkey tests (OPSO, OQSO and DNA) 
are listed as being unreliable so they were not used for the DIEHARD testing. The DIEHARD tests work 
on the same null-hypothesis theorem as the NIST tests, so that we kept the same significance value of 
0.01 for determining P-value success or failure. The results of the DIEHARD tests are shown in Table 
7. Our design was able to pass all of the available DIEHARD tests, giving a great confidence in the truly 
random nature of our generated bitstream. To further illustrate the randomness of our generated 
bitstream, a sample set of 146k bits was used to create a bitmap in Figure 75, where no clear patterns 
can be seen, confirming the randomness of the bitstream.  
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Table 6, NIST Test suite results for bitstream generated by our TRNG design with a significance value of 0.01. 
Test 
ID 
Name Proportion Pass/Fail 
T1 Monobit test 99/100 Pass 
T2 Frequency tests within a block 100/100 Pass 
T3 Cumulative sums Test 96/100 Pass 
T4 Run Test 99/100 Pass 
T5 Longest Run of Ones in a block 98/100 Pass 
T6 Discrete Fourier Transform Test 49/50 Pass 
T7 Non-overlapping Template Matching n/a Pass 
T8 Approximate Entropy Test 96/100 Pass 
T9 Serial Test 100/100 Pass 
T10 Binary Matrix Rank 99/100 Pass 
T11 Overlapping Template Matching 8/10 Pass 
T12 Universal 8/10 Pass 
T13 Linear Complexity 10/10 Pass 
T14 Random Excursions n/a Pass 
T15 Random Excursions Variant n/a Pass 
 
Figure 75, Bitmap of 146k output random bits from the improved RTN based TRNG circuit. 
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Table 7. DIEHARD Test Results 
Test ID Name P-Value Pass/Fail 
T1 Birthday spacings test 0.87125 Pass 
T2 Overlapping permutations 0.98398 Pass 
T3 Rank of matrices 0.56833 Pass 
T4 Bitstream test 0.72978 Pass 
T5 Count-the-1's stream test 0.36753 Pass 
T6 Count-the-1's byte test 0.22222 Pass 
T7 Parking lot test 0.94059 Pass 
T8 Minimum distance test 0.12461 Pass 
T9 3D spheres test 0.12013 Pass 
T10 Squeeze test 0.55082 Pass 
T11 Overlapping sums test 0.16278 Pass 
T12 Runs test 0.95088 Pass 
T13 Craps Test 0.35721 Pass 
T14 Random Excursions n/a Pass 
T15 Random Excursions Variant n/a Pass 
 
Resistance to Machine Learning Attacks. To test how our TRNG would resist machine learning attacks 
and further enhance confidence in the security of the TRNG, we tested some of our generated 
bitstreams with an LSTM neural network. LSTM networks have been shown to be able to predict some 
random number generator outputs, even if the RNG passes all of the NIST tests [125]. We used 1 
million generated bits for testing with the LSTM network and tried to predict future bits that will be 
generated by the TRNG. The construction of the LSTM neural network was guided by the earlier works 
that used machine learning to try to crack random number generators [38], [125], [126]. Based on the 
principles outlined in these previous works, our LSTM network was constructed with an LSTM layer of 
256 hidden units and a single hidden layer, connected to a fully connected layer. Figure 76 shows the 
format and connections of the layers within the LSTM network. The training was performed with 1 
million bits over 20 epochs. 100,000 predicted bits were generated and tested against 100,000 bits 
from the TRNG and the hamming distance between them was calculated. The hamming distance 
achieved was 0.4981. The result of this process is that after training, the LSTM network was only able 
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to predict the bits of our TRNG output with an accuracy of 49.81%, which is very close to the ideal 
value of 50% that could be achieved through random guessing. This shows that our design is resilient 
against machine learning based attacks and further increases confidence in the true random nature 
of the output.   
 
Figure 76, Layout and connections of layers within the LSTM network used for testing the TRNG design. 
Next, we will discuss the various benefits and limitations of this newly proposed design, as well as 
comparing it to previously proposed designs. We also discuss the tuning of various parameters within 
the design to optimise it for different applications. Previously proposed RTN based TRNGs could not 
extract the full entropy from multi-level or abnormal RTN. They rely upon finding a device from a large 
array that fits the ideal requirements of the TRNG[48]. These ideal devices can be exceedingly rare, 
resulting in a large TRNG footprint as many devices have to be included in the array as well as 
complicated tuning and selection circuits to identify and select the ideal device. In our new design the 
ability to use devices that have multi-level or abnormal RTN vastly increases the chances that a device 
will be suitable for use in a TRNG. This means that the size of array required for potential entropy 
sources can be reduced to fewer than 10 devices. There is further benefit to using multi-level RTN in 
terms of output bit rate. In traditional designs where multi-level RTN might be present, the device is 
still usable if one trap is significantly larger than the other. In this case, only the entropy from this 
largest trap, however, was extracted. With our design, we can extract entropy from all of the traps. 
This allows us to utilise many more RTN events in a given time window, when compared to a traditional 
design. 
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The new processing scheme proposed in this work gives us several key advantages over previous 
works. The first one is the removal of the complicated tuning of a sampling clock frequency. In 
traditional designs, the sampling clock frequency must be heavily correlated with the capture and 
emission times of the device being used as an entropy source in order to maintain a high output bit 
rate, while also avoiding oversampling of the entropy source. As the capture and emission times of a 
given device are unknown and can have a large device to device variation, the selection of a sampling 
clock frequency is complicated as it has to match a specific device before manufacture, or the TRNG 
must have a complex self-tuning mechanism that will greatly increase design complexity and power 
consumption. With our proposed TRNG design the RTN events are used to do the sampling, so that no 
tuning is needed as long as the oscillator being sampled is running at a higher frequency than the RTN 
events. This sampling technique also makes our design immune to over-sampling attacks which has 
been known to be an issue for previous TRNGs [127], where a higher frequency signal is imposed on 
top of the sampling clock to oversample the RTN signal and give long chains of ‘1’ or ‘0’. It is important 
to note that our design would be susceptible to under-sampling attacks which would give the same 
effect as oversampling for a traditional design. It is more difficult, however, to remove edges from the 
oscillator signal, without having direct access to the oscillator itself, than to add extra edges to a signal 
by simply applying an additional signal on top of it.  
Another key advantage of the new processing scheme is that it removes the need for complicated 
post-processing. In traditional designs, Von Neumann or ORing post-processing were the most popular 
techniques to remove bias from the output[128]. These techniques require large complex circuits to 
implement and reduce TRNG throughput. More recently new post-processing techniques have been 
proposed that use a toggling output for each input rising edge from the entropy source[37]. This 
greatly reduces the circuit complexity, but it also greatly reduces the bit rate of the design. With our 
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new technique no post-processing is required, as long as the sampling oscillator has a duty factor 
between 44% of 56%.  
The current bit rate of our TRNG is limited to 19,200 bps by the requirements of the RS232 
communication. For practical applications, this transmission circuit is not required so this limitation 
on the maximum bit rate would be removed. With the data transmission bit rate limit removed the 
next limiting factor is the slew rate of the op-amps used in the edge-to-pulse module. With the 
currently selected components the slew rate allows us to achieve a bit rate of several Mbps. If the 
edge-to-pulse model was designed from the transistor level for this purpose, higher slew rates should 
be achieved, further increasing bit rate into the range of at least tens of Mbps.  
The speed of the RTN events also governs the bit rate of the TRNG. At the current bit rate limit of 
19,200 bps it is extremely common to have an RTN which is capable of generating bits at this rate. As 
the bit rate increases to a level that the rate of the RTN events becomes the limiting factor, there are 
several options available to increase the TRNG throughput. The first option is to find a device with 
faster RTN events. As mentioned earlier RTN event rate has a large device to device variation. Some 
devices may be capable of generating TRNGs with a bit rate in the Mbps range[129] while others can 
only achieve a few kbps. In practice all TRNGs could be tested after manufacture and have their 
throughput rated accordingly so a consumer can select a TRNG with a suitable speed for their given 
application. Another option for increasing throughput is to use an AC RTN scheme for the voltages 
applied to the entropy source device. An AC RTN scheme has been shown to be capable of increasing 
the observed rate of RTN events by thousands of times [103]. The downside to using this AC RTN 
scheme is an increase in design complexity. The final option for increasing throughput is to have 
multiple devices used in parallel as the entropy source, doing this could massively increase the bit 
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rate. As for the AC RTN, having multiple devices as the entropy source increases design complexity so 
it should be avoided if not necessary for a given application.  
Another factor to consider for TRNG operation is the temperature effect on the TRNG. The key effect 
of temperature on the proposed TRNG is its effect upon the rate of RTN events. The effect of 
temperature on the capture and emission times of RTN traps has been studied in some detail [130]. It 
is known that typically an increase in temperature will decrease both the capture and emission times 
of an RTN trap. For our TRNG, higher temperature will increase bit rate. In terms of security, these 
variations will not affect the randomness of the generated bitstream thanks to the RTN sampling 
oscillator scheme. This was verified by heating the entropy source device in the design to 125°C and 
recording the output bits generated. With the entropy source device heated to 125°C, a high entropy 
of 0.9996 was maintained and no change in output bitrate was observed due to the 19,200 bps limit 
still set by the RS232 communication. The only time that security could be compromised is if the RTN 
is accelerated to such an extent that it surpasses Foscmin and the RTN starts oversampling the 
oscillator. To avoid this, Fosc should be selected to be sufficiently above the maximum possible rate 
at which RTN could be accelerated by raising temperature. Conversely, decreasing the temperature 
will increase the capture and emission times. Increased time constants will slow down the generation 
rate of the random numbers, but it will not affect the security of the system as the RTN will simply 
sample the clock signal less frequently but will retain the same entropy.     
A further consideration for the parameters related to the entropy source is the voltage applied to it, 
namely Vg and Vd. The effect of Vg and Vd on RTN traps has also been studied previously[107], [123]. 
Typically, an increase in Vg will decrease the capture time and increase the emission time with a given 
Vd and the exact relationship being highly device dependent. For Vd variation with a given Vg, an 
increase in Vd will cause a decrease in emission time and an increase in capture time[131], again with 
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the exact relationship being highly device dependent. For low power applications it is advisable to use 
the lowest possible value for Vg and Vd as this will give the lowest current flow through the device, 
thereby reducing power consumption. It has also been reported that a low Vd will give the largest 
single trap impact on the Id within the device, making extraction of the RTN signal easier. Figure 77 
shows the effect on the output bitstream entropy by altering the Vg supplied to the entropy source 
device. Figure 77 shows that changing the supply voltage between 0.35-0.8 V has less than 0.4% effect 
upon the output entropy showing that the design has a high tolerance for supply voltage variation.    
 
Figure 77, Effect of Altering Vg applied to entropy source device on the entropy of output bitstream. Vd fixed at 0.3V with 
temperature at 30°C.   
The last key consideration for the proposed TRNG design is the depth of the FIFO buffer. The depth of 
the FIFO buffer is a parameter that can be adjusted to make the proposed design fit a wider range of 
applications. For applications that require consistent random numbers at a low rate then the depth of 
the FIFO buffer does not need to be significant as the TRNG will be able to fill the buffer at a faster 
rate than the numbers are read from it. For applications that require fast number generation in bursts 
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then the depth of the FIFO buffer can be increased as the TRNG can consistently fill the buffer while 
no numbers are being read from it and then output them at a faster rate when required.  
We now compare our design with some of the prominent TRNG designs previously proposed. The key 
figures for the discussed designs are shown in Table 8. Firstly, we look at the original RTN based TRNG 
proposed by Brederlow et al. [48] The key improvements over this design include removing the post-
processing circuit and thereby increasing design efficiency. As we use a much broader range of RTN 
types, it reduces the required size of device array.  
The design of Figliolia et al.[53]  has a good generation rate of 25MHz (which we could potentially 
match with the UART limitation removed as the Figliolia design is also RTN based), but is significantly 
more complex and requires a lot more design area when implemented onto an IC. Also, Figliolia’s 
design was not tested using the DIEHARD or NIST test suite, so the randomness of the generated 
bitstream is not verified.  
Chen et al.[60] proposed a design that can either offer a comparable or better bit rate than our design 
depending upon the type of device used and the level of confidence in the security that is required. 
At a similar security confidence, the bit rate will be similar to ours, if the RS232 limitation is removed 
and a single entropy source is utilised. Our design offers improvements over Chen’s design in areas of 
design complexity and efficiency of entropy extraction as we utilise more types of RTN. Chen’s design 
is only tested in a simulated environment, rather than with a practical circuit, so that there is more 
uncertainty in the real-world performance of their design when compared to ours.  
The design by Mohanty et al.[37]  improves the efficiency when compared to other previous RTN 
based designs. Our proposed design further improves the efficiency. Mohanty removes the need for 
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post-processing circuits through a balancing scheme. We also remove the post-processing circuits by 
using RTN to sample an oscillator. For multi-level RTN, Mohanty’s proposed design extracts the 
entropy from the slowest trap, whereas our design extracts the entropy from all RTN events. This 
improved entropy extraction is the primary reason why our design generates bits at a significantly 
higher rate as compared with Mohanty’s design.  
Next, we compare our design with some of the most prominent non-RTN based TRNGs. The 
metastability based TRNG proposed by Sanu et al. [52] can achieve bit rates higher than any of the 
RTN based TRNGs, but it is significantly more complex and requires tuning and processing circuits, 
making it suit high performance, high power applications. On the other hand, the simplicity and low 
power of our design fits better for applications such as remote IoT sensors or ID cards. 
Matsumoto et al. [57] proposed a design based on tunnelling in SiN devices. Its bit rate is lower than 
the bit rate of our design without the RS232 limitation and its area is even larger than that of Sanu et 
al.[52]. Matsumoto also mentions that the proposed design only works well with a specific type of 
device, whereas our CMOS-based design does not have this limitation.  
The design proposed by Jiang et al.[45] is based on the write time of memristors. Jiang’s design can 
achieve a bit rate that is comparable with our design when limited by the RS232 and would be 
significantly slower than our design with that limitation removed. Their design has a similar level of 
complexity as ours. Our design has the advantage that it is based on CMOS technologies, making it 
readily implementable. 
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Table 8. Comparison with Other TRNGs. *speed when limited by RS232 communication. 
TRNG Entropy Source Generation rate  Design area Post-Processing  Verification 
This Work Random 
Telegraph Noise 
19.2 kbits/s* N/A None Passes NIST 
and ML attack 




162.5 Mbit/s 1088um2 XOR decorrelator 
and BIW extractor   
Passes NIST 
Figliolia et 
al.  2015 
[53]  
RTN with sigma 
delta converter 
1-25 Mbit/s 2200um2 None N/A 
Matsumoto 
et al.  2008 
[57] 
Tunnelling in SiN 
device 
0.3 Mbit/s 1200um2 None Passes FIPS 
140-2 
Brederlow 




200 kbits/s 0.009mm2 Von Neumann Passes NIST 




0.25-5 Mbits/s N/A Von Neumann or 
bit truncation 
Passes NIST 




6 kbits/s N/A none Passes NIST 
with reduced α 
value  
Mohanty et 




3 bits/s N/A  none Passes NIST 
 
In conclusion, we present an experimentally verified TRNG design, based on the trap event timing of 
multi-level RTN, using standard CMOS technology. The proposed design makes use of a new edge-to-
pulse entropy extraction technique, which enables us to utilise multi-level RTN, abnormal RTN as well 
as traditional two level RTN, thereby improving on device selectivity and output bit rate. The design 
also introduces a new processing technique, which removes the need for any post-processing, the 
need for complicated tuning circuits for sampling frequency, as well as increasing resistance to 
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oversampling attacks. The randomness of the proposed TRNG is verified by the 15 NIST Special 
Publication 800-22 randomness tests as well as the DIEHARD randomness tests. The proposed design 
also shows resilience against machine learning attacks. Selection of key parameters is discussed for 
optimising TRNG performance in terms of output bit rate and design complexity for different user 
requirements. The novel improvements presented in this work pave the way for a TRNG suitable for 
the low power, low area, and low-cost applications that are key requirements of IoT edge units. 
  




Chapter 5 -  A Novel Time-Dependent PUF 
 Introduction 
As mentioned in section 2.2, the need for more secure methods of authentication has been evident 
for a long time [5]. One of the promising techniques for authentication is the Physically Unclonable 
Function (PUF). The PUF has been around for many years now [77], [84], [85], [132], but has not broken 
through as a mainstream cybersecurity solution [133]. The main reasons for this are: limited number 
of available challenge and response pairs (CRP), long-term reliability of PUF circuits, slow speed for 
authentication, difficulties in storing and distributing CRPs to the server, and importantly, vulnerability 
to attacks [28],[134]. The majority of recent research into PUFs has used the same basic principle of 
finding some repeatable physical property and using this to create a set of fixed CRPs, which are 
defined at the creation of PUF and later distributed to a server that controls authentication. The PUFs 
built in this way are generally referred to as “weak PUFs”, as their low number of available CRPs limits 
their applications in the cyber security domain [64]. A strong PUF, which has an infinite number of 
CRPs, is difficult to develop as the circuits are too complex to justify their use over existing solutions 
such as public key infrastructures and digital certificates. A radical new approach is needed if the PUF 
is to become a mainstream solution for cybersecurity applications. 
In this chapter we propose a novel approach to the PUF scheme. The new PUF design utilises the de-
trapping phenomena of defects within nanoscale MOSFETs in order to add a time-dependent element 
to the PUF design. This aim of creating this new concept is to increase the number of CRP pairs for a 
given number of entropy sources, without increasing the circuit footprint of the design. The second 
major aim is to use this new design to create a novel PUF protocol that can be used for authentication 
in applications such as local networks.  




We first look at the operating principles of the newly proposed PUF scheme and explain in detail how 
each section works as well as how the PUF’s parameters can be adjusted to tune the PUF for different 
situations. We then look at the performance of the PUF in terms of the key criteria that were discussed 
in section 5.4. This evaluation includes analysis of the hamming distances as well as a point by point 
evaluation of the key PUF characteristics as defined by Maes et al. [64].    
 The Time-Dependent PUF Concept 
In this section we discuss the operating principles of a time dependent PUF. We first outline the basic 
principles of a time-dependent PUF in terms of the CRP behaviour, created by use of a PUF module 
and associated probability model. Next, we look at how the probability model can be created from 
observing the de-trapping behaviour of defects within nanoscale MOSFETs. We then explore how 
specific PUF, and probability model parameters can be adjusted to optimise performance. We then go 
into more detail on the construction of the PUF module through the use of a proof of concept circuit, 
built from discrete components and an FPGA module. This proof of concept circuit is used to verify 
that the proposed PUF module is feasible to construct and operate in the real world. Finally, we 
analyse three novel PUF protocols that can be used with the proposed time-dependent PUF to create 
a full authentication scheme. Like the previously proposed PUFs discussed in this work, the security of 
the response length is multiplicative rather than exponential. The multiplicative nature of the PUF is 
one of the key deficiencies of the concept that has been present since its first inception and has not 
confidently been solved. While it does mean the security of these PUFs is not optimal there are still 
viable applications for them in areas such as local network authentication. 





Figure 78, Comparison of response time dependence between proposed PUF and conventional PUF schemes. 
The basic principle of a time-dependent PUF is that the response to a given challenge is dependent 
upon time. This principle is illustrated in Figure 78 where a conventional PUF design has a response 
that is fixed, the proposed time-dependent PUF scheme has responses that can change to any value 
between 0 and 2n when the challenge time is changed, where n is the number of entropy sources 
(equal to response length) within the PUF.  
The proposed time-dependent PUF consists of two main elements, the first of which is the PUF 
module. The PUF module is where the CRP behaviour, which enables authentication with the PUF, 
originates. For the proposed time-dependent PUF, the PUF module is a system that contains an array 
of entropy sources which have a known probability to generate a specific response when measured 
for a specific amount of time. The response for each entropy source is either ‘1’ or ‘0’ depending upon 
whether a specified event is observed or not. The second key element is the probability model. The 
probability model is a model of the PUF module which contains the probabilities of each entropy 
source exhibiting the specified event at a given time. This probability information can be expressed as 
a probability curve as shown in Figure 79. The figure shows how the probability of observing the event 
varies between 0 and 1 over the measurement window. To get a CRP from this, the challenge can be 




defined as any specific time within the measurement window. The response is whether the specified 
event occurs or not, the probability curve for an entropy source can be used to determine what the 
expected response should be at any given time. If the probability of observing the event is ‘1’ then the 
expected response is ‘1’, if the probability of observing the event is ‘0’ then the expected response is 
‘0’. The expected response for times where the probability is between these values is unknown. Each 
bit of the CRP is created by finding the expected response from each entropy source within the PUF 
module at that specified challenge time. If the expected response from an entropy source is unknown 
for the specified challenge time, the response from that entropy source is ignored when 
authenticating. The other option for uncertain responses is the authenticating server removing that 
entropy source from the challenge, instead selecting only entropy sources that have a certain 
response at the specified challenge time. Choosing between these two options is covered in section 
5.3. The length of the response is therefore determined by how many entropy sources are measured 
for each challenge. If the number of available entropy sources is greater than the required response 
length, different combinations of entropy sources can be used to give multiple CRPs for each challenge 
time, increasing the total number of CRPs for each PUF module.    
 
Figure 79, Example of a probability curve for a single entropy source which shows the probability of finding a specific event 
at each point in time over the measurement time window. 




5.2.1 Creating and optimising the PUF Probability Model 
The probability model is the key feature which enables the functionality of this PUF. In this work we 
measure de-trapping events of defects within nano scale MOSFETs as our entropy source. The basic 
principle is that a number of de-trapping events inside of nanoscale MOSFETs have a certain 
probability to be observed within a given amount of time. If the probability of either not observing or 
observing a certain number of de-trapping events at a given time is almost certain, we can define 
these outcomes as ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively, to create a single bit challenge/response. To observe the 
de-trapping events, we use the TDDS methodology outlined in section 3.4.5. Figure 80 shows the 
waveforms and voltages used for the TDDS measurements. The typical time for the measurement is 
0.1s of charging and then 0.1s of measurement.   
 
Figure 80, Waveforms and parameters of TDDS measurements used for proposed PUF concept. 
The TDDS measurement principle works because of the typical dependence of defects time constants 
on applied Vg. Figure 81 shows how τe is typically shorter at low Vg and τc is typically shorter at high 
Vg. This dependence is the same as that utilised for the AC measurement procedure used in section 
4.3. Here the high Vg is used to charge traps within the device quickly. After the charging step, the Vg 
is dropped to the low value to allow for the traps to discharge quickly. It is this discharging, which is 




observed as steps in the measured Id, with the timing of the discharges being dependent on the 
distribution of te values for each trap.  
 
Figure 81, Typical dependence of τc and τe to applied Vg. 
For this part of the work, we used 90x70nm pFET devices of the HK45 wafer. 91% of the tested devices 
show clear steps in TDDS measurement. This is already a very good yield for fresh devices although it 
could potentially be improved even further by using the stressing scheme proposed in section 4.2, if 
required. We have also shown in section 4.2.2 that the timing characteristics of these traps is stable.    
To create the probability model, each response device within the PUF is measured using the TDDS 
procedure 500 times. We then define a specific number of traps that we are looking for (selection of 
this number will be discussed in more detail later in this section) and calculate the probability of having 
that number of traps at any given time within the measurement window.  Figure 82 illustrates this 
process of finding the de-trapping times and then how that relates to the probability model for that 
device. It can be seen how the probability of finding the correct number of de-trapping events starts 
at 0% and increases (ideally to 100%) and then decreases again (ideally to 0%). When the probability 
is ~0% the expected response from the PUF should be that the correct number of de-trapping events 
is not found and for ~100% the correct number of de-trapping events is found. Between ~0% and 




~100% the result is uncertain. To create the probability model of the whole PUF each individual bit 
probability model is combined. The bottom part of Figure 82 shows a PUF probability model that has 
10 CRP bits. It can be seen how each bit’s probability curve is unique and varies between ~0% and 
~100% across the measurement time window. It is this uniqueness of each bit’s probability curve that 
enables PUF operation. The distribution of possible challenge times should be logarithmic as the de-
trapping events occur across the time window in logarithmic scale more evenly than with a linear 
scale. The probability model of a full PUF is the combination of the individual probability models of 
the de-trapping exhibited in individual ‘bit’ devices. In practice, a PUF module would be created by 
measuring the de-trapping events in each bit device and then be distributed to the authentication 
server.          
 
Figure 82, Methodology for creating the probability model of defect de-trapping events. One model is created for each CRP 
'bit' within the PUF. The models are then stored on the authenticating server. Bottom plot shows the probability models 
from 10 devices (bits) that have had this methodology applied. ‘Defined number of de-trapping events’ is the number of 
observed events whose probability of having is found.  




Here, we look at how some of the parameters of the probability model can be selected and adjusted 
to improve the performance of PUF. The three key parameters are the number of grouped traps, the 
number of ORed remeasurements, and the starting trap. The number of grouped traps refers to the 
number of traps we find the probability of observing. The number of grouped traps is usually a range 
and its purpose is to increase the probability of finding the correct number and to tune the bit bias of 
the PUF. The number of Ored measurements refers to the number of times the TDDS measurement is 
repeated on each challenge bit. The main aim of repeating the measurement is to increase the 
proportion of possible challenges that will be certain, reducing the need for extra devices to give a 
guaranteed number of certain responses. The starting trap refers to the trap number at which the 
group range starts. For example, a starting trap of ‘1’ would mean that the first detected trap would 
be the start of the number of grouped traps range, starting trap value of ‘2’ would that the first 
detected trap is ignored and counting starts on the second. The aim of adjusting the starting trap value 
is to better balance the distribution of time at ‘1’ and time at ‘0’ across the measurement window.    
Figure 83 shows how changing the number of grouped traps effects the probability of a response 
device within a PUF. By increasing the number of grouped traps, we allow for a greater range of 
possible results from the TDDS measurement that will result in a positive ‘1’ outcome. As we increase 
this range, the maximum probability that the probability model can achieve increases. In Figure 83 we 
can see that when we are only looking for a single trap the maximum probability is around 0.65, 
whereas when we are looking for between 1 and 4 traps the maximum has increased to ~100%. Having 
a maximum probability of around 100% is essential for the PUF operation as this is the only time when 
a ‘1’ result can be achieved as the response. We can also see that increasing the number of grouped 
traps widens the distribution of probabilities against time. It is this widening effect that can be used 
to control the bit bias of the PUF. Figure 84 shows the bit bias of across all possible challenges on 60 
PUF bits with various different grouping parameters. To simplify the operation of the PUF it is desirable 




to have a constant number of grouped traps across all devices. Through the experimental testing we 
found that 3 grouped traps gave the best balance between a good maximum probability and a 50% 
bit bias of responses, when the sample times are distributed on a logarithmic scale. It is important to 
note that this ideal number of grouped traps will only be accurate for the specific device size and 
design that we used here. Different devices will require different tuning of this parameter as they can 
have different average numbers of traps per device.     
 
Figure 83, Effect of changing the number of grouped traps parameter on a PUF probability model. 
 
Figure 84, Effect of the number of grouped traps on the bit bias of 60 PUF bits across all challenge times. 





Figure 85, Effect of changing the number of the ORed measurements parameter on a PUF probability model. 
 
Figure 86, Effect of changing the number of ORed measurements on the proportion of 60 response bits that are certain 
across all challenge times. 
Figure 85 shows the effect of changing the number of repeated measurements that are Ored together 
when creating the probability model or generating a response from the PUF. By allowing any of the 
repeated measurements to give a positive result when looking for the specified number of traps we 
can have a couple of positive effects on the PUF operation. Firstly, we can slightly further increase the 
maximum probability achieved in the probability model, making the chance of creating a ‘1’ response 
slightly higher. Secondly, and more significantly, we can increase the gradient of the edges of the 




probability model. Increasing the gradient of these edges is highly desirable as it reduces the amount 
of time the probability of the PUF response will be in the unsure state between a ‘0’ and ‘1’ response. 
Figure 86 shows how increasing the number of Ored measurements from 1 to 10 can increase average 
number of certain bits at any challenge time by over 17%. The obvious downside to this ORing scheme 
is that repeating the measurements takes longer time as each individual measurement takes at least 
0.2s to charge and measure. A balance has to be found for each application between the reliability, 
and efficiency of the PUF against the speed of the response. For a highly secure and important 
application it is probably best to have many ORed measurements as the time taken to gain the result 
is less important than the security. For a less important communication system it may better to reduce 
the number of Ored measurements in order to increase the communication speed.   
 
Figure 87, Device probability curve when 5 ORed measurements are used and the desired number of traps is between 1 and 
3 traps. 
Figure 87 shows the result of applying both the grouped traps and ORed measurements schemes to 
one device. We can see that the probability curve for this device has a maximum probability of ~100% 
and spends a reasonable amount of time at that value. We can also see the minimum probability 
returns to ~0% after some time which is desirable as different devices will do this at different times 
adding to the uniqueness of the PUF as a whole. The edges of the probability curve are quite steep 




with not a significant amount of time spent in the unsure region between 0% and 100%. For our chosen 
devices, these parameters of between 1 and 3 desired traps and 10 ORed measurements results in 
probability curves that have good maximum and minimum values and a good distribution of times at 
these values.   
 
Figure 88, Effect of changing the starting trap number on a single device probability curve. 
Figure 88 shows the effect of changing the starting trap number that the grouped traps are counted 
from. In the figure it can be seen that increasing the starting trap number shifts the probability curve 
to the right as a longer time passes before the number of traps observed is within the defined range. 
Tuning this parameter allows for shifting the distribution of probability curves within the 
measurement time window. The aim of adjusting the distribution is to have a more even balance of 
‘1’ and ‘0’ results across the whole time window. Adjusting this parameter can also help reduce the 
amount of correlation between time and the expected result as the chance of having a specific result 
at the start and end of the measurement window can be changed by altering the starting trap number. 
In the rest of this work the starting trap number is selected as 1 as this gives a good distribution of ‘1’ 
and ‘0’ probability across the measurement window with the typical de-trapping events’ timing 
observed.     





Figure 89, 10 device PUF probability model using both grouped traps and ORing schemes. 
Figure 89 shows the probability curves of 10 devices that were created using the previously discussed 
parameters of 1 to 3 grouped traps, 10 ORed remeasures, and a starting trap value of 1. From these 
10 probability curves we can see that all of the devices have regions that are either ~100% or ~0%, at 
different times. This means that every one of these devices can provide different responses to a 
challenge at different times, demonstrating the time dependence of the proposed PUF scheme. It also 
shows that the setting of the grouping and ORing parameters are well set for these given devices. We 
can also see that each device’s curve is unique with the times at high and low probability being 
distributed at different times for different curves, demonstrating some degree of uniqueness of each. 
Having these key properties of the PUF scheme shown mean that the basic principles are solid. Next, 
we discuss a proof of concept circuit that is used to show the practicality of implementing this system 
in the real world.   
5.2.2 PUF Node Proof of Concept Circuit 
Here we outline and discuss one potential circuit that could be used to implement the proposed PUF 
module. This circuit is explored using a proof of concept circuit which has a single entropy source. The 
purpose of the proof of concept circuit is to show that it is feasible to create the whole PUF module 




but also do this in a way that can be done with limited equipment. The proof of concept circuit can be 
created using discrete components in a breadboard. The entropy is provided to the proof of concept 
circuit by probing a single MOSFET using a probe station, and analysis is performed through 
experimentally informed simulation, oscilloscopes, and an external analysis PC.  
 
Figure 90, Block diagram of key components required for proposed PUF module. 
Figure 90 shows a block diagram of all the components that are required for basic PUF module 
operation, using the proposed time-dependent PUF concept. In Figure 90, the Device node block 
contains all of the components that are necessary to extract the number of de-trapping events 
observed in a single entropy source. Within the Device node block there is the Device block, the 
Amplifier and Edge Detection block, and the Counter block. The Device block refers to the MOSFET 
that is used as the entropy source for a single CRP bit. The Amplification and Edge Detection block 
contains the circuits that are required to detect the de-trapping events’ timing, as well as digitise that 
information. The counter block is used to count how many de-trapping events are observed within 
the measurement time window.  
The Voltage and Timing Supplies for TDDS block contains the circuits that are required to apply the 
TDDS voltages which are described in Figure 80 and the timing that is used to control how long the 
current should be measured for to have the correct challenge time. The Buffer for Repeat 




Measurements is used to store the multiple repeat TDDS measurements that are required to 
implement the ORed remeasures methodology. The Output Response Logic block is used to determine 
whether the TDDS results stored in the Buffer for Repeat Measurements block should result in a ‘1’ or 
a ‘0’ response for each response bit.   
In the proof of concept circuit, the Device block is created using one of the 28nm devices of the CSR 
wafer that was probed using the Cascade Summit probe station. Timing and voltages were applied to 
the Device block using Keysight 81150A and Keysight E3632A power supplies and signal generators 
allowing for accurate TDDS measurement. In the final circuit these could be replaced by low power 
adjustable voltage supply circuits, such as the one proposed by Guo et al. [135] .The amplification part 
of The Amplification and Edge Detection block was achieved using a Femto DHPCA-100 amplifier. The 
edge detection and digitisation requirements for the Amplification and Edge Detection block use 
circuits based on the same principle as was used in section 4.4.2 for the edge-to-pulse module. Figure 
91 shows the proposed circuits for the edge detection and digitisation sections of the Edge Detection 
block. The edge detection is performed by a differentiator which converts all the edges present in the 
amplified Id signal into short pulses. For the PUF application we are only interested in rising edges 
caused by de-trapping, therefore the absolute value that is present for the TRNG design is not required 
here. A comparator is then used to convert the pulses from the differentiator into square pulses of 
the appropriate magnitude to be used as an input to the digital section of the circuit (square wave 
signal between 0-5V).   





Figure 91,Edge detection and digitisation circuits within Amplification and Edge Detection block of PUF proof of concept 
circuit. 
The functionality of the circuit shown in Figure 91 was verified using the Proteus 8 Professional 
simulation software to be used with simulation of the digital section. The circuit in Figure 91 was also 
verified experimentally with a breadboard circuit. The results from a single TDDS measurement for 
the Figure 91 circuit are shown in Figure 92.  
 
Figure 92, Results from a single TDDS measurement of the breadboard version of the edge detection block of the PUF circuit 
The simulated version of the circuit was created in Proteus and a signal that is representative of an 
amplified Id signal from a TDDS measurement was used as an input. The amplified Id signal and the 




corresponding output signals from the differentiator and comparator are shown in Figure 93. In the 
figure the clear de-trapping events can be seen as the large steps in the amplified Id current signal 
shown in Figure 93(a). The output of the differentiator signal can be seen to have a clear negative 
pulse at the same time as each de-trapping event. The pulse is negative due to the inverting nature of 
the differentiator. the magnitude of each differentiator signal pulse is correlated to the size of the step 
in the amplified Id current, although all pulses have magnitude greater than several hundred mV. The 
output of the comparator is set so that every time there is a negative pulse in the differentiator output, 
the comparator outputs a positive 5V pulse. The rising edge of the 5V comparator pulses can be used 
as an input to the FPGA section of the proof of concept circuit. It can also be clearly seen that timing 
of the comparator pulses is almost identical to the timing of the de-trapping events, with the error of 
this timing being mostly attributed to the slew rates of the operational amplifiers.  
 
Figure 93, (a) Input amplified de-trapping signal, (b) output differentiator signal, and (c) output comparator signal of PUF 
analogue to digital circuit section of Amplification and Edge Detection block. 





Figure 94, Circuit Diagram for PUF Proof of Concept Circuit. This circuit looks for 1-3 de-trapping events and 4 Ored 
remeasures. 




Figure 94 shows the circuit diagram for the proof of concept circuit. This proof of concept circuit is the 
most basic implementation of the proposed PUF module, with one entropy source and fixed values 
for the number of grouped traps and ORed remeasures. In addition to the circuit shown in Figure 93, 
the circuit shown in Figure 94 contains circuits to create the counter, buffer for repeated 
measurements, and output logic blocks of Figure 90. The output rising edges from the comparator are 
used as an input to a the ‘CLKU’ pin of a 40193 counter, by doing this the counter will increment the 
stored value by one every time a de-trapping event is observed. Some basic logic circuits are also 
attached to the counter to determine whether the number of observed traps is within the defined 
range or not. In this example the circuit is configured to look for between 1 and 3 traps. If the number 
of traps is within this range then the logic will output ‘1’, if not it will output ‘0’. For the real PUF design 
this logic can be created in hardware so that the defined number of traps is fixed, or this logic can be 
created using firmware such as an FPGA unit so the defined number of traps can be adjusted after 
manufacture. It is also possible to replicate this section using a software-based approach if a 
microcontroller is available for use with the PUF circuit. The buffer for repeat measures is 
implemented using a 4015 serial to parallel register. To use this register, we also generate a pulse 
every time a TDDS measurement is completed. This measurement completion pulse is then used to 
write the output of the previous logic stage into the register. The measurement completion pulse is 
also used to clear the counter from the previous measurement so only the observed de-trapping 
events from the current measurement are counted. The result from each measurement is then written 
to consecutive output bits of the register. In this example there are 4 parallel bits in the register, so 
the maximum number of measurements is 4. To increase the number of possible measurements to be 
ORed together, the number of parallel output bits can be increased. To determine the final response 
output of the PUF module a simple OR gate is used as any measurement stored in the remeasure 
buffer containing the correct number of de-trapping events will be considered a ‘1’ response. A ‘0’ 
response is only achieved if none of the TDDS measurements had the correct number of de-trapping 




events. After all measurements are completed the final response bit results can be sent to the device’s 
transmission module to be sent to the server.   
Figure 95 shows an example of a PUF reading where the generated response is ‘1’. In this example 2 
TDDS measurements are ORed together and the defined number of de-trapping events to look for is 
between 1 and 3. The challenge time is set to be the full measurement window of 0.1s. In Figure 95(a) 
it can be seen that the first TDDS measurement has 3 de-trapping events and the second one has 4. In 
Figure 95(b) it can be seen that as soon as a measurement with the correct number of de-trapping 
events is completed the response bit output changes to its high value, giving a response of ‘1’.    
 
Figure 95, An example of a ‘1’ response when (a) Amplified Id signal of 2 repeat TDDS measurements is used and (b) 
response bit output voltage when defined number of traps is 1-3 and two TDDS measurements are Ored. 




Figure 96 shows an example of a PUF reading where the generated response is ‘0’. This example uses 
the same settings as the example in Figure 95 but with different emission times for traps within the 
entropy source. This time it can be seen in Figure 96(a) that neither TDDS measurement has an 
observed number of de-trapping events within the defined range of 1-3. The result of neither TDDS 
measurement having the correct number of events can be seen in Figure 96(b) where the response 
bit output remains at its low value giving a ‘0’ response.  
 
Figure 96, An example of a ‘0’ response when (a) Amplified Id signal of 2 repeat TDDS measurements is used and (b) 
response bit output voltage when defined number of traps is 1-3 and two TDDS measurements are Ored. 
The two examples in Figure 95 and Figure 96 show that the proposed circuit for the PUF module is 
working as intended.        




To create a full PUF with multiple entropy sources and response bits the circuit shown in Figure 94 can 
simply be repeated to give the desired number of response bits. It is also possible to create a full PUF 
with certain parts in parallel by repeating the PUF core components but then replacing the following 
sections with components that have bus input and outputs where each PUF core is connected to a 
different bus bit of the inputs and outputs of the counter, register and logic circuits.  
 PUF Based Authentication Protocol 
In this section we discuss a possible authentication protocol that could be used with our proposed 
PUF. The proposed protocol aims to take advantage of the unique properties of both PUFs in general 
but also the new time-dependent element introduced by our newly proposed design. The protocol 
only requires the basic PUF module and transmission circuits to be available.   
5.3.1 Basic Time-Dependent PUF Authentication Protocol 
The proposed protocol only requires the basic PUF node to operate. Figure 97 shows the proposed 
interaction between the authenticating server, with the PUF probability model, and the PUF module 
itself, that will facilitate authentication of the PUF unit. The authentication may be initiated by either 
the PUF or the server. The following step is for the server to create a CRP, this is done by selecting a 
set of challenge bits to be used and a challenge time. These parameters can be selected randomly or 
chosen specifically if there is a requirement to do so. It is important to note that each CRP that is 
created should be unique and only used once to minimise the risk of any “man in the middle” attacks 
where a hostile party observes the communication and records previously used CRPs. After the CRP is 
created, the challenge section is sent to the PUF module and the server awaits the response. The 
response of the PUF module to the challenge is illustrated in Figure 97.a. When the PUF module 
receives the challenge, it performs TDDS measurements on the challenged devices. These TDDS 




measurements may be repeated several times if the ORing scheme is used. The PUF module then 
counts how many de-trapping events were observed in each TDDS measurement within the challenge 
time. If the number of de-trapping events observed in any of the measurements of challenge ‘bit’ 
device match the specified amount, the response is ‘1’, otherwise the response is ‘0’. When a response 
for every challenged bit is found they are all sent back to the authenticating server. The actions of the 
authenticating server that are performed while the PUF module is generating a response, and then 
how the server verifies if the response is valid or not are illustrated in Figure 97.b. Immediately after 
the challenge is issued to the PUF module the PUF server uses the probability models stored on it to 
calculate the expected response for each challenge bit sent. To do this the server loads the model for 
each bit and then checks the probability of finding the specified number of traps at the given challenge 
time. If the probability is certain then the expected response will be either ‘1’ or ‘0’ depending on 
whether the probability is ~100% or ~0%. If the probability is anywhere in the middle of these values, 
then the expected response will be set to uncertain. When this has been performed for all challenged 
devices then an authentication key is created containing all of the expected results. The server then 
waits to receive the response bits from the PUF module. When the server receives the response from 
the PUF module, it compares the expected results to the received results. For the certain bits 
(expected ‘1’ and ‘0’ results), the expected and the received results must match for authentication to 
be successful. For the uncertain bits (probability not ~0% or 100%), the received response does not 
need to match the expected result. Essentially, the uncertain bits are ignored by the authenticating 
server.     





Figure 97, Illustration of authentication protocol using the proposed PUF methodology. (a) The steps that the PUF module 
runs during an authentication cycle. (b) the steps the authentication server performs during an authentication cycle. It is 
assumed that the complete PUF probability model has been distributed to the authentication server before authentication 
begins. For this example, the desired number of observed de-trapping events is considered to be <4 but >1. It is also set so 
that each bit is remeasured 6 times so that the ORing scheme can be used.     
Using our experimental sampling frequency of 100KHz, we have 10,000 different time points within 
the 0.1s TDDS measurement time window that could potentially be used as the challenge time. There 
are some limitations on this that reduce that number due to correlations between some time values, 
as well as limitations of the measurement hardware available for PUF modules. For example, the first 
few measurement points have a much higher chance of giving a ‘0’ response than the later time points 
as de-trapping events take some time to occur. To try and avoid some of the correlations issues the 
challenge times possible can be limited to the range where the bit bias is not close to 0 or 1. To further 
remove visible correlations the challenge times should not directly correlate to the real measurement 
time through the use of some scrambling or hashing function that would make it much harder for a 
potential attacker to find each challenge bit’s time dependence through observation. Figure 98 shows 
how the bit bias towards ‘1’ varies across the TDDS measurement window across 60 PUF bits. From 
a. b. 




Figure 98 it is clear that at least the first ~5 measurement points should be avoided as possible 
challenge times as the bits are very strongly biased towards ‘0’. Figure 98 also shows how there is 
some correlation between time and the expected response, which supports the suggestion to 
obfuscate the real measurement time from the specified challenge time through the use of some 
hashing type of scheme.  
 
Figure 98, Bit bias towards ‘1’ across 60 PUF bits over the whole measurement time window. 
There are also two other limitations of this implementation, the first of which is related to the 
uncertain bits. As the uncertain bits are not used for authentication these bits would not have to be 
guessed correctly by any attacker trying to guess the response. This effectively has the effect of 
shortening the key length by the number of uncertain bits. To compensate for this the overall key used 
should be long enough that the key length minus the number of uncertain bits is at least as long as 
the minimum required key length. From the number of Ored measurements analysis shown in Figure 
86, each PUF response that is used should be at least 30% longer (when using 5 remeasures) than the 
minimum required key length to ensure security against guessing attacks. 
The other limitation of this protocol is that the responses are transmitted in plain text. This means 
that the PUF module and device that it is embedded into does not need any complicated mathematical 




or cryptographic functions. However, it also means that any potential attackers can collect previously 
used CRPs with relative ease. To avoid this causing a serious reduction in security each entropy source 
can only be used at each possible challenge time once. If this is not done, then any attacker who has 
previously observed this response bit will know what the expected response is at the previously used 
challenge time. This would mean that even if the combination of challenge bits is unique, a potential 
attacker could already know the response from many of the selected bits if they have been sampled 
at the given challenge time previously. To avoid this each challenge bit should only be used at any 
given challenge time once. This means that in order to expand the number of CRPs beyond the number 
of unique challenge times the number of challenge bits has to be increased by the minimum response 
length which will give a new unique set of challenge bits at every available challenge time. Figure 99 
shows this relationship between the number of available response bits and the number of available 
CRPs. This relationship makes increasing the number of CRPs available to this PUF quite inefficient 
compared to the other proposed protocols that are discussed later in this section.  
 
Figure 99, Number of CRPs available with a given number of challenge bits/entropy sources using the Basic Time-Dependent 
PUF Authentication Protocol. Sampling rate of 100kSa/s for 0.1s TDDS measurements and 128-bit key length (180 bits 
including uncertain bits). 
In conclusion for this protocol, it should only be used when the device within which the PUF is 
embedded has very limited available power and operations as this PUF protocol is very simple. It 




should also only be used when the required number of CRPs is small (several thousand), and the 
security of the device is desired but not critical. The best use for this proposed protocol is for local 
network applications where the likelihood of there being malicious parties is much lower, but 
authentication of different entities is still desirable.  
 Performance Analysis of Proposed PUF Scheme 
5.4.1 Analysis of Key PUF Characteristics 
In this section we look at the performance of our proposed PUF in terms of the hamming distances as 
well as evaluating the design against the key points outlined in section 2.2, which include 
constructability, evaluability, reproducibility, uniqueness, identifiability, physical unclonability, 
unpredictability, mathematical unclonability, one wayness, and tamper evidence. We discuss each of 
these characteristics individually as well as look at key results for specific characteristics.  
Constructability: this characteristic describes the feasibility of physically manufacturing the proposed 
PUF. This parameter is hard for us to evaluate quantitatively due to limited facilities available for circuit 
design. Section 5.2.2 coverers the design and analysis of the PUF node’s circuit requirements. Figure 
90 shows the complete block diagram of required components to create the full PUF module. The 
proof of concept circuit shows how the PUF module could be created. In the proof of concept circuit, 
the voltage supply and timing signals were provided by external sources. In a real implemented PUF 
module the voltage and timing would have to be provided either by the PUF itself or by the device it 
is embedded within. For the voltage supply a linear power supply with adjustable output voltage is 
required. Voltage supplies that can provide the required values of 0.4-1.2V have been proposed 
previously [135] and could be used to provide the voltage required for the TDDS measurements 
performed in this work. The timing requirements of the circuit can be met by utilising any clock signal 




that is available in the device within which the PUF is embedded. The clock signal can be divided and 
counted to give intervals that give the required timing of the TDDS measurements. The timing interval 
of the TDDS measurements is directly correlated to how many different points in time can be used as 
challenge times. In this work 100KSa’s was used which requires a timing signal with a frequency of 
100KHz. 100KHz is a slow clock speed for digital circuits so is highly achievable for this PUF design.        
The proof of concept circuit designed in this work only has a single response bit (device node). 
However, the device array is created by copying many device nodes to create a large set of possible 
response bits and thereby increase key length. As the proof of concept circuit has shown that the 
device node is constructible then the device array is also constructible and the efficiency depends 
upon the size of each device node, as well as the efficiency of circuits created to select specific nodes 
within the array for testing. Also, it is likely that a single voltage supply for TDDS block can be used to 
supply all of the Device Nodes so this should not have to be copied across the Device Array. The Buffer 
for Repeated Measures Block is used so that the ORing multiple remeasures scheme can be achieved. 
If this scheme is not used, then this block can be removed.        
Finally, we discuss the feasibility of creating the probability model that is stored on the authentication 
server. To create this model, it must be possible for the manufacturer (or potentially user) to measure 
the counter output of the CRP device against the time when TDDS measurement is applied. This should 
be repeated at least 100 times for every CRP device within the device array. The probability model can 
then be constructed on an analysis PC and distributed to the authenticating server. All of these steps 
are very feasible to achieve, although the ability to directly read the output counter of the CRP device 
should be removed in some way before the PUF is deployed to stop any potential attackers from easily 
building their own model (further discussed in the unclonable sections).  




In conclusion, all components of the PUF are constructible. The only limitations may be in the size and 
efficiency of the circuit when a large number of CRP bits are required as repeating the Device and 
Amplification and Detection blocks may be expensive in terms of design area and cost if it cannot be 
parallelised in some way.  
Evaluability is the characteristic that refers to the PUF scheme’s ability to generate and evaluate CRPs. 
In section 5.3 we discussed three proposed schemes that can be used to generate and evaluate CRPs 
using the proposed PUF circuit and probability-based model of that PUF circuit. The proposed schemes 
clearly demonstrate how an authenticating server can evaluate the response to a given challenge in 
order to authenticate the identity of a given PUF circuit. The proposed PUF design therefore has a high 
degree of evaluability.        
Reproducibility: this characteristic refers to the ability of a single PUF instance to provide consistent 
responses to a given challenge. The key form of analysis for this characteristic is the intra hamming 
distance between responses to the same challenges. For our specific proposed PUF this is slightly more 
complex than with traditional PUFs. This is because our proposed design is probability based, so we 
can have both certain and uncertain bits in the response, where the certain bits are used for 
authentication and the uncertain bits are used as ‘salt’ to obscure the true CRP to any observing 
attacker. This obviously means that the certainty that is required for a bit result to be certain has an 
impact on the intra hamming distance of the PUF. Figure 100 shows how changing the tolerance of 
the certainty changes the mean of the intra hamming distance between certain PUF responses. It can 
be seen that decreasing the certainty exponentially increases the intra hamming distance away from 
the ideal value of 0%. The downside to increasing the certainty is that more bits will be considered 
uncertain and therefore the number of bits actually used for authentication will decrease, potentially 
decreasing security and bit efficiency. For the following results we use a certainty tolerance of 1% as 




this value should maintain a low intra hamming distance while also allowing for more bits to be 
considered certain for authentication. The proportion of certain to uncertain bits for a given challenge 
across 40 PUFs with these parameters has already been shown in Error! Reference source not found.. 
It can be seen that the proportion of uncertain bits is quite significant for most PUFs, so it is in the 
interest of efficiency and performance to keep the tolerance of the certainty at ~1%.   
 
Figure 100, Experimental results showing dependence of the mean of the intra hamming distance, of only the certain bits, 
on the certainty tolerance of certain bits. 
 
Figure 101 shows the full distribution of the intra hamming distances between responses of the 
proposed PUF using the parameters that have been selected earlier in this section. Figure 101 shows 
both the intra hamming distance for just the certain bits, and for the uncertain with certain bits 
together. The effect of including the uncertain bits is clear, the mean of the intra hamming distance is 
significantly increased when they are included. With only the certain bits, the hamming distance has 
an average of less than 2%, which is comparable to the contemporary designs shown in Table 10. A 
low certain bit intra hamming distance is very positive as these bits are the ones that are used for 
authentication. With the uncertain bits included the mean increases to ~18%, which shows how some 




of these bits are changing with repeated measurements. The distribution of the hamming distance 
with only certain bits is also much narrower than the one with uncertain bits included.       
 
Figure 101, Experimental results for intra hamming distance of certain bits used for authentication and the intra hamming 
distance including uncertain bits which are not used for authentication but obfuscate which bits are used for authentication 
if observed by any 3rd party. 
The main source of error, that increases the intra hamming distance of certain bits, is RTN traps that 
overlap in timing with other traps as well as traps which can still have capture events at the Vg measure 
voltage, causing multiple de-trapping events to be observed for that one trap. Another cause of 
unreliability in the reproductivity is other sources of noise within the Id of the device (such as within 
device fluctuation and white noise) which are more prevalent in the research samples that we are 
using. The other noises are lesser in commercial grade wafers, as can be seen in the results of the 
TDDS-based PUF as reported by Chen et al. [84]. Therefore, we can expect to see some improvement 
of our PUF’s performance when it is implemented using commercial grade devices. The primary reason 
for this would be a significant improvement of the signal to noise ratio, resulting in fewer de-trapping 
events being missed or other noise sources being counted as de-trapping. 




Even with the current limitations, our proposed PUF has comparable reproducibility to contemporary 
PUF designs as shown later in Table 10. With these findings we can say that our proposed PUF has an 
acceptable level of reproducibility, although further improvements could be made. Currently, some 
error correcting scheme should be employed with our proposed design in order to avoid the ~1% of 
bits in error causing authentication to fail.      
Uniqueness is the next key characteristic that a PUF must have. Uniqueness for a PUF is defined as no 
two PUF instances having the same challenge. The typical measurement of this characteristic is the 
inter hamming distance between different PUF responses to a given challenge. Figure 102 shows one 
example of the simulated TDDS measurements on which this section is based. The τc, τe, and 
magnitude of traps as well as the number of traps per device are selected randomly within ranges that 
are based upon the typical observed values from our experimental results. The timing distributions of 
the capture and emission events are based on the same hidden Markov model as used for simulated 
RTN events in section 4.4.    
 

























To find the inter hamming distance between different PUFs we simulated 40 PUFs, each with 50 
response bits. A random challenge was selected and the response from every PUF was calculated. The 
hamming distance between each response was then found to give the inter hamming distance. Figure 
103 shows the inter hamming distance between all response bits (certain and uncertain) (as used in 
the basic and public key-based proposed protocols) and we can see that the mean of the hamming 
distances is close to the ideal value of 50% (50.08%), showing that each PUF response bit has on 
average a 50% chance as being the same as the corresponding response bit from another PUF. The 
distribution is also fitted with a binomial power density function (PDF), as outlined by Daugman [136]. 
This binomial fitting has 52 degrees of freedom. The data suggest that it is highly unlikely that two 
different PUF instances will provide responses differ in less than about a third of their information. If 
an attacker was observing the communication between the PUF and the server, these are the bits 
observed when using the basic or public key proposed protocols. As these bits are very close to ideal 
inter hamming distances for a PUF, it would be very difficult for an attacker to predict another PUF 
instance’s responses, even if one PUF unit is compromised. Figure 104 shows the inter hamming 
distance between only the certain bits of the different PUF instances. The inter hamming distance 
between only the certain bits is not as ideal as with all the bits, only being 40%. 





Figure 103, Simulation results of the inter hamming distance between different PUFs tested with the same challenged bits 
at the same challenge time including certain and uncertain response bits. The histogram fits very well with a binomial 
distribution of P=0.5 and N=52 degrees of freedom, as shown by the solid curve.  
 
Figure 104, Simulation results of the inter hamming distance between PUFs tested with the same challenge bits at the same 
challenge time with only the certain response bits. 




Overall, the inter hamming distance results from these simulations show that there is a high degree 
of uniqueness in the responses from different PUF instances. From these finding we can say that the 
proposed PUF has acceptable uniqueness and the inter hamming distance for all bits is comparable 
with, or in excess of, contemporary PUF designs as shown later in Table 10.  
Identifiability is another key parameter of a good PUF and is defined as a PUF that has both good 
reproducibility of responses for each instance and uniqueness of responses from other PUF instances. 
The most common way to measure this is the distance between the intra hamming distance and inter 
hamming distance of a PUF design, with the ideal value being 50%. The distance between the mean 
of the hamming distances of our PUF is ~49% which is very close to the ideal value. To further illustrate 
the proposed designs identifiability, the binomial fitting shown in Figure 103 was used to predict the 
chance of a false positive result during authentication when various Hamming Distances are used as 
the criteria to validate each response. The results from this false positive estimation are shown in 
Table 9 and show that when the Hamming Distance criteria is set to below ~0.15 the chance of a false 
positive is extremely low. These results in combination with the already discussed reproducibility and 
uniqueness show the proposed design has a good degree of identifiability. 
Table 9, Binomial fitting in Figure 103 used to estimate chance of a false match occurring when HD is used for verifying 
response at various HD criteria. 
HD Criterion Odds of false match 
0.11 1 in 233,967,864 
0.15 1 in 6,294,219 
0.2 1 in 77,760 
0.25 1 in 7355 
0.3 1 in 447 
 
Physical Unclonability is an important characteristic property of a good PUF. It should be impossible 
for anybody to create a PUF instance that has the same CRPs as any other PUF instance, this is to avoid 
attacks where a hostile party could use the copy of a PUF to impersonate another. Our proposed PUF 




has a strong case when displaying physical unclonability as it is based on the timing of de-trapping 
events of defects within nano-scale devices. This timing is based on the same principle as that for the 
entropy source for our proposed TRNG in Chapter 4 - , where we showed that these de-trapping 
events’ timing is random and unique. As this timing is randomly distributed and cannot be controlled 
then it is unfeasible for anyone to make a physical clone of a PUF constructed using this concept.  
Unpredictability of the PUF responses is also important as it should not be possible for a potential 
attacker to guess a response to a given challenge, even if they know many previously used CRPs.  The 
most common way to analyse the ability of the PUF to be unpredictable is to look at the inter hamming 
distance between the responses from a single PUF instance. If the PUF responses are uncorrelated 
and therefore unpredictable then the mean of the inter hamming distance between them will be 50%. 
Figure 105 shows the inter hamming distances between 39,231 responses from one simulated PUF 
using our proposed design which has 16 selectable challenge bits and each CRP being 8 bits long. 10 
different challenge times are available for each challenge bit and these times are distributed 
logarithmically between 10us and 0.1s. The mean of the inter hamming distances for this PUF is 
50.14%, which is very close to the idea value of 50%. This almost ideal mean combined with the 
distribution shown in Figure 105, which shows that the vast majority of responses are different to any 
other response, shows that our PUF has a high degree of unpredictability. The fact that some 
responses are the same is not unexpected with only an 8-bit key, resulting in 256 possible unique 
results, and the total possible number of unique challenge combinations being 39,231.   





Figure 105, 500,001 Inter hamming distances between responses from a 16-challenge bit PUF with a key length of 8 bits. 
Mathematical Unclonability is a characteristic that refers to an attacker’s ability to create a 
mathematical model of the PUF behaviour when they have total access to the PUF’s CRPs or even the 
entropy source itself. The best way to increase mathematical unclonability is to increase the total 
number of CRPs so that it is unfeasible to analyse them and to have an entropy source that is too 
complicated to analyse. This is a property that no PUF has been able to show in practice and is very 
difficult to achieve. For our proposed design, we do offer some improvements as we increase the 
potential number of CRPs for any given number of challenge bits, thereby making the modelling more 
difficult. As our entropy source is probability based it would also take many measurements for an 
attacker to be able to construct their own model. Overall, our proposed PUF cannot be said to be fully 
mathematically unclonable, however it is not worse than previously proposed PUFs and may offer 
some improvement if the proposed public key protocol is used, as the PUF can only be activated if the 





























One Wayness is the characteristic that refers to an attacker’s ability to know what specific challenge 
should be used to give a known response. For PUFs One Wayness can be improved by increasing the 
total number of CRPs or by making it very difficult to find what challenge gives a certain response. Our 
proposed PUF offers some key improvements on this characteristic. The proposed design increases 
the number of potential CRPs for a fixed number of challenge bits, thereby increasing One Wayness 
of the PUF, as defined by Maes et al. [64]. If the challenge time is also hashed so that it does not 
correspond to the real measurement time this also makes it more difficult for an attacker to try and 
guess a specific challenge to give a known response. This is because any correlation between response 
and measurement time is obfuscated through this hashing. In section 5.4.2 we show how the 
probability model-based storage of CRPs makes it much more feasible for servers to store a very large 
number of CRPs, further increasing One Wayness as the number of CRPs that can be used is increased.  
Tamper evidence is the final characteristic that is desirable for a PUF to have. This refers to it being 
clear if there has been an attempt to modify the behaviour of the PUF through physical tampering. 
For our proposed PUF, it is impossible to create entropy sources with any specified parameters so it 
would be obvious if any of the entropy sources are altered as this would cause a mismatch between 
the probability model stored on the server and the responses from the PUF causing the PUF to be 
locked out. The real issue for our proposed design would be if an attacker tampered with the PUF so 
that they could measure many responses from each entropy source within the PUF to create their 
own probability model. To avoid this a tamper evidence-based system could be employed that could 
show the server if the entropy sources have been measured without proper communication with the 
server. Another way this problem could be minimised is to have enough entropy sources so that it is 
unfeasible for an attacker to measure enough of them to have a reasonable chance of predicting a 
future CRP. A good way to do this would be to physically limit how may entropy sources can be 
measured simultaneously after manufacture.    




In conclusion, our proposed PUF shows solid evidence that it displays each of the key characteristics 
that are required for PUF operation. This means the overall concept of our PUF is solid and we can 
move on to look at how our PUF compares to previously proposed designs. 
5.4.2 Comparison with Other Notable PUF designs 
Here we compare the performance and characteristics of our proposed PUF concept with designs 
previously proposed by others, such as the hamming distances, attack resistance, and the efficiency 
of extraction of entropy from each response bit. Table 10 shows the comparison.  
  




Table 10, Comparison of key characteristics of notable PUF designs, * Results are taken from my estimation of a figure rather 
than a value stated by the author, ** Value is directly correlated to the resolution of the measurement of time during TDDS 
measurements. 
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The first thing we look at is the number of CRPs that can be created for every possible combination of 
challenge bits. For conventional PUF designs, each challenge bit combination will only give a single 
fixed response. In our design we can utilise different sampling/challenge times to achieve variable 
responses from a single challenge bit combination. As shown in Figure 78 the response from the 
proposed PUF can have 2n unique response possibilities (with n being the number of response bits) 
over the time window, for any given combination of challenge bits. The number of unique CRPs that 
can be extracted using this relationship is governed by the resolution that time can be measured at. 
The value in the table of 10,000 different possible CRPs for each challenge bit combination comes from 
our experimental results. In our experiments we used a 100kSa/s sampling rate over a 0.1s time 
window giving up to 10,000 possible time points to sample. When implemented in a practical PUF 




circuit these time points should be distributed logarithmically to better match the distribution of de-
trapping events. It may also be necessary to remove some sampling points from the beginning and 
end of the time window as most bits will be the same in these regions, causing a reduced entropy in 
those regions. Even with these limitations it is clear that our PUF design offers a significant increase in 
the number of possible CRPs over previous designs, thereby increasing the design efficiency.  
Next, we look at the difference in how traditional PUFs and our PUF store the CRP behaviour on the 
authentication server. In traditional PUFs, every CRP must be stored separately on the server which 
means PUFs with many possible challenge and response bits can have many millions of possible 
combinations which must all be stored taking up a significant amount of memory (especially if the 
server is connected to many PUFs). A PUF with only 16 challenge bits already has 65,536 unique 
possible CRPs and this number will increase exponentially as the number of challenge bits is increased. 
In our new proposed design, we only store the data for one probability curve (can be expressed as a 
look-up table or as a fitted equation) per response bit. For the same example as above, a PUF with 16 
challenge bits and an 8-bit length key would require the 16 look-up tables or curve equations to be 
stored on the server to be able to calculate all possible CRPs. For very large and secure PUFs these 
savings in server storage could be significant. Figure 106 shows a comparison between the number of 
bits required to store CRP data using both the traditional method and our new proposed method. Both 
PUFs operate with a response length of 128 bits because this is the minimum value for key length that 
is considered secure for the Advanced Encryption Standard [139]. For these results, the memory 
required was calculated in two ways. For the traditional method, each challenge was represented as 
a binary number with the fewest required number of bits and the response was taken as a binary 
number of 128-bit length. The total required memory was the total number of bits used to have every 
possible CRP combination. For our newly proposed method, the total memory required was calculated 
by representing each entropy source’s probability model look-up table as 10,000 32-bit floating point 




numbers. We then calculated how many unique CRP combinations a PUF with the given number of 
entropy sources could create when using a fixed response length of 128 bits. It can be seen that initially 
with a small number of CRPs (10,000) (which is the minimum amount for our proposed PUF with the 
100kSa/s sampling rate during 0.1s of TDDS measurement) the traditional method is more memory 
efficient. However, when the number of CRPs is increased the traditional method requires significantly 
more memory to store the data as compared to our proposed method. For example, with our 
proposed method, 1x109 CRPs can be stored with a few 10s of Mb whereas the traditional method 
would require close to 1Tb of memory. This shows a very significant improvement for CRP storage and 
make it very feasible for a server to be connected to many PUFs with many CRPs without the memory 
requirements for storage becoming unfeasible.  
 
Figure 106, Comparison between memory bits required to store all CRP data from a traditional PUF vs our proposed PUF. 
Both PUFs use a 128bit response length. For the traditional PUF, the challenge number is represented with as few bits as 
possible. For out proposed PUF, each data point for the probability curve is a 32-bit floating-point number with a 100kSa/s 
sampling rate used during TDDS measurement.    
Figure 107 shows how many challenge bits would be required to give the number of CRPs shown in 
Figure 106. Figure 107 shows that the number of additional challenge bits required to give very large 




numbers of CRPs is not very large, for example 1x109 CRPs can be achieved with only ~10 additional 
challenge bits to the 128 required to give the 128 bit response length. To find the number of possible 
challenge bit combinations in Figure 107 we first found all the possible numbers that could be 
represented with that many bits, we then found how many of those numbers had the correct number 
of ‘1’ bits in them (for this example 128 ‘1s’ to give 128 response values). By counting how many 
numbers have the correct numbers of ‘1’ bits we can find the number of possible challenge bit 
combinations for any number of entropy sources. Due to the massive amount of numbers possible for 
PUFs with many additional bits (greater than 20), data after that value is based on estimation from 
fitting the previous data with a 4th order polynomial line of best fit, and extrapolating.  
 
Figure 107, Number of possible challenge bit combinations for the proposed PUF when using a fixed response length of 128 
bits. Additional challenge bits are added to the base 128 to allow for extra unique challenge combinations.   
Looking at the mean intra hamming distance between responses to a single challenge for each PUF 
gives us good insight into the reliability of each design. Our design has a very similar mean intra 
hamming distance to the designs by J. Chen et al. [84] and P. Chen et al. [137], although it is noticeably 
higher than that for the other designs in Table 10, which suggests that they are more reliable. 
However, all of the designs would still need some error correction scheme for fully reliable 




communication so that the difference may not be as significant as it first appears. Also, we mentioned 
previously that using improved quality devices has a good chance of further improving the reliability 
of our proposed design. Overall, the slightly higher mean intra hamming distance is not ideal, but it is 
not a serious disadvantage against our proposed design.  
Next, we discuss the mean inter hamming distance between responses from different PUFs to the 
same challenge. This is a good measure of the uniqueness of each PUF instance. Our PUF has a very 
good mean inter hamming distance and this is comparable with the other existing PUF designs shown 
in Table 10. There is no significant difference between the means of the inter hamming distances, 
showing that all the PUF designs have a good degree of uniqueness. For our PUF this means that we 
have reached the benchmark for this parameter and it is hard to show any major improvement over 
previous designs as this characteristic was already well displayed.  
One important characteristic that we have shown is the mean inter hamming distance between 
different CRPs on one PUF instance. This value is a good representation of the correlation between 
different responses of a PUF instance. This is very important as modelling (most commonly machine 
learning) attacks are a big problem for PUFs that has previously not been fully addressed [74], [75], 
[134], [140], [141]. Our proposed PUF shows a very good mean inter hamming distance for this of 
49.57% which is a good indicator that our PUF has very little correlation between responses that could 
be used as a vector of attack on the PUF. As a further extension to this, Table 10 shows measures that 
are taken to increase the attack resistance of the PUFs. None of the previous PUF designs explicitly 
take any measure to avoid these modelling attacks. Our PUF makes use of the uncertain bits resulting 
from the probability-based approach to obfuscate the actual used response bits from any observing 
attacker. This adds another level to the difficulty of building a machine learning-based model to attack 
the security of our PUF.  




In conclusion for this comparison, our PUF has similar performance to previously proposed PUFs in 
some categories and exceeds them in other categories. The reliability (intra hamming distance) of our 
PUF is its weakest attribute when compared to some contemporary designs. In terms of entropy 
source use efficiency, server storage space efficiency, our PUF offers significant improvements and 
brings the concept of the PUF much closer to mainstream reality.          
  




Chapter 6 -  Conclusions and Future Work 
The main goal of this project is to improve upon existing security primitives so that they could be 
realistically implemented into IoT devices, to secure them against the ever-growing threat of 
cyberattacks. In this chapter we conclude each major section of the undertaken project. This includes 
what has been achieved and how that contributes to the specific areas of research. We also discuss 
the potential future work that could be undertaken to continue the work of this project. We begin by 
looking at the work performed on the RTN-based TRNG and then move onto the proposed time- 
dependent PUF. We finish this chapter outlining a new potential security primitive which combines 
the TRNG and PUF concept into a single system.  
 Conclusions and Future Work for RTN-Based TRNG 
6.1.1 Conclusions  
Our aim for the TRNG is to improve it in areas that would make it more appropriate for use in IoT 
devices as existing designs all had issues that made them difficult to use for such applications. The first 
major issue is device selectivity. This was primarily a problem for existing RTN-based TRNGs where the 
RTN that was suitable for use as an entropy source was rare, resulting in the use of very large device 
arrays which occupy the majority of the TRNGs’ design area. To improve upon this area, we made 
several novel advances. The first of these advances was the use of HC stressing to generate RTN traps 
reliably in devices that would be used as an entropy source. This could generate traps in over 80% of 
devices, meaning array sizes could be massively reduced. We also introduced a new entropy extraction 
scheme using a differentiator to allow us to effectively extract entropy from both multi-level and 
abnormal RTN traps which would have caused issues for previous designs. Being able to use more 
types of RTN as the entropy source further reduced device selectivity issues by ~30%. We also 




introduced a new sampling scheme where the RTN signal is used to sample an oscillator signal. This 
scheme simplified the complex post-processing circuits used in most previous RTN TRNGs. These key 
improvements reduced the area required for the TRNG circuit, making it a more appealing solution 
for generating random numbers in low power and space restricted IoT devices.  
The second major limiting factor of previous RTN-based TRNG designs is the low bit rate. We have 
presented major improvements in this area. Firstly, we showed how using an AC RTN scheme can 
massively accelerate the observed RTN events, so that they can generate entropy at a faster rate. In 
the AC RTN scheme, we showed how using AC signals for both Vg and Vd can accelerate RTN events 
by potentially thousands of times. The new differentiator-based RTN sampling technique also helps 
improve TRNG output bit rate. By allowing extraction of entropy from multi-level RTN, we can have 
more RTN events extracted within a given time window, increasing the output bit rate.  
We experimentally verified the performance of these improvements by creating a proof of concept 
circuit that extracted the entropy from the RTN in a single MOSFET device and applied the new 
processing and sampling schemes to give a random output bitstream. This bitstream was analysed 
using both the NIST test suite and the DIEHARD battery of tests as well as using an LSTM neural 
network to guess future bits. All the testing showed that the bitstream was random and suitable for 
use as a security device within IoT applications. All of these together show that we have achieved the 
goals for this section of the project and created a new RTN-based TRNG that is more suitable to IoT 
applications. 
6.1.2 Future work 
The obvious next step for this work is to create a fully integrated circuit (IC) prototype that could be 
used to fully assess the capabilities of the proposed design. With an IC prototype we could assess the 




actual design area, as well as important factors such as power consumption and the real maximum bit 
rate.  
Another interesting avenue to explore would be to see if multiple devices could be connected in 
parallel and extract the RTN entropy from all of them simultaneously. This parallelisation has the 
potential to greatly increase the output bit rate. With enough devices in parallel this could even 
potentially give us the opportunity to scale up the TRNG designs with many entropy sources to give us 
output bit rates that could compete with the fastest TRNG designs.  
Finally, one could explore increasing the chances of having clear RTN within devices during the 
manufacturing process without the need for stressing. Some possible things to explore are the doping 
levels used in each area of the device as well as the specific materials and design used for the device. 
If it is found that the amount of RTN within a device can be somewhat controlled through one of these 
mechanisms, then it would have to be calculated what is the most efficient, in terms of time and cost, 
way of inserting RTN into entropy source devices for TRNGs.           
  Conclusions and Future Work for Time-Dependent PUF 
6.2.1 Conclusions 
The second major aim of the project was to create a new PUF scheme that could improve upon as 
many of the major deficiencies of previous PUF designs as possible. The PUF concept has been around 
for many years but has not managed to break through into mainstream usage, especially for IoT 
devices. The main reasons for this are deficiencies in reliability, clonability, key distribution, power 
consumption, design complexity, or design footprint. We proposed a new time-dependent PUF 
scheme with the aim of improving upon these issues.  




In terms of reliability the currently proposed PUF circuit does not offer huge improvements over 
existing PUF designs as the intra hamming distance is comparable with most existing designs. We do 
offer some encouragement for the long-term reliability by showing that the timing characteristics for 
the RTN traps, which are used as the source of the PUF behaviour, are stable over long periods of time.  
For the clonability (including modelling) characteristic we show some key improvements over previous 
designs. As the probability-based approach is based on the random de-trapping times of defects within 
MOSFETs it also makes it impossible to make a physical clone of the PUF using the same technique. 
We have also shown that there is very little correlation between the responses of each PUF which 
further increases the difficulty of cloning the PUF. The time dependence also increases the difficulty 
of cloning the PUF because it increases the possible number of CRPs that each PUF module can have, 
which increases the number of CRPs that have to be modelled to clone the PUF. 
For key distribution, we show some major possible improvements for the memory required on the 
server to store the CRPs of each PUF. By utilising the proposed probability model, we make it so each 
response bit of the PUF can have all of its CRP information stored as a single curve. This allows the 
server to create any possible CRP behaviour from these models rather than having to store every 
possible CRP. When as PUF instance has many hundreds of response bits (or more) the number of 
possible challenge combinations is huge. Our new scheme allows for a reduction in the required space 
by several orders of magnitude in this case.  
For the final three deficiencies (power consumption, design complexity, and design footprint) we 
cannot comment yet on how our proposed PUF design will perform as we have not developed an IC 
design which can be used to compare our performance with that of existing PUF designs. This IC design 
would be guided by the findings of the proof of concept circuit created to verify the PUF functionality.  




Overall, we have shown some key improvements over traditional PUF designs without reducing 
performance in any of the other key areas. However, the full potential of our PUF design has not been 
fully explored due to the time and facility limitations of this project.  
6.2.2 Future Work 
From our conclusions it is clear that there is a lot of further work that could be done to improve the 
proposed PUF design. The first and most basic task would be to repeat the experiments with high 
quality commercial devices to see if that can improve the reliability of the results and the PUF 
performance. When this is done it would also be better to use a much higher number of devices so 
inter hamming distances between different PUFs can be verified experimentally as well as with more 
simulations.  
The next step would be to try and create a full IC design based upon the proposed proof of concept 
circuit that could be developed to find what the overall performance of the PUF could be. This would 
give much more insight into whether the PUF concept, in its current form, is suitable for real-world 
applications. This process would give essential information on the overall size of the circuit, as well as 
power consumption and cost. This would also give us more accurate results for the hamming distances 
for the PUF as modules with much higher numbers of response bits could be created that are not 
feasible to simulate due to the time required to simulate the TDDS measurements. Having a large 
number of CRPs also gives a good opportunity to test the proposed PUF’s resistance to modelling 
attacks as there would be a large amount of data available to use as training data for a machine 
learning-based attack.  
Another part of the proposed PUF principle that could be further explored is the possibility of using 
different challenge times for different devices within a single challenge to the PUF to further reduce 




any correlations between different response bits, making modelling attacks even more difficult. 
Another possibility is to use multiple challenge times for response bits in a single CRP, this would allow 
for longer authentication keys for a given number of response bits. Having longer keys could 
potentially increase the security of a PUF with a fixed number of response bits. However, this could 
introduce some correlations between bits within the response that would make predicting them 
easier so further analysis needs to be done.   
Finally, it could be worth investigating the possibility of using the stored probability models in a public 
key-based system. In this system the probability models publicly available and the scheme would 
follow a similar authentication protocol as the one proposed by Rührmair et al.[92]. In this proposed 
system the CRPs are made available through the use of a public model of the PUF and then the PUF 
model itself can be authenticated if it can respond to a challenge faster than anyone could simulate 
the result using the public model. This solution solves a key problem for PUFs, which is the ability to 
easily distribute the CRPs to authenticating parties. The main issue that currently stops our PUF using 
a similar scheme is the slow speed of the TDDS measurements so it is unlikely that the real PUF module 
could generate the correct response more quickly than someone else with the probability model. To 
solve this our probability model-based approach could be used but with a different entropy source 
that is capable of creating responses at a significantly faster rate. A PUF utilising all of these concepts 
together would have a good chance of making a design that could solve the major challenges that are 
currently stopping PUFs from becoming a mainstream security primitive.  
  - Other Possible Security Primitives for Low Power IoT Applications   
In this section we discuss a security primitive that could be developed using a combination of two 
designs which have been discussed in this project but did not have time to fully explore. This third 
possible design is a combined PUF and TRNG that both utilise the same entropy source. The concept 




of a combined entropy source was first proposed by Satpathy et al. [36], where they combined a 
TRNG and a Chip-ID, which is a basically a PUF with only a single CRP. This circuit has a lot of 
potential as there is often a requirement for a TRNG to be present as well as a PUF to secure a 
system and implementing them separately is much less efficient. By creating a unified entropy 
source for both significant area, power, and cost saving are possible, all of which are major 
considerations for IoT devices.  
The entropy source for this new combined TRNG and PUF is again single MOSFETs with RTN defects 
present. The entropy is harvested from these devices using the same TDDS measurement as used in 
the PUF part of this project. The output current from each TDDS measurement is sent to an edge-to- 
pulse unit following the same design as the one used in the TRNG proof of concept circuit from 
section 4.4.2 and the PUF proof of concept circuit shown in section 5.2.2. It is these pulses that are 
used differently to create TRNG and PUF operation simultaneously. For the TRNG operation, the 
pulses are simply used to sample a clock signal, as the pulses in section 4.4.2 are used. This process 
will create a random bitstream where the timing of each bit is determined by the de-trapping times 
of the traps measured in the TDDS measurement. By using the timing of all of the de-trapping events 
across multiple entropy sources in parallel, there is potential to have a very high random number 
throughput while the TDDS measurements are being performed.  
For the PUF section of the circuit, the pulses are sent to counters that count how many pulses have 
occurred within a certain timeframe. The counted pulses are the used following the same 
probability-based principle as used in section 5.2 of this work. Figure 108 shows a block diagram of 
this concept.     





Figure 108, Block diagram of proposes combined TRNG and PUF unit. 
In this concept both units can operate by themselves if only one system is required at the time or both 
can be operated simultaneously so that the TRNG can generate a random bitstream which can be use 
with an encryption protocol to secure the PUF communication following the idea as proposed by 
Satpathy et al. [36]. 
This concept was not explored any further in this project, so how much this approach could improve 
design efficiency and/or security has not been quantified. However, this proposal does show that 
there is a clear next step for future work following on from this work and there is a lot of further 
potential in each of the proposed concepts.
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